Opinion
B227779
09-28-2011
In re ANGEL S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGEL S., Defendant and Appellant.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and David C. Cook, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YJ 34258)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie Davis, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and David C. Cook, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Angel S. appeals from the juvenile court's sustaining of a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602) finding he was in possession of burglary tools in violation of Penal Code section 466. Appellant contends (1) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his backpack, and (2) there is insufficient evidence he possessed the tools with the intent to commit a burglary. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 11, 2010, at approximately 10:05 p.m., Officer Irmina Dumaplin of the Los Angeles Police Department and her partner observed appellant from their patrol car walking on the sidewalk in the area of 22nd Street and Gaffey Street in the City of San Pedro. It was a cold, rainy night and few people were out and about. Officer Dumaplin and her partner were in the area because a number of car burglaries had recently occurred within a half mile radius of the location. Appellant drew their attention because of his youthful dress and appearance, the time of night, and the fact that few pedestrians were outside in the inclement weather. The officers pulled up beside appellant and asked his age. When appellant replied he was 17 years old, they detained him for a possible violation of a curfew law prohibiting a minor from being out in public unsupervised after 10:00 p.m.
Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.03(a) provides that no minor under 18 years old may be out in public after 10:00 p.m. without supervision.
The officers asked appellant where he lived. Appellant replied that he lived "up the street," but he could not provide a numerical address although he claimed to have lived there for two years. He was then arrested for a curfew violation.
Incident to the arrest, Officer Dumaplin and her partner searched appellant and his backpack. The officers discovered a screwdriver, pliers, a metal file and ball bearings in the backpack. Officer Dumaplin was a 15-year veteran of the police department, and she had worked in the harbor area for about 12 years. The officer knew from her experience that such tools were commonly used to break into a car: a screwdriver as a pry tool, pliers to cut wires in taking stereo systems out of cars, metal ball bearings to shatter car windows and a metal file also as a pry tool. In addition to the tools, the officers discovered some jewelry in the backpack.
Appellant told Officer Dumaplin he needed the tools to fix his bicycle and the jewelry belonged to his uncle. When the officer asked appellant where his bicycle was, he said he left it at the house of a friend his age named Antonio. When the officers asked where Antonio lived, appellant directed the officers to a nearby residence. The officers knocked on the door of that residence and the residences on either side of it but were told nobody of that name lived there. One resident stated that an "Antonio" lived two houses down but he was 60 years old. Appellant was taken to the station where the officers tried to contact his uncle. Appellant could not provide the officers with the uncle's numerical address and the phone number he provided did not work.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 2010, the district attorney filed a section 602 petition, which sought to have appellant adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and alleged appellant was found in possession of burglar's tools. Appellant was arraigned and denied the allegations of the petition.
The matter was adjudicated before the juvenile court on September 14, 2010. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his backpack. After hearing testimony from Officer Dumaplin, the court denied appellant's motion. The court found the allegations of the petition to be true and sustained the petition, finding appellant a person subject to the court's jurisdiction. The offense was declared a misdemeanor and appellant was ordered detained in juvenile hall.
At a disposition hearing on September 23, 2010, the juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court, ordered custody to be taken from the parents, and ordered appellant to be in suitable placement with the maximum period of confinement to be three years four months. The court recommended that appellant be screened for placement that included a drug treatment component. This timely appeal followed.
The disposition hearing involved the instant petition and two other unrelated petitions filed under section 602.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Juvenile Court Properly Denied the Motion to Suppress Evidence
"The standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress is well settled. 'We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.'" (People v. Roberts (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1189; see also People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) This standard of review also applies to proceedings in the juvenile court. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction." (Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763.) Thus, it is settled Fourth Amendment doctrine that a police officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee's person and of the vicinity into which the arrestee might reach to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence. (People v. Ingham (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 326, 330-331 (Ingham).)In Ingham, the court indicated that an arrestee's purse located on the floor of the room in which she was arrested would have been properly subject to a warrantless search as a normal extension of her person and within the area of her immediate control, noting, "so long as the purse is in use by the arrestee at the time of her arrest, it does not need to be on her person at that moment to be subject to search." (Id. at p. 331.)
