Opinion
4117-2008.
Decided September 7, 2011.
Eric T. Scneidermann, Attorney General by Julia H. Lee, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, New York, New York, For Petitioners Commissioner of the Office of Mental Hygiene and Peggi Healy, Executive Director, Mid-Hudson ForensicPsychiatric Center.
Naomi Weinstein, Esq., Michael Genkin, Esq., Mental Hygiene Legal Services Bronx, New York, For Defendant.
Pursuant to CPL § 730.50, Petitioner Peggi Healy (hereinafter, "Movant") as Executive Director of the Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center (hereafter Mid-Hudson) moves for an Order of Retention, authorizing continued secured custody of Defendant for a period of one year from the expiration date of the previous commitment order. Dr. Healy is joined in this application by the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health.
In response to Movant's application, Defendant invoked the provisions of CPL § 730.50(2) and demanded a hearing to determine whether he possesses capacity to stand trial, that is, a functional understanding of the charges against him and the ability to assist in his own defense (see generally, Matter of Thomas C., 196 AD2d 393 [2nd Dept. 1994]). Defendant, in the alternative, prays for the Court to transfer him to a non-secure facility under the Commissioner of Mental Health's jurisdiction. A hearing was held on July 15, 2011.
For a historical analysis of the evolution of New York's common law and statutory treatment of mentally ill criminal defendant, see People v. Valentino, 78 Misc 2d 678 (County Ct. Nassau1974). See also, Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L Rev 454 (1967); Cooper, Fitness to Proceed: A Brief Look at Some Aspects of the Medico-Legal Problem Under the New York Criminal Procedure Law, 52 Neb L Rev 44 (1972).
Background
On November 6, 2008, the Bronx County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for Assault in the second and third degree (see, Penal § 120.00[1] and Penal § 120.05[1]) for causing serious physical injury to one Daniel Pharr. No trial has taken place following the issuance of orders of commitment on November 10, 2008 (Byrne, J.) and May 5, 2010 (Marvin, J.). The orders were issued on consent of all parties. Defendant is presently confined at Mid-Hudson where Dr. Healy is Executive Director.
Defendant has a long history of psychiatric hospitalization, beginning at age 13, and including hospitalization at North Central Bronx Hospital, Jacobi, St Vincent's, Columbia Presbyterian, Bronx Lebanon, Lincoln, and Bellevue Hospital Psychiatric Prison Ward. He had two prior admissions to Mid-Hudson.
Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center
To properly evaluate Movant's request, the Court first examines the nature of Defendant's present confinement. Mid-Hudson is a hospital under the State Office of Mental Health. It offers a range of programs and services for the treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill in a secure setting, programs and services designated for patients who need closer supervision than can be given at mainline hospitals, and whose behavior raises the likelihood of causing harm to others and/or themselves. These patients cannot be given care and treatment at other hospitals since, for the protection of other patients and staff, they must be kept in closed wards and sometimes in seclusion. Mid-Hudson, with specially trained staff and perimeter security, allows these patients the possibility of rehabilitation therapies, which because of their need for close supervision would not be available for them at other hospitals (see, 14 NYCRR § 57.1) (see generally, Woe v. Cuomo, 638 F. Supp. 1506 [ED NY 1986]).
In their professional opinion, the hospital staff wants Defendant to remain at Mid-Hudson to continue to receive treatment. In support of that position, Movant points to (1) the testimony of Dr. Angela Leach, Defendant's treating physician; (2) Defendant's testimony; and (3) the medical report attached to the application. Movant maintains that when this evidence is viewed together it reveals that Defendant suffers from a severe mental illness: schizoaffective disorder. It causes him delusional grandiosity, exaggerated mood behavior and violent aggression, affecting his ability to withstand the pressure of a trial (entire Tr.).
Defendant's Relief
As the Court understands, Defendant seeks release from hospital confinement to the extent that he be permitted to stand trial for the pending criminal matter, or, alternatively, to be moved to a less secure facility. Defendant says the fact that he suffers from mental illness does not mean he lacks the ability to understand the charges leveled and/or to defend himself against them. In this regard, Defendant's counsel argues Defendant understands the various courtroom roles and based upon that understanding he is sufficiently capacitated to proceed.
