Opinion
F070340
03-16-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FEDERICO SANCHEZ ANGUIANO, Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Charity S. Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. BF146998A)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth C. Twisselman II, Judge. Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Charity S. Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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While fleeing from a police officer, appellant, Federico Sanchez Anguiano, drove 85 miles per hour on city streets at night with the lights off, wove in and out of traffic, and crashed his vehicle into a parked flatbed trailer. The impact killed appellant's girlfriend. At the time of the crash, appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
On appeal, appellant challenges his conviction for second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) According to appellant, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted with implied malice.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Implied malice requires a finding that the defendant was subjectively aware that his conduct was dangerous to human life. Appellant argues the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that driving under the influence of methamphetamine was dangerous to human life and thus this subjective component of implied malice was not satisfied. Appellant further contends the evidence regarding the effects of methamphetamine intoxication was insufficient to establish that his use of methamphetamine was objectively dangerous to human life.
Contrary to appellant's position, sufficient evidence supports his conviction. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Late at night, appellant was driving a Chevrolet Blazer through Bakersfield with his girlfriend, Guillermina Puentes, in the front passenger seat. A deputy sheriff in a patrol car noticed that the Blazer's license plate lamp was out. The deputy turned on his flashing lights and appellant pulled into a gas station and stopped.
The deputy exited his vehicle and approached the Blazer on foot. However, after appellant looked back at the deputy, appellant sped out of the gas station and fled down the street. The deputy got back in his vehicle and chased after the Blazer.
Appellant turned off his lights and drove in excess of 85 miles per hour on a city street that has a 35-mile-per-hour speed limit. Appellant wove in and out of traffic to get around other cars and, at one point, ran a red light. Some of the cars appellant swerved around had to brake to give appellant room. Still driving in excess of 85 miles per hour, but with his lights turned back on, appellant tried to pass a car in the right lane by veering to the right and crashed into a parked flatbed trailer. The Blazer spun around and broke apart, ejecting Puentes. Puentes died at the scene. Appellant was still in the driver's seat, unconscious.
An ambulance transported appellant to a hospital. A sample of appellant's blood revealed a high concentration of methamphetamine.
Appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant admitted that on the evening of the crash, he and Puentes smoked a lot of methamphetamine, $50 or $60 worth. Afterwards, they drove around in the Blazer to look for one of appellant's friends so they could buy more methamphetamine. Appellant testified he was driving within the lines and following the speed limit and did not feel impaired in any way. Appellant stated that, after he pulled over for the deputy sheriff, Puentes told him that her presence in the car violated a restraining order. Thus, appellant drove away from the traffic stop and turned off the Blazer's lights. Appellant blamed the crash on Puentes grabbing the steering wheel and veering the Blazer to the right.
Appellant's prior convictions include one for driving under the influence in 2008. Appellant admitted that, based on this conviction and a form he signed, he knew that he could face a murder charge if he drove while impaired and someone died. At that time, someone told appellant that driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol or both was dangerous to human life. Appellant stated he knew that he should not drive after taking methamphetamine but did it anyway.
A jury convicted appellant of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 191.5, subd. (a)), and causing death or serious bodily injury by fleeting from a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.3).
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the second degree murder conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish the requisite implied malice. 1. Standard of review.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) "Although a jury must acquit if it finds the evidence susceptible of a reasonable interpretation favoring innocence, it is the jury rather than the reviewing court that weighs the evidence, resolves conflicting inferences and determines whether the People have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 128.) Thus, reversal based on insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears "'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].'" (People v. Bolin, supra, at p. 331.) 2. Substantial evidence supports the implied malice murder conviction.
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought." (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. Malice is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." (§ 188.)
The term an "abandoned and malignant heart" is far from clear and could be misleading. Accordingly, over time, courts have translated this concept into a tangible standard a jury can apply. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151-152.)
To imply malice, the killing must be proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who acted with conscious disregard of the danger. (People v. Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 156; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300.) Thus, implied malice has a subjective component. In addition to the act having been one that a reasonable person would have been aware was dangerous to human life, the defendant must have been subjectively aware of the risk to human life. (People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) A person who acts with conscious disregard for life knows that his or her conduct is dangerous to others, but does not care if someone is hurt or killed. (People v. Johnigan (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1092.)
A traffic fatality caused by a grossly intoxicated motorist may support a conviction for second degree murder. (People v. Johnigan, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.) One who willfully becomes intoxicated knowing that he or she thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. (People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300-301.)