As the United States Supreme Court has further explained, "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and . . . in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235; see also In re Demetrius A. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1245, 1247-1248.) Whether the search is incident to an arrest or to temporary custody, the justification for the search is the same, i.e., the safety of the officers and other detainees. (Demetrius A., at p. 1248; In re Ian C. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 856, 860.)
In In re Humberto O. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 237, 241 (Humberto O.), the appellate court held that a search of a backpack a minor was wearing at the time of his arrest for truancy was proper as incident to the arrest. The court considered a search of a backpack is no different than a search of a woman's purse as a normal extension of the person subject to search as an item customarily carried by an arrested person and within the area of her immediate control. (Id. at p. 243.) Following Ingham and citing numerous federal and out-of-state authorities, the court observed that "[i]ncident to a lawful arrest, searches of backpacks and bags worn by arrestees at the time of arrest have been upheld in other jurisdictions." (Humberto O., at p. 243.)
Humberto O. held that a dagger found in the backpack of a minor arrested for truancy was improperly suppressed as being the fruit of an unlawful search. (Humberto O., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 244.) The court noted, "Here, the search did not exceed the permissible scope and did not involve a general criminal investigation. The search occurred contemporaneously with the . . . arrest right where defendant was stopped. The property searched was a backpack that defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest. Moreover, the exigent circumstances persisted even after defendant was handcuffed. The limited nature of [the truancy arrest] requires that the minor be transported to school, as the officers here planned to do. Thus, both before defendant was handcuffed, and afterwards when he was released to enter school, he would have had access to the backpack. The search of the backpack was permissible." (Id. at pp. 243-244.)
Similarly, in cases in which a minor was arrested or placed into temporary custody for curfew violations, the court held reasonable a subsequent full body search at the police station that uncovered methamphetamine (In re Charles C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420, 424-425) and a pat down search at a curfew center that turned up marijuana and cash (In re Ian C., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 860).
The juvenile court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from appellant's backpack at the time of his arrest.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's True Findings
"Our review of [a minor's] substantial evidence claim is governed by the same standard applicable to adult criminal cases. [Citation.] 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.]' [Citation.] '"[O]ur role on appeal is a limited one." [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.)
To sustain a conviction for possession of burglary tools in violation of Penal Code section 466, the prosecution must establish three elements: (1) possession by the defendant, (2) of tools within the purview of the statute, (3) with the intent to use the tools for the felonious purposes of breaking or entering. (People v. Southard (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084-1085.) Appellant asserts there is insufficient evidence of his intent to use the tools found in his backpack for the commission of burglary. We disagree.
A violation of Penal Code section 466 is complete when the tools are procured with a design to use them for purpose of a burglary. (People v. Southard, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) Only a general intent is sufficient, and the prosecution need not allege or prove intent to use the tools in a particular place, for a special purpose or in any definite manner. (Ibid.)Because intent is seldom susceptible of direct proof, it may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245.)
Here, contrary to appellant's argument, his possession of the burglar tools is evidence of his intent to use the tools for commission of a burglary. Appellant possessed a screwdriver, pliers, ball bearings and a metal file. Officer Dumaplin, a seasoned police officer who had worked in the harbor area for 12 years, opined that the tools were commonly used as burglary tools. She testified that a screwdriver is used as a pry tool, pliers are used to cut wires from a car stereo, ball bearings are used to shatter a car window, and a metal file can also be used as a pry tool.
Appellant's implausible explanation to the police regarding the tools also was relevant to his intent. (See People v. Southard, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090-1092 [flight from police and weakness of explanation regarding flight are relevant factors in determining the defendant's intent].) Although appellant did not flee from the officers, he gave a false explanation for possessing the tools to avoid apprehension. He told the officers he needed the tools to fix his bicycle, which was at the home of his friend Antonio, who he claimed was the same age as appellant. When the officers went to the residence to which appellant directed them, they found no one at the residence or in adjacent residences named Antonio and were told the only "Antonio" in the neighborhood was 60 years old.
The juvenile court could also take into consideration additional circumstances, including appellant's presence in the streets past curfew, in an area recently experiencing a rash of car burglaries, on an inclement night when few people were about, and appellant's attributing ownership of the jewelry in his possession to an uncle whose address he did not know and whose telephone number did not appear to be valid. Although such circumstances might very well have innocent implications, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer from the combination of these factors that appellant intended to use the tools for burglary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
FLIER, J. WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
RUBIN, J.