Legal Discussion
The primary issue presented is whether or not Defendant is fit to proceed to trial and able to assist in his own defense. Pursuant to CPL § 730.10(1), an "incapacitated person," as applicable here, is a defendant who because of mental disease lacks capacity to understand the proceeding against him and cannot assist in his own defense (see generally, People v. Valentino, 78 Misc 2d 678 [Sup Ct. Special Term Nassau 1974]). The touchstone of a competency proceeding is not absence of mental illness, but the ability to comprehend and meaningfully participate in trial process while it is occurring (see generally, People v. Swallow, 60 Misc 2d 171 [Sup Ct. Richmond 1969]).
CPL § 730.50(2) provides that where, at the conclusion of a hearing, a court is satisfied that a defendant is no longer an incapacitated person, the criminal action against him must proceed. On the other hand, if a court finds that a defendant continues to be an incapacitated person, the court must adjudicate him as such and must issue an order of retention which authorizes continued custody by the Commissioner of Mental Health for a period not to exceed one year (see generally, People v. Christopher, 65 NY2d 417).
To determine competence, the relevant test is whether a defendant, as a result of mental disease, lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense (see, People v. Mendez , 1 NY3d 15 ) (see, CPL § 730.10[1]). In order to satisfy due process, the evidence must show that a defendant possesses sufficient rationality to allow meaningful consultation with his lawyer while enjoying a degree of understanding of the overall proceedings (see, Dusky v. United States, 362 US 402 [1960]). Pursuant to case law, a court is directed to weigh certain factors in determining a defendant's competence to stand trial. These include: (1) Is the defendant oriented as to time and place? (2) Can the defendant perceive, recall, and relate? (3) Does the defendant have at least a rudimentary understanding of the process of trial and the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense attorney? (4) Can a defendant, if he wishes, establish a working relationship with his attorney? (5) Does a defendant possess sufficient intelligence and judgment to listen to the advice of counsel and, based on that advice, appreciate (without necessarily choosing to adopt it) that one course of conduct may be more beneficial to him than another?(6) Is a defendant's mental state sufficiently stable to enable him to withstand the stress of trial without suffering a serious, prolonged or permanent breakdown? (see generally, People v. Picozzi, 106 AD2d 413 [2nd Dept. 1984]; People v. Valentino, 78 Misc 2d 678 [County Ct. Nassau 1974]).
Weighing the above, the Court finds Defendant here lacks ability to cooperate with his defense attorney and lacks a comprehension of the proceeding against him. This is most obvious from Dr. Leach's testimony and from the Report in Support of the Application for Order of Retention submitted by Mid-Hudson's professional staff.
Dr. Leach diagnosed Defendant's condition as "schizoaffecive disorder" (Tr. p. 7). She testified with medical certainty that because of this condition Defendant is unable to assist in his own defense. She describes Defendant's condition as characterized by "thought disorder, poor executive functioning, and inter personal violence" (Tr. p. 9). She finds that Defendant's description of the roles of the court, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel, shows "mental confusion" (Tr. p. 35). Clearly, the existence of a serious mental illness hinders Defendant's competency to stand trial as is shown by Defendant's delusional testimony during the hearing in which, among other things, he claims to be "Emmanuel, the son of Christ" (Tr. p. 34), and claims he has seen UFOs, demons, and spirits (Tr. p. 36).
See generally, Matter of Harvey S. , 38 AD3d 908 (2nd Dept. 2007). See also generally, Matter of Dominique Larissa Blue M. v. Yasmin M., 84 AD3d 962 (2nd Dept. 2011).
During his hospitalization, Dr. Leach found Defendant showed a lack of understanding of the charges against him, often denying the existence of the charges (Tr. pp. 21-22). He also demonstrated a low frustration tolerance level that was manifested by violent episodes against fellow patients as recently as the July 4 weekend (Tr. p. 24) and incidents involving contraband and garbage scavenging (Tr. p. 29). As a result, Dr. Leach concluded that Defendant cannot deal with stress (Tr. p. 24).
