Opinion
February 1, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heller, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court's denial of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress certain statements was proper. There is no indication in the record that the police made any remark or engaged in any conduct which was reasonably likely to elicit a response from the defendant (see, People v Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, cert denied 472 U.S. 1007). Instead, the defendant's custodial statements were unprovoked and spontaneous. Thus, their admission into evidence at trial was proper (see, People v Padilla, 123 A.D.2d 364, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 715).
Notwithstanding the denial of that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress, the defendant was entitled to attempt to show at trial that his inculpatory statements should be disregarded by the jury as involuntarily made (see, CPL 710.70; Crane v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683; People v Graham, 55 N.Y.2d 144; People v Casiano, 123 A.D.2d 712, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 744). Therefore, we find that the trial court improperly restricted the defendant's cross-examination of the arresting officer concerning the circumstances under which the defendant's admissions were made. However, reversal is not warranted since the facts relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant's statements were established upon direct examination and were fully explored during the defendant's summation. Moreover, the court properly charged the jury on the issue of voluntariness and its marshaling of the evidence adduced by each party on that issue was accurate. Consequently we find that the error in restricting cross-examination with respect to the voluntariness of the statement was harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230; People v Casiano, supra). Thompson, J.P., Rubin, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.