People v. Andrews

10 Citing cases

  1. Mestas v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County

    22 Cal.App.3d 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)

    Petitioner attacked the impounding of the car on the grounds (1) that his arrest was illegal (see discussion in text below), and (2) that a car cannot be automatically impounded when its owner is arrested. (See People v. Nagel (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 492, 494-498, 95 Cal.Rptr. 129; People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cap.App.3d 428, 437, 85 Cal.Rptr. 908 (disapproved on inventory search issue in Mozzetti v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 699, 703 and 712, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84); and Virgil v. Superior Court (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 127, 131-133, 73 Cal.Rptr. 793. Cf. Martinez v. Superior Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 569, 574, 87 Cal.Rptr. 6 (disapproved on inventory search issue in Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra); and People v. Andrews, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at pp. 437-438, 85 Cal.Rptr. 908.

  2. People v. Green

    46 Cal.App.4th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 51 times
    Upholding inventory search of automobile properly impounded upon the defendant's arrest for driving without driver's license

    (2) "There is little doubt that law enforcement authorities under certain conditions have the right, and often the duty, to impound a motor vehicle." ( People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 428, 431 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 908].) An officer may exercise discretion in deciding when to impound an automobile "`so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. . . .' [Citation.]" ( People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 324 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 512].)

  3. People v. Padilla

    15 Cal.App.3d 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    Both cases are clearly distinguishable. As noted in People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 428, at pages 436-437 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 908]: "In Virgil, the evidence fell short of proof of any bona fide inventory; if one were taken, it was committed to memory for no record of it was made. And the court found no reason for the car's impoundment; Virgil had been arrested for a traffic offense and his passengers could probably have taken care of the automobile.

  4. Mozzetti v. Superior Court

    4 Cal.3d 699 (Cal. 1971)   Cited 167 times
    Holding police as involuntary bailees are not liable for ordinary negligence and have a duty to use only slight care in protecting the bailment

    Rather, the People rely on a series of cases in the Courts of Appeal purporting to validate inventory searches whenever the police are authorized to remove and store vehicles. ( Martinez v. Superior Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 569 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 6]; People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 428 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 908]; People v. Havenstein (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 710 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 528]; People v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 304, 309 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 766]; People v. Hunter (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 461, 464 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 750]; People v. Marchese (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 1007 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 525]; People v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 209]; Bramlette v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 799, 806 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 532]; People v. Sesser (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 297]; People v. Laursen (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 932, 941 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 71]; People v. Norris (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d Supp. 897 [68 Cal.Rptr. 582]; People v. Roth (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 430 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 49]; People v. Harris (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 455 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 849]; People v. Gil (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 189 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 88]; People v. Garcia (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 681 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 609]; People v. Odegard (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 427 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 515]; People v. Myles (1961) 189 Cal.App.

  5. People v. Zabala

    19 Cal.App.5th 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 27 times
    Vacating the section 11370.2, subdivision (c) enhancement on appeal following a plea

    The Lugo court held that searching behind a door panel was not " ‘standard police procedure,’ " nor did it serve the purpose of " ‘protecting the car and its contents' under any normal construction of those terms" as used in Opperman . ( Id . at pp. 636–637.)The reasoning in Best and Lugo was expressed in California nearly 50 years ago in People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 428, 85 Cal.Rptr. 908. Discussing the right of police to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded car, including the contents of the trunk, the Andrews court explained: "The inventory must be reasonably related to its purpose which is the protection of the car owner from loss, and the police or other custodian from liability or unjust claim. It extends to the open areas of the vehicles, including such areas under seats, and other places where property is ordinarily kept, e.g., glove compartments and trunks.

  6. State v. Phifer

    39 N.C. App. 278 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    While each case must stand on its own facts, a brief review of selected cases results in the conclusion that although the inventory "search" is a unique concept in law and cannot be "analyzed through the use of traditional constitutional tools", 48 Chicago — Kent Law Rev. 48, 52 (1971), certain principles emerge which should be devices for measuring the reasonableness of the procedure in a particular case. In People v. Andrews, 6 Cal.App.3d 428, 85 Cal.Rptr. 908 (1970), U.S. cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970), the Court held that where all the occupants of an automobile had been properly arrested, the police had the right to remove and impound the automobile and inventory its contents. Items discovered in the trunk during the inventory were held to be admissible in evidence in defendants' trial for burglary.

  7. People v. Shaw

    21 Cal.App.3d 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Shaw (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 710 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 724], the case cited by Mestas in the above quotation, the stated ground for the search was that the officer was conducting an inventory search of the vehicle.

    Even less rational would be the application of the suppression doctrine in the case at bench in which the police officers followed a procedure which a long line of California appellate court decisions had held to be not only a proper procedure but one which the officers' duties required them to pursue. As our former opinion in this case indicates, we relied upon People v. Andrews, 6 Cal.App.3d 428, [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 908], a case in which the Supreme Court denied a hearing as late as June 7, 1970, without a single vote for a hearing! This was only one of the 19 decisions of the Court of Appeal filed during the 14-year period between 1956 and 1970 which the Supreme Court disapproved in Mozzetti for the stated reason that said cases provided "no persuasive rationale to justify the practices which their holdings and dicta validate."

  8. People v. Robinson

    36 A.D.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)   Cited 20 times

    Of course, the existence or nonexistence of a police regulation cannot be used as a predicate for determining the issue of the reasonableness of an "inventory search" of a vehicle (cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, supra), but in deciding the question we should not reach out to stamp as unconstitutional a procedure which bears every indication of reasonableness. The "search" of a vehicle which has been lawfully impounded for the purpose of inventorying its contents is calculated to safeguard them for the benefit of their rightful owner as well as to protect the police against possible dishonest claims of misappropriation of the vehicle's contents; and there would seem to be no valid reason for extending the constitutional limitation against "unreasonable" searches to a fact pattern where the "search" is not made in defiance of constitutional standards to obtain incriminating evidence but rather in furtherance of a wholly reasonable and legitimate purpose ( People v. Andrews, 6 Cal.App.3d 428; Cooper v. California, supra; State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44; People v. Marchese, 275 Cal.App.2d 1007). The facts here support, if they do not compel, a finding that the "search" of the defendant's vehicle was made solely for the purpose of compiling an inventory of its contents and that it was not, nor was it intended to be, an exploratory search for evidence.

  9. People v. Zabala

    17 Cal.App.5th 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)   1 Legal Analyses

    (Id. at pp. 636-637.) (3) The reasoning in Best and Lugo was expressed in California nearly 50 years ago in People v. Andrews (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 428 . Discussing the right of police to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded car, including the contents of the trunk, the Andrews court explained: "The inventory must be reasonably related to its purpose which is the protection of the car owner from loss, and the police or other custodian from liability or unjust claim. It extends to the open areas of the vehicle, including such areas under seats, and other places where property is ordinarily kept, e.g., glove compartments and trunks.

  10. State v. Williams

    382 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 4 times

    The owner having no legitimate claim for protection of property so hidden, the police could have no legitimate interest in seeking it out.People v. Andrews, 6 Cal.App.3d 428, 85 Cal.Rptr. 908, 914 (1970) (emphasis added), quoted in 3 LaFave § 7.4(a), at 552–53.See also, e.g., United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 & n. 1 (8th Cir.1998) (after officer conducting inventory search noted that window did not lower properly, he shone flashlight into window slot of door, removed door panel, and discovered contraband; court held that removal of door panel was unjustified as part of inventory search, where “the door panel had no obvious damage”; “Best would not have a legitimate claim for protection of property hidden in the door panel and therefore Trooper Byrd did not have a legitimate interest in seeking such property.”).