Opinion
F050281
5-21-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TODD ANTHONY ANDRADE, Defendant and Appellant.
Patricia L. Watkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
THE COURT
Defendant Todd Anthony Andrade challenges the sentence imposed on him pursuant to a plea bargain. He contends the trial court was prohibited by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution from basing his sentence, in part, on a prior juvenile adjudication in which defendant had no right to a jury trial. Whatever merit this argument might have in the abstract (and we note it uniformly has been rejected by California appellate courts [see, e.g., People v. Palmer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 724, 731-734]), in the present case the argument is particularly meritless. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Defendant was charged with four felony counts and a misdemeanor. The complaint also alleged two strikes, one of which was a 1982 juvenile adjudication for felony assault. (See Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)(3); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)(14).) Defendant eventually pleaded no contest to one count of felony failure to appear (Pen. Code, § 1320.5) and admitted the two strike allegations, including the 1982 juvenile adjudication. The plea bargain contemplated defendant would be sentenced to a term of 25 years to life in prison under the three strikes law unless, at sentencing, the court granted defendants Romero motion to strike one or more of the prior strike allegations. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)
The court denied defendants Romero motion. It sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging his sentence.
Discussion
Defendant contends his sentence is unconstitutional because it is based, in part, on a juvenile proceeding in which he had no right to jury trial. He relies on the line of cases culminating in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. ___ . Cunningham, however, states: "As this Courts decisions instruct, the Federal Constitutions jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant." (Id. at p. ___ .)
In the present case, defendant admitted the enhancing factor. Under Cunningham, that is the end of the inquiry. It makes no difference whether the admitted factor is a high degree of "cruelty, viciousness, or callousness" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), subornation of perjury (id. at rule 4.421(a)(6)), or a prior, qualifying juvenile adjudication. In each case, defendants admission of the factor takes the place of a finding by a jury and permits use of the factor in sentencing.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in relying on defendants admitted prior juvenile adjudication.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. --------------- Notes: Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Hill, J.