Further, driving in a manner reckless enough to demonstrate a wanton disregard of the near certainty that someone will be killed can support a second degree murder conviction. (People v. Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) In People v. Moore, the defendant was not intoxicated. Nevertheless, the court found sufficient evidence to support the second degree murder conviction where Moore "drove 70 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone, crossed into the opposing traffic lane, caused oncoming drivers to avoid him, ran a red light and struck a car in the intersection without even attempting to apply his brakes." (Ibid.) The court noted that all of the circumstances determine the question of implied malice. (Id. at p. 942.)
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew driving under the influence of methamphetamine was dangerous to human life and thus did not prove that he acted with conscious disregard of the danger. However, appellant testified that he smoked "a lot" of methamphetamine before getting in the car that night and knew he should not drive after taking methamphetamine but did it anyway. In fact, the drug level in his blood was 10 times higher than a therapeutic dose. Further, in connection with a previous conviction for driving under the influence, appellant was advised that he could be charged with murder if he drove again while intoxicated by drugs or alcohol. This demonstrates that appellant was subjectively aware that his conduct was dangerous to human life.
Moreover, appellant's extremely reckless driving alone supports finding he was subjectively aware that his conduct was dangerous to human life. While trying to outrun a deputy sheriff, appellant drove 85 miles per hour at night on a city street, which was 50 miles per hour over the speed limit, with his lights out, despite there being traffic in both lanes. Appellant wove in and out of traffic and ran a red light before he swerved around a car in the right lane and crashed into a parked flatbed trailer. As noted by the court in People v. Moore, supra, when a person acts with such a wanton disregard of the near certainty that someone will be killed, how could he not be subjectively aware of the risk. (187 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
In sum, appellant's outrageous driving plus appellant's admissions that he knew he should not drive under the influence of methamphetamine and that driving while intoxicated by drugs could lead to a murder charge, provide sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that appellant was subjectively aware that his conduct was dangerous to human life.
Appellant further asserts the evidence is insufficient to show that his driving while under the influence of methamphetamine, as opposed to other intoxicants, was actually dangerous to human life. According to appellant, the expert testimony was too generic. Appellant further points out that, before the deputy sheriff stopped him, he was able to drive normally and lawfully.
The medical expert, Dr. Rick McPheeters, and the criminalist, Ada Rodriguez, testified that methamphetamine intoxication causes a rapid heartbeat, an inability to stay still, paranoia, an inability to concentrate, and an inaccurate perception of time. Both experts opined that methamphetamine impairs the ability to make good decisions and leads to risky behavior. Thus, the experts concluded that driving after ingesting methamphetamine is dangerous. Moreover, appellant's extremely reckless driving in itself is conduct that is dangerous to human life.
The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. That is the province of the jury. (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 128.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the record supports finding both that a reasonable person would have found appellant's acts dangerous to human life and that appellant was subjectively aware of the risk his conduct posed. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to uphold appellant's second degree murder conviction. 3. The abstracts of judgment must be modified to reflect the imposed sentences.
The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life on the second degree murder conviction, enhanced by three years for the three prior prison term allegations. The trial court further sentenced appellant to two determinate terms, one for eight months and one for four years, enhanced by three years. Thus, the pronounced sentence totaled 15 years to life, plus 10 years eight months.
Both an indeterminate abstract of judgment and a determinate abstract of judgment were prepared. The indeterminate abstract of judgment correctly reflects the 15 years to life sentence plus the three-year enhancement. However, the abstract needs to also indicate there is an "Additional determinate term."
The determinate abstract of judgment does not correctly reflect the sentence imposed. It states the "TOTAL TIME ON ATTACHED PAGES" is 18 years. However, that section is referring to additional determinate time only. Thus, rather than 18 years, the total determinate time on attached pages should be three years. It must also be marked to indicate there is an "Additional indeterminate term." Finally, the determinate abstract of judgment states the total time is 25 years, eight months. The total imposed determinate sentence is 10 years, eight months, not 25 years eight months. Thus, the determinate abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
DISPOSITION
This matter is remanded to the trial court to correct the abstracts of judgment as follows:
1. The indeterminate abstract of judgment must indicate in item 7 that there is an "Additional determinate term."
2. The determinate abstract of judgment must indicate in item 7 that there is an "Additional indeterminate term." It must further show in item 6 that the "TOTAL TIME ON ATTACHED PAGES" is 3 years 0 months. It must also show in item 8 that the "TOTAL TIME" is 10 years 8 months.
The trial court shall then forward the amended abstracts of judgment to the appropriate authorities. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/_________
LEVY, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, J. /s/_________
MEEHAN, J.