Opinion
B191169
7-11-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM LITTLE ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Russell A. Lehman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Defendant and appellant, William Little Anderson, appeals from the judgment entered following the trial courts denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.
The appeal is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
In 1972, a man named either Charles Williams or William Anderson, was convicted of armed robbery in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. A181452. Imposition of sentence was suspended and the defendant was given a four-year term of probation.
Both an own recognizance release report and the preliminary hearing reporters transcript name the defendant as "William Anderson, aka Charles Williams." The information names the defendant as "Charles Williams aka William Anderson."
In 1975, a man named William Anderson was arrested on a bench warrant in case No. A181452 for allegedly violating probation. Subsequent minute orders indicate there was a question as to the arrestees identity and that this was resolved by releasing him. One minute order stated, "Court orders Sheriffs Office to compare the fingerprints of the Person delivered to this Court today under the name of `William Anderson . . . against the fingerprints of a Charles Williams . . . ." A second minute order stated, "Bailiff C. Hughes having determined from Deputy J.P. Morgan of Fugitive Detail . . . that the person delivered to this court under the name of `William Anderson. . . is not the defendant Charles Williams in this case, Court now orders release of said `William Anderson. . . ."
In 1996, in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. YA021902, a man named William L. Anderson was convicted for battery, forging a check, forging a drivers license and possessing a forged drivers license, with prior serious felony conviction findings (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 470, 470a, 470b, 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The trial court imposed a Three Strikes sentence of 51 years to life, using the 1972 robbery conviction in case No. A181452, and a 1981 robbery conviction arising from Kern County Superior Court case No. SC22457, as strike priors. Following subsequent appeals to this court, and ensuing remands to the trial court, Andersons sentence was reduced to 26 years to life.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Andersons conviction in case No. YA021902 led to unpublished opinions by this court in case Nos. B104623 (November 13, 1998), B133190 (January 30, 2001; modified February 28, 2001) and B151156 (July 31, 2002).
In December 2005, Anderson filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis in case No. A181452, claiming he is not the person who had been convicted of robbery in that case and, therefore, his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court in case No. YA021902 relied on the A181452 prior to impose a Three Strikes sentence.
The trial court denied Andersons petition for coram nobis relief. Noting the judgment in case No. YA021902 had been affirmed on appeal, the trial court ruled: "If a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, coram nobis or a motion to vacate cannot be made in the trial court. [Citation.] Instead, defendant must file a writ of error coram vobis in the court of appeal." The trial court also pointed out the Three Strikes sentence in case No. YA021902 could have been properly based entirely on the prior convictions Anderson had suffered in Kern County Superior Court case No. SC22457: "Even if the defendants position is correct, that the conviction alleged under A181452 is not his, the sentence . . . of 26 years to life is not invalidated because the defendant has the four `strike prior convictions from Kern County in 1981. . . ."
Anderson now appeals the trial courts denial of his coram nobis petition. The underlying factual basis for his appeal involves a fundamental dispute regarding identity. Anderson asserts he is the person who was mistakenly arrested in 1975 for violating probation in the 1972 robbery case (case No. A181452), that he did not commit the 1972 robbery and, therefore, that his 1996 convictions in case No. YA021902 were improperly enhanced by the 1972 prior. The Attorney General asserts Anderson is the person who committed the 1972 robbery, that he is not the person who was mistakenly arrested in 1975 and, therefore, that his 1996 convictions were properly enhanced by the 1972 prior.
Resolution of Andersons appeal does not, however, require us to definitively solve this identity mystery.
CONTENTIONS
1. The Attorney General contends the denial of Andersons coram nobis petition is not an appealable order.
2. Anderson contends the trial court erred by denying his coram nobis petition.
DISCUSSSION
1. Anderson cannot appeal the trial courts order.
The Attorney General contends the trial courts ruling denying Andersons coram nobis petition is not appealable. This claim has merit.
a. Legal principles.
"A writ of coram nobis permits the court which rendered judgment `to reconsider it and give relief from errors of fact. (Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) Judgment & Attack in Trial Court, § 626, p. 616.) The writ will properly issue only when the petitioner can establish three elements: (1) that some fact existed which, without his fault or negligence, was not presented to the court at the trial and which would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; (2) that the new evidence does not go to the merits of the issues of fact determined at trial; and (3) that he did not know nor could he have, with due diligence, discovered the facts upon which he relies any sooner than the point at which he petitions for the writ. [Citations.]" (People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1474.)
"A trial courts denial of a coram nobis petition is an appealable order, unless the coram nobis petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief, or the petition raised issues that were, or could have been, raised in other proceedings. [Citation.]" (People v. Dubon (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 944, 950; accord People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982 ["Denial of a defendants request for coram nobis relief is appealable [citation] unless the petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief [citation] or the petition merely duplicated issues which had or could have been resolved in other proceedings [citations]."].)
b. Analysis.
The Attorney General argues the trial courts order is not appealable because the basis for Andersons coram nobis petition, his claim that the 1972 robbery prior does not belong to him, is a claim Anderson has already raised in other proceedings. We agree. As the Attorney General correctly states, Anderson raised the same claim in three separate habeas corpus petitions he filed in the California Supreme Court (each of which was denied).
