¶ 29 In People v. Watkins, 387 Ill.App.3d 764, 327 Ill.Dec. 231, 901 N.E.2d 964 (2009), the Third District considered sections 5–5–3(c)(8) and 5–8–1(d) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3(c)(8), 5–8–1(d) (West 2004)), indicating that an MSR term attaches to a Class X sentence “as though written therein” as being three years. The court determined that the trial court had appropriately imposed a three-year MSR sentence, citing People v. Anderson, 272 Ill.App.3d 537, 208 Ill.Dec. 954, 650 N.E.2d 648 (1995), and People v. Smart, 311 Ill.App.3d 415, 243 Ill.Dec. 645, 723 N.E.2d 1246 (2000). Watkins, 387 Ill.App.3d at 766–67, 327 Ill.Dec. 231, 901 N.E.2d at 966.

The court denied defendant's motion to reduce sentence. ¶ 9 When the court entered the sentence and MSR term in 2007, it was consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with case law in this district. See People v. Hoekstra, 371 Ill. App. 3d 720, 728 (2007) (Second District) (accepting the State's concession that, under section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2004)), a person who committed a Class 2 felony but who, due to a criminal history, was sentenced as a Class X felon, need complete only two years of supervised release); cf. People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417 (2000) (Fourth District); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995) (First District). ¶ 10 Later, in People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81 (2010), we determined that the State's concession in Hoekstra had been made in error. We joined with the other Districts to hold that a defendant convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, who is sentenced as a Class X offender because of his criminal history, should receive a three-year MSR term applicable to Class X felonies, rather than a two-year MSR term applicable to Class 1 or Class 2 felonies.

To further support our conclusion on this issue, we point to the analysis in People v. Anderson where the court held that the "[vehicular invasion] statute's plain language evinces the legislature's intent to protect the security of motor vehicles, which have been deemed adjuncts of the home in modern society." People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 540 (1995) (citing People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 321 (1985)). In Anderson, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the vehicular invasion statute (720 ILCS 5/2-11.1 (West 1992)), and argued that it impermissibly imposed a more severe punishment for a crime that is essentially an attempted robbery.

¶20 This Court has considered this issue and repeatedly held that the three-year MSR term is proper when a defendant is sentenced as a Class X offender based upon prior qualifying convictions and a current Class 1 or Class 2 felony conviction. People v. Wade, 2013 IL App. (1st) 112547 at ¶¶ 31-38; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612 at ¶¶59-62; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (1st Dist. 2011); People v. Lampley, 405 Ill. App. 3d, 13-14 (1st Dist. 2010); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1st Dist. 1995); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 78-83 (2nd Dist. 2010); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2nd Dist. 2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (3rd Dist. 2009); People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3rd 1058, 1078 (4th Dist. 2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (4th Dist. 2010); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (4th Dist. 2000); People v. Davis, 2012 IL App. (5th) 100044, ¶¶26-34. In reaching this conclusion, this Court has reasoned "the gravity of conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature," so attaching a three-year MSR term to a Class X felony pursuant to the Statute is reasonable. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1st Dist. 1995). Defendant provides no reasoned analysis as to why we should depart from these holdings.

Defendant concedes this court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Nevertheless, defendant claims that our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), dictates that a defendant convicted of a Class 2 felony, but sentenced as a Class X offender, should receive the term of MSR for Class 2 felonies. ¶ 35 Defendant argues that Pullen stands for the proposition that Class X sentencing eligibility under section 5-5-3(c)(3) will not trump a sentencing statute written in terms of felonies committed.

Although defendant suggests that the length of the MSR term imposed should be based on the classification of the underlying felony conviction rather than the classification of the requisite sentencing range, this argument has been repeatedly rejected by reviewing courts. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38 (recognizing that defendant's subject to Class X sentences are subject to the Class X three-year MSR term); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62 (same); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011) (same); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010) (same); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 82-83 (2010) (same); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995) (same). Courts have reasoned that "the gravity of the conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature."

¶ 60 The law is clear that when a defendant qualifies for Class X sentencing, a three-year period of MSR is necessarily imposed. See, e.g., People v. Watkins, 387 Ill.App.3d 764, 766–67, 327 Ill.Dec. 231, 901 N.E.2d 964 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill.App.3d 415, 417–18, 243 Ill.Dec. 645, 723 N.E.2d 1246 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill.App.3d 537, 541, 208 Ill.Dec. 954, 650 N.E.2d 648 (1995). In Anderson, this court explained the reasoning behind imposing a three-year MSR period on an offender who was Class X eligible by background, but not convicted of a Class X offense, stating “the gravity of the conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature.”

Defendant recognizes that three different districts of the appellate court have rejected the same argument he raises here. See People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 417-18; People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Nevertheless, defendant claims that our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), dictates that a defendant convicted of a Class 2 felony, but sentenced as a Class X offender, should receive the term of MSR for Class 2 felonies.

Other districts of the appellate court that have considered this issue have held that, "it is clear that the gravity of conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires" a longer period of watch after release from prison than a violation of a less serious nature. People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541, 650 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1995); see also People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417, 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). As the Anderson court observed, when an individual commits three felonies in a period of a few years, he demonstrates the wisdom of a lengthier MSR term than one who is not a recidivist offender.

The State argues that the legislature clearly intended that a defendant eligible for enhanced sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Code is to be treated as a Class X offender under both subsections (a) and (d) of section 5-8-1. It would be inconsistent to treat such a defendant as a Class X offender for purposes of the term of his imprisonment and not for the term of his mandatory supervised release. In People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App.3d 537, 650 N.E.2d 648 (1995), the First District Appellate Court discussed this issue. The first district held that while the issue had never before been adjudicated by an Illinois appellate court,