Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA308786, Ruffo Espinoza, Judge.
Kenneth J. Hutz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Following his conviction by jury of possessing heroin for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), defendant Ocdulio Quintero Anguiano admitted that he had been convicted of first degree residential burglary within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law and had served four prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b) through (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) through (d), 667.5, subd. (b).) He appeals, contending his admission that he had been convicted of first degree residential burglary must be aside because the trial court failed to inquire into the factual basis of his admission, as required by section 1192.5. We conclude that the requirements of section 1192.5 do not apply to defendant’s admission, and affirm the judgment.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
As defendant’s appeal attacks his admission of a prior conviction, we do not set forth the facts underlying his prosecution pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11351. On December 12, 2006, while the jury was deliberating on the drug charge, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant waived his right to a court trial on the priors and admitted the allegations.
With regard to the burglary prior at issue, the court informed defendant that “it is also alleged that you were convicted of a first degree residential burglary, violation of Penal Code section 459 on August 29, 1989, in the Los Angeles Superior Court.” After the prosecutor reminded the court that the date of conviction was August 28, 1989, it noted the correct date, and told defendant, “The allegation is that was case A937640. If you admit this allegation is true, then you would be admitting to the conviction of the strike, which would have the effect of doubling any sentencing that you would otherwise receive under this Three Strikes Law.” The court asked defendant if he understood the “important significance of what [he was] admitting,” and defendant answered that he did. The court asked, “do you admit that you were previously convicted of first degree residential burglary on or about August 28, 1989,” and defendant answered, “Yes.” After defendant admitted that he had served four prior prison terms and his counsel joined in the waivers and stipulated to a factual basis for the admission, the court asked, “Do you also admit that you were the one that committed these crimes?” and defendant replied, “Yes.”
The court proceeded to sentence defendant. It imposed a sentence of 11 years in prison, consisting of the high term of four years for the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, and three years for the prison priors pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). This appeal followed.
On April 20, 2007, while this appeal was pending, the court recalled defendant’s sentence. It imposed a nine-year sentence, consisting of the midterm sentence of three years for the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, and three years for the prison priors.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that the trial court had a duty under section 1192.5 to inquire into the factual basis of his admission. He relies principally on the Supreme Court decision in People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432 (Holmes) and an appellate court decision in People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329 (Willard). The Attorney General argues that section 1192.5 applies only to conditional pleas, and its requirements are inapplicable in this case because defendant was convicted by a jury and admitted the prior convictions without relying on a promise from the court. We agree.
“The language of section 1192.5, read as a whole, unambiguously refers to conditional pleas.” (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1181 (Hoffard).) In particular, section 1192.5’s requirement that the trial court “satisfy itself . . . that there is a factual basis for the plea” applies only when there is a negotiated plea. (Ibid.) In Hoffard, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of committing a lewd act with a child under the age of 14 and admitted an allegation that he committed an act of substantial sexual conduct while occupying a position of special trust, making him presumptively ineligible for probation. He appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the factual basis of his admission. The Hoffard court concluded: “Under the circumstances of this case—a plea unconditioned upon receipt of a particular sentence or other exercise of the court’s powers—the trial court had no duty to conduct such an inquiry.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1243-1244, where it rejected the appellant’s argument that inquiry into the factual basis of an unconditional plea and admission was required in all capital cases.
In his reply brief, defendant retreats from his claim that the trial court had a duty to inquire pursuant to section 1192.5, arguing “it is not entirely important whether [the court’s duty] be deemed rooted in the language of section 1192.5, or section 1044 [judge’s duty to control trial proceedings], or a court’s fundamental duty to ensure fair criminal proceedings.” Citing language from Hoffard, he suggests an inquiry is necessary where it “may further important interests, even where such an inquiry is not required by section 1192.5.” (Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) However, defendant does not allege any other defect in his admission, such as a lack of voluntariness or an unintelligent waiver of rights. He is disputing the accuracy of his admission, that is, that he committed a prior residential burglary. Thus, his claim is governed by section 1192.5, whose purpose is to ensure “‘that the defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one to which he is willing to plead.’ [Citation.]” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50.)
Neither Holmes nor Willard assist defendant, as in each case the accused entered a conditional plea, clearly bringing the plea within the ambit of section 1192.5. (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 437 [pled guilty to violating sections 220 and 243.4 in exchange for a promised two-year prison sentence]; Willard, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [pled no contest to violating section 288, subdivision (a) in exchange for an eight-year prison sentence].)
We conclude that because defendant’s admission was not taken as part of a negotiated plea, the trial court had no duty to inquire into its factual basis.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., WILLHITE, J.