Opinion
2002-00313.
Decided February 23, 2004.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McKay, J.), rendered December 20, 2001, convicting him of rape in the first degree (two counts), sodomy in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), after a nonjury trial, and sentencing him to concurrent determinate terms of imprisonment of 15 years for each of the rape counts, 15 years for sodomy in the first degree, and two years for each of the sexual abuse counts, with an order of protection remaining in effect until December 20, 2021.
Laura R. Johnson, New York, N.Y. (Adrienne Hale of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Jeanette Lifschitz, and Beverly Kalman of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, SANDRA L. TOWNES and BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision in the order of protection which provided that it shall remain in effect until December 20, 2021, and substituting therefor a provision providing that the order of protection shall remain in effect until December 20, 2019; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the element of forcible compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Williams, 259 A.D.2d 509; People v. Maysonet, 178 A.D.2d 558). Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses ( see People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86). Any possibly improper motive of the complainant, and any inconsistencies in her testimony, merely raised issues of credibility for the trier of fact to determine ( see People v. Gantt, 294 A.D.2d 446; People v. Hayden, 221 A.D.2d 367). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
As the People correctly concede, the Supreme Court erred in setting the expiration date of the order of protection 20 years after the defendant's conviction. Since the maximum permissible duration of the order of protection was three years from the date of the expiration of the defendant's sentence ( see CPL 530.13) and he was sentenced to a determinate term of 15 years, the order of protection shall remain in effect entered December 20, 2019.
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.