Opinion
No. 1044 KA 19-02110
02-10-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. TREVER E. ANDERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
ERIK TEIFKE, ACTING PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (PAUL SKIP LAISURE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARTIN P. MCCARTHY, II, OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
ERIK TEIFKE, ACTING PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (PAUL SKIP LAISURE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARTIN P. MCCARTHY, II, OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND OGDEN, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Victoria M. Argento, J.), rendered June 27, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of strangulation in the second degree and aggravated family offense (seven counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of one count of strangulation in the second degree (Penal Law § 121.12) and seven counts of aggravated family offense (§ 240.75). Contrary to defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of strangulation in the second degree as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987]).
We reject defendant's further contention that Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to introduce Molineux evidence related to prior incidents of domestic violence between defendant and the complainant. The court properly concluded that the evidence "provided necessary background information on the nature of the relationship and placed the charged conduct in context" (People v Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19 [2009]; see People v Swift, 195 A.D.3d 1496, 1499 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1030 [2021]; see generally People v Frankline, 27 N.Y.3d 1113, 1115 [2016]), and was relevant to the issue of defendant's intent (see Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19; People v Cung, 112 A.D.3d 1307, 1310 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 961 [2014]). We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice to defendant (see Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19; see generally People v Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242 [1987]), and that the court's repeated limiting instructions minimized any such prejudice (see People v Murray, 185 A.D.3d 1507, 1508 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 974 [2020]; People v Matthews, 142 A.D.3d 1354, 1356 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1125 [2016]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe, and we decline defendant's request to exercise our power to reduce the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]). We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they do not warrant modification or reversal of the judgment.