People v. Anderson

74 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wilks

    2020 Ill. App. 182168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)

    The trial court need not give defendant's potential for rehabilitation greater weight than the seriousness of the offense. People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 637 (2001). ¶ 61 Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying defendant's request for probation and sentencing him to a term of four years' imprisonment, the minimum term in the statutory range. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d at 373-74.

  2. People v. Tito

    2019 Ill. App. 142603 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    In the case of aggravated criminal sexual assault, while multiple convictions based on the same physical act are improper, a person can be guilty of two offenses even when a common act is part of both offenses. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188-89; see People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 638 (2001) (upholding the defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the same aggravating factor); People v. Bell, 217 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1012-13 (1991) (upholding the defendant's multiple convictions of aggravated criminal sexual assault where the defendant committed separate acts of sexual penetration).

  3. People v. Tito

    2017 Ill. App. 142603 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    In the case of aggravated criminal sexual assault, while multiple convictions based on the same physical act are improper, a person can be guilty of two offenses even when a common act is part of both offenses. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188-89; see People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 638 (2001) (upholding the defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the same aggravating factor); People v. Bell, 217 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1012-13 (1991) (upholding the defendant's multiple convictions of aggravated criminal sexual assault where the defendant committed separate acts of sexual penetration).

  4. People v. Crenshaw

    2016 Ill. App. 133573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Furthermore, the trial court is presumed to have considered theevidence contained in the record (People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 637 (2001)) and the court need not detail precisely for the record the process by which it determines a sentence (People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 968 (2007)). The record here reflects that the mitigating evidence was presented to the court in the PSI and in defense counsel's argument at sentencing.

  5. People v. Clendenny

    48 N.E.3d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    To begin, we note generally, the trial court is in the best position to determine an appropriate sentence in each case, and a reviewing court will not disturb that sentence unless it appears the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Anderson, 325 Ill.App.3d 624, 637, 259 Ill.Dec. 603, 759 N.E.2d 83 (2001). That is, a reviewing court gives great deference and weight to the trial court's decision.

  6. People v. Denbo

    372 Ill. App. 3d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 23 times
    Reversing aggravated sexual assault conviction after finding insufficient evidence of force or threat of force

    The jury possessed the responsibility to choose between competing versions of fact, assess the witnesses' credibility, draw inferences from the evidence, and decide whether the evidence as a whole ultimately proved defendant to be guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Janik, 127 Ill. 2d at 401, 537 N.E.2d at 761; People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 634, 759 N.E.2d 83, 92 (2001). To avoid intruding upon the jury's prerogative as the finder of fact, we are to use a deferential standard of review.

  7. People v. Long

    2024 Ill. App. 4th 230528 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 57 However, defendant failed to tender any such instructions, so he forfeited this issue. People v. Anderson, 325 Ill.App.3d 624, 636 (2001) ("[N]o party may raise on appeal the failure to give any instruction unless he tendered it to the court."). Defendant represented himself at trial, so he cannot blame this forfeiture on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

  8. People v. Watts

    2024 Ill. App. 5th 220644 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 34 Reviewing courts have long held that the trial court is in the best position to make a reasoned decision as to the appropriate punishment in each case. See People v. Anderson, 325 Ill.App.3d 624, 637 (2001); People v. Vasquez, 327 Ill.App.3d 580, 592 (2001); Jones, 168 Ill.2d at 373. In this matter, the surrounding circumstances of the case include the determination of whether the defendant remains extended-term eligible and the appropriate sentence absent consideration of the defendant's burglary conviction in People v. Watts, No. 20-CF-46 (Cir. Ct. Coles County, October 23, 2020).

  9. People v. Traynoff

    2024 Ill. App. 4th 231102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    . "[I]t is presumed that the trial court considered the evidence in mitigation absent any contrary indication in the record." People v. Anderson, 325 Ill.App.3d 624, 637, 759 N.E.2d 83, 94 (2001).

  10. People v. Trevino

    2024 Ill. App. 4th 230549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    The crime of aggravated criminal sexual assault requires, in relevant part, proof of" 'sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force.'" Childs, 407 Ill.App.3d at 1131 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2008)). Even though aggravated criminal sexual assault has voluntary act elements of the use of force or threat of force, this court held that any of the three mental states are implied, citing People v. Anderson, 325 Ill.App.3d 624, 633 (2001), which relied on section 4-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2000)), which became effective on January 1, 1962, and has not been amended since. Childs, 407 Ill.App.3d at 1131.