Andersons three Supreme Court habeas petitions were filed in case Nos. S055687 (petition denied February 26, 1997), S060471 (petition denied May 28, 1997), and S061932 (petition denied October 29, 1997). Furthermore, Anderson could have raised the same claim when he appealed his conviction in case No. YA021902. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106 [considering claim defendant was not person who had sustained and served prison terms for alleged prior convictions].)
Anderson does not dispute these facts. Rather, he argues this court may not rely on those facts because they come from records in other proceedings, records which are not properly part of the record on appeal in this case. Not so.
Under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), judicial notice may be taken of the files of "any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States." "Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 permit the trial court to `take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached — in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments — but cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact. [Citation.]" (People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 123, 126-127; see also People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 459-460 [judicially noticed court files properly used for nonhearsay purpose of determining basis for judicial result if document logically shows fact in question].)
Anderson argues that, even if he has already raised this claim, it was properly before the trial court because "[i]n his coram nobis petition, appellant essentially contended that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it imposed an increased sentence based upon . . . the prior conviction in case No. A181452, after previously finding that appellant was not the defendant who suffered that prior conviction . . . ." But Anderson is conflating the actions of two different trial courts. It was the trial court in case No. YA021902 that enhanced his sentence based on the 1972 robbery conviction, yet Anderson filed his coram nobis petition in A181452. Moreover, the judgment in YA021902 had already been affirmed on appeal before Anderson filed his coram nobis petition. Under section 1265, subdivision (a), "when a judgment of conviction has been affirmed on appeal the writ [of error coram nobis] cannot be sought . . . in the trial court but application for the writ can be made to the affirming court." (People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527-528, fn. 2.) Hence, the trial court properly held Anderson filed his writ petition in the wrong court.
As the Attorney General correctly points out, under Andersons theory of the case he is not claiming the trial court in A181452 made any mistake. That is, if Anderson is not the person who was convicted in A181452, then he is not claiming the trial court in that case made any error as to him. Rather, Anderson is claiming the trial court in YA021902 erred because it used the conviction suffered by someone else in A181452 to enhance his sentence. Indeed, under Andersons theory, he did not even have standing to seek post-judgment relief in case No. A181452. "Except as specifically provided by law, a private citizen has no personal legal interest in the outcome of an individual criminal prosecution against another person. . . . [¶] The parties to a criminal action are the People, in whose sovereign name it is prosecuted, and the person accused [citations]; the victim of the crime is not a party [citation]." (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 451.) Neither is some third person who subsequently gets mixed up with the defendant.
Thus, Andersons appeal from the denial of his coram nobis petition is procedurally defective and we will order it dismissed.
For reasons we explain below, we also agree with the Attorney Generals argument the trial courts order was not appealable because Andersons coram nobis petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief. (See People v. Dubon, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 [trial courts denial of coram nobis petition is not appealable order if petition "failed to state a prima facie case for relief"].)
2. Trial court did not err by denying Andersons petition.
In any event, even if the trial courts ruling were appealable, we would conclude Andersons coram nobis petition had been properly denied. A trial courts denial of a coram nobis petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. McElwee (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1352; People v. Dubon, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.)
The Attorney General asserts the record in case No. YA021902 demonstrates Anderson did commit the 1972 robbery. Once again, Anderson argues those documents are not part of the record on appeal in this case. As we explained above, he is wrong; we may take judicial notice of those records.
The records in one of the appeals (B104623) arising out of the conviction in case No. YA021902 confirm the accuracy of the Attorney Generals assertion. After a jury trial on the substantive offenses in YA021902, there was a bifurcated court trial on the prior serious felony conviction allegations. The prosecution called a fingerprint expert, who testified he had rolled Andersons right hand in court that same morning. The expert testified Andersons prints perfectly matched Department of Corrections records for the person who had been convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. A18145 and in Kern County Superior Court case No. SC22457. After hearing this evidence, the trial court found the priors had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The information had alleged six strike priors: two 1972 priors (two robberies) in case No. A181452 (Los Angeles County), and four 1981 priors (three robberies and a burglary) in case No. SC22457 (Kern County). However, the record shows that in A181452 Anderson pled guilty to one robbery and the remaining charges were dismissed.
The 1975 minute orders relied on by Anderson demonstrate only that a person, arrested for allegedly violating probation in the 1972 robbery case, was released when the trial court was informed by court personnel that the wrong person had been arrested. In 1996, on the other hand, a trial was held and Anderson was given a Three Strikes sentence after the prosecution proved he was the person who had committed the 1972 robbery. The 1975 minute orders merit less, not more, weight than the 1996 judgment. It could be that the Attorney Generals interpretation is right: Anderson is the person who suffered the 1972 and 1996 convictions; he just is not the person who was arrested and released in 1975. Or, perhaps Anderson was also the person arrested in 1975 but he was released in error. In any event, as the trial court pointed out, the record demonstrates Andersons Three Strikes sentence could have been predicated solely on the 1981 offenses he committed in Kern County case No. SC22457. Thus, had we reached the issue, we would have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Andersons coram nobis petition.
Finally, we decline Andersons request to treat his appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For all the reasons detailed above, it appears such a habeas petition would be entirely without merit.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur:
CROSKEY, J.
ALDRICH, J.