The Court finds it significant that during Dr. Leach's testimony Defendant stood up and protested loudly. Dr, Leach opined that this outburst was indicative of Defendant's illness (Tr. p 25).
Medical Report
The opinion of Mid-Hudson's professional staff is set forth in the report submitted with the retention order application. The hospital's professional staff found that Defendant "lacks sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "lacks a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him." The report finds that the sympthoms that most adversely affect Defendant's competence-related abilities are: (1) persistent thought disorder; (2) mood liability, and (3) paranoia.
Further, the report finds that Defendant exhibited only mild improvement in his condition over the course of treatment since the issuance of the original order(s) of commitment. This despite receiving various therapies. It also finds that Defendant suffers a sever impairment of ability to establish a working relationship with an attorney, suffers a severe impairment of ability to listen in order to evaluate counsel's advice, and a severe impairment of ability to withstand the stress of trial. In summary, the medical staff concludes that Defendant's delusional thinking interferes with his cooperating with his attorney and there is a danger of the possibility of assaultive behavior in the courtroom.
Defendant offered no contradictory medical evidence at the hearing. Instead, counsel relied upon cross examination of Dr. Leach (Tr. pp. 26 to 31) and Defendant's testimony. Weighing said testimony as well as the medical report submitted by Mid-Hudson, and taking into account that Defendant offered no expertise — not to speak to the significance of his demeanor in the courtroom — the Court feels compelled to grant Movant's application for an Order of Retention pursuant to CPL 730.50.
Transfer as Alternative
If denied permission to proceed to trial, Defendant alternatively seeks transfer to a less restrictive environment (see generally, Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 [ED La. 1976]). This branch of Defendant's motion is also denied (see generally, People v. Bisnett, 144 AD2d 567 [2nd Dept. 1988]).
The only application before this Court is Mid Hudson's request that Defendant remain at the facility. A CPL Article 730 hearing is a determination of whether or not a defendant has the capacity to stand trial, that is, a functional understanding of the charges against him and the ability to assist in his own defense. Thus, the only relief to this type of hearing is a granting of Mid-Hudson's application for continued retention or a denial of the retention application because a defendant is found fit to stand trial, whereupon the underlying criminal case would continue.
Although Defendant has asked that, in the alternative, he be transferred to a less secure faculty, this type of relief cannot be given in a CPL 730 hearing. Our Legislature does not empower a court under this article to transfer a defendant to a less secure facility as an alternative. As instructed by the Appellate Division, the proper way to challenge an Office of Mental Health determination concerning transfer of a patient where a secure facility is involved is an Article 78 proceeding (see generally, Consilvio v. Michael B., 307 AD2d 852 [1st Dept. 2003][Mental Hygiene Law proceeding involving involuntary psychiatric patient]). Therefore, upon this record, the Court is not empowered under CPL § 730.50 to direct that a patient be transferred from a secure to a nonsecure psychiatric facility.
The First Department directs that even in a non-criminal setting "[n]othing in article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law authorizes a court presiding over a retention proceeding to engage de novo review of an administrative determination to continue the patient at a secure facility. . . ." (see, Consiglio v. Michael B., supra.)
(but see generally, 14 NYCRR § 57.6). The Court will not conduct a de novo review here. In this regard, it finds significant Defendant's failure to respond to Petitioners' reliance upon Consiglio v. Michael B., when given leave to so comment.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, it is
The Court read the following papers in deciding this matter: (1) Movant's Application for Order of Retention; (2) Report in Support of Application for Order of Retention; (3) Notice to Defendant of Application for Order of Retention; (4) Defendant's Request for a Court Hearing; (5) Order to Produce; (6)Transcript of July 15, 2011 hearing; (7) Indictment; and (8) correspondence concerning alternative relief.
ORDERED that Movant's application for an order authorizing the continued custody of Defendant is GRANTED; and it is
ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's cross application for an order granting Defendant the right to proceed to trial is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's cross application for an order granting Defendant a transfer to less secure facility is DENIED.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
SETTLE ORDER.