In addition, this court had recently departed from the rule enunciated in Tamborski and has decided cases that attribute delay in processing discharge motions to defendants. See People v. Medina, 239 Ill. App.3d 871, 607 N.E.2d 619 (1993); People v. Colts, 269 Ill. App.3d 679, 645 N.E.2d 225 (1993); People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App.3d 292, 664 N.E.2d 256 (1996). Our northern brethren shun Tamborski and call for an examination of the facts and circumstances of each case.
Shifflett's evidence reflected upon his habits, character, and family circumstances and was therefore relevant to determining an appropriate punishment. We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence from the jury's consideration. Accord State v. Lee, 600 So.2d 796, 799 (La.Ct. App. 1992) (stating that when sentencing a defendant, "[i]mportant elements to be considered are the convict's personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record or absence thereof, [the] seriousness of the particular offense, and the likelihood of recidivism or rehabilitation"); People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App.3d 292, 215 Ill.Dec. 859, 869, 664 N.E.2d 256, 266 (1996) (stating that when sentencing a defendant, "[r]elevant factors include . . . defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, age, and criminal history"). See generally People v. Whalin, 885 P.2d 293, 298 (Colo.Ct.App. 1994) (stating that when sentencing a defendant, "[r]elevant factors to be considered include the character of the offender"); Commonwealth v. Cotter, 415 Mass. 183, 612 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1993) (stating that when sentencing a defendant, the "defendant's character and propensity for rehabilitation are relevant . . . considerations").
Like the appellate court panel in this case, other panels of the appellate court have also concluded that neither the prosecution nor the defense must automatically bear all the time attributed to the resolution and disposition of a defendant's motion seeking discharge under the speedy-trial statute. See People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App.3d 292, 298-300 (1996) (in considering which party is responsible for time necessary for disposing of speedy-trial motion, court "must look to the timeliness of the motion, the complexity of the motion, whether the facts necessary to decide the motion are readily available, and the length of the continuance"); People v. Medina, 239 Ill. App.3d 871, 877-78 (1993). We agree with the appellate court in this case that the defendant is not responsible for the entire period of time following the August 15-25 continuance he requested.
We agree. See People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App.3d 292, 301-03 (1996) (officer's testimony improperly and unnecessarily advised jury of defendant's prior criminal activity); People v. Smith, 12 Ill. App.3d 295, 297-98 (1973) (improper testimony regarding defendant's parole violation). When evidence of other offenses is admissible for some relevant purpose, it should be confined to such details as demonstrate its relevance, and not the details of the crime.
People v. Andrade, 279 Ill.App.3d 292, 300, 664 N.E.2d 256, 262 (1996) (stating "it is not practical to automatically charge the State for all time connected with [the] defendant's motion to discharge" nor is such time "always attributable to the defendant"). Factors to consider include "the timeliness of the motion, the complexity of the motion, whether the facts necessary to decide the motion are readily available, and the
(Emphasis in original.) People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 296-97 (1996). The Speedy Trial Act is to be construed liberally so as to give effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and each case is to be decided on its own facts.
ΒΆ 99 Lastly, even assuming that the defendant's trial tactics had not invited the implications that he complains of on appeal, we would find that any resulting error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. See People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 303 (1996) ("If the State's other evidence establishes defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence will be deemed harmless.").
This rule, however, is neither automatic nor per se. The court must examine the circumstances in order to determine if the defendant's motion actually caused delay that should be attributed to the defendant. People v. Ladd, 294 Ill. App. 3d 928, 931-32 (1998); see also People v. Myers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688 (2004) (a "motion filed by the defendant which eliminates the possibility that the case could immediately be set for a trial also constitutes an affirmative act of delay attributable to the defendant;" delay "cannot be attributed to the defendant when the record is silent;" "whether a motion in fact causes delay depends on the facts and circumstances of each case"); People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 300 (1996) (whether a motion causes delay depends on the facts and circumstances of the case); People v. Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d 679, 684 (1993) (not all motions filed by a defendant cause delay, and whether a motion causes delay depends on the facts and circumstances of the case). Finally, when examining the circumstances in order to attribute delay, the court must keep in mind that delay is an action undertaken by any party or the court that moves the trial date outside of the speedy-trial term. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 390; Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ΒΆ 16; Zeleny, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 921-22.
The State correctly points out that the prejudicial impact of drug-use testimony is lessened because the charge the defendant was facing had no drug involvement. See People v. Norwood, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1130-31, 841 N.E.2d 514, 523-24 (2005); People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 304, 664 N.E.2d 256, 265-66 (1996). However, drug usage was only one part of the other-crimes evidence introduced.
Continuances, where defense counsel has affirmatively agreed and has not reasserted his demand for trial, will toll the speedy trial term. See People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 296-98 (1996); see also 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2004). However, delays attributable to a defendant on the original charges are not always attributable to subsequently filed charges.