“ ‘Just as a defendant may affirmatively waive constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to the privilege against self-incrimination, and to counsel as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement, so also may a defendant waive the right to appeal as part of the agreement.’ [Citation.] As the Court of Appeal noted in People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445]: ‘The right to appeal a criminal conviction has no roots in the United States or California Constitutions and is a statutory right only. [Citations.] If a defendant may waive important constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it follows a fortiori that a defendant may expressly waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a plea agreement....’ ” (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 289, citing People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.) “[T]herefore, an express waiver of the right of appeal made pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement is valid provided defendant’s waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” (People v. Vargas, supra, at p. 1659; see also People v. Charles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 558–559.) II.
[Citation.] As the Court of Appeal noted in Peoplev.Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445]: ‘The right to appeal a criminal conviction has no roots in the United States or California Constitutions and is a statutory right only. [Citations.] If a defendant may waive important constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it follows a fortiori that a defendant may expressly waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a plea agreement....’ ” (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 289, citing People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.) “[T]herefore, an express waiver of the right of appeal made pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement is valid provided defendant’s waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” (People v. Vargas, supra, at p. 1659; see also People v. Charles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 558–559.) II.
[Citation.] As the Court of Appeal noted in People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 445... ‘If a defendant may waive important constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it follows a fortiori that a defendant may expressly waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a plea agreement ....’ " ( People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 289, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 750, citing People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ( Panizzon ).) Similarly, "[b]oth our state Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that plea bargaining is based upon ‘reciprocal benefits’ or ‘mutuality of advantage’ between the prosecution and the defendant.
No other issues are cognizable on appeal in light of appellant's waiver. (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 289.) DISPOSITION
Whether a no contest plea was voluntarily and intelligently made is subject to de novo review on appeal. (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 289; People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360-361 (Mosby)[reviewing an admission that a defendant suffered a prior felony conviction]; U. S. v. Kaczynski (9th Cir. 2001) 239 F.3d 1108, 1114 (Kaczynski).)However, the trial court's factual findings must prevail if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254 [reviewing the denial of a motion to withdraw plea on the grounds that the plea was not voluntary due to intoxication; the trial court's observation of the defendant supported its conclusion that he was not intoxicated]; Kaczynski, supra, 239 F.3d at p. 1114 [factual findings reviewed for clear error].)
Defendant has waived his right to appeal and the proper course is to dismiss his appeal. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80, 84; People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 292; People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 124.) There is no merit to defendant's contention that his waiver of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
The Attorney General argues defendant, with the agreement of her attorney Richard Hutton, waived the right to appeal her sentence. We agree with the Attorney General the appeal must be dismissed as defendant waived the right to appeal her sentence. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80, 84; People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 292; People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 124.) There is no merit to defendant’s argument the scope of her waiver did not extend to sentencing issues.
We need not address the issue of whether defendant is estopped to challenge his sentence because of his waiver of his right to appeal. (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 292; see People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 124.) C. Enhancement
This is a horrific case—any error was harmless. We need not address the issues of whether: defendant is estopped to challenge his sentence because of his waiver of his right to appeal (People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 292; see People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 124); defendant was eligible for upper term sentencing because his nolo contendere pleas admitted multiple victims were involved even though the trial court did not rely on that factor in selecting the upper term (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303-304; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813, 817); and he consented to upper term sentencing because he agreed he would be subject to a sentence that could be anywhere up to the statutory maximum by the trial court. (United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 276-277; Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 310.)
(People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.) A defendant also may waive his or her right to appeal a conviction as part of a plea bargain, even if the conviction is from another case. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80; People v. Aparicio (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 286, 292; see People v. Chatmon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 771, 772.) If a defendant may waive important constitutional rights as part of a plea bargain, it follows that a defendant may waive the right to bring a civil lawsuit.