Opinion
C084794
06-06-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSHUA JAMES ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14F02844)
Defendant Joshua James Anderson appeals his conviction for first degree murder. He contends the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to investigators, which he claims where obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We agree and reverse the judgment.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 .
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and Thomas Parks were cellmates in prison, housed in the enhanced outpatient program, for inmates with mental health issues. One night correctional officers responded to hearing defendant yell, "man down." When they arrived at the cell, defendant was standing near the door and Parks was on the bottom bunk, unresponsive. Defendant stated Parks had committed suicide by hanging himself. Despite medical staff's attempts to revive him, Parks died shortly thereafter. The cause of death was ligature strangulation.
Parks's body was covered with a blanket up to his neck and he was still warm to the touch. There was a long twisted strip of a torn sheet on the floor. It was not knotted, so it did not appear to be a noose. The condition of the cell indicated signs of a possible struggle. Defendant had abrasions on his forehead, right clavicle and back of his left ear, swelling near his ear, and his left eye appeared scratched. The scrapings from underneath Parks's fingernails on both hands matched defendant's DNA profile.
Sacramento County District Attorney's Office Investigators Jay Sims and Paul Chrisman interviewed defendant. Defendant initially denied killing Parks. He told the investigators he had been napping, and while he was asleep, Parks had committed suicide. He said Parks had a knotted sheet around his neck, like a noose. He took it off Parks's neck, but Parks did not respond. Ultimately, defendant admitted he had lied to the investigators and stated he had killed Parks. He said he had used the sheet to choke Parks. Parks had struggled and scratched him on the eye and face. Afterward, defendant used a pair of wet socks to try to clean his skin from Parks's fingernails. He offered a number of motives for the killing, including that he believed Parks was a child molester and that he had been wanting to kill someone for a while.
Defendant was charged with first degree murder and it was alleged he had served nine prior prison terms. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true the prior prison term allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life, plus six consecutive years for the prior prison terms. The trial court struck three of the prior prison terms.
DISCUSSION
I
Denial Of The Motion To Suppress
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the investigators, as those statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he contends the investigators did not terminate the interrogation, despite defendant unequivocally invoking his rights, twice.
Following Parks's death, Investigators Sims and Chrisman interviewed defendant at the prison. After some preliminary questions about how long defendant had been incarcerated and his underlying offenses, Sims informed defendant he did not have to read him his rights because defendant was already in custody and Sims was not increasing defendant's level of custody.
Contrary to Sims's assertion, the trial court ruled this was a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes; accordingly, defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings. (See Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499 ; People v. Macklem (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 674; Cervantes v. Walker (9th Cir. 1978) 589 F.2d 424.) --------
The following exchange then took place:
"[Defendant]: Then I have no wish or desire to talk to you unless my attorney is present.
"[Sims]: Okay. Well, let me read you your rights anyway. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to an attorney, and have an attorney present with you when you're being questioned. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you desire. Do you understand your rights?
"[Defendant]: Mm-hm.
"[Sims]: Okay. And having your rights in mind, do you wish to give me a statement about what happened tonight?
"[Defendant]: Not unless there's an attorney present, I don't want to talk to you.
"[Sims]: Okay. Well, I'm not gonna ask any questions, so just keep in mind that you've made statements to the officers out here already. Those are gonna be useable, okay?
"[Defendant]: Yeah, they ain't gonna be useable. I already know they won't.
"[Sims]: Why's that?
"[Defendant]: Because, uh, rights weren't read, and, um, my rights were violated. I mean, I'll talk to you, I don't have a problem talking to you, but I don't like, you know, you guys d- if you're gonna be hone- straight up, just be straight up with me.
"[Sims]: I just did.
"[Chrisman]: We were.
"[Sims]: I - that's why I told you I had to right . . .
((Crosstalk)).
"[Defendant]: No, I don't want nobody to lie to me. I - I - my walls . . .
"[Sims]: I just told you . . .
"[Defendant]: . . . will go up.
"[Chrisman]: [Defendant], listen . . .
"[Defendant]: I - I'm sorry, I just have a thing . . .
"[Chrisman]: I understand that. I understand that . . .
"[Defendant]: You do, okay.
"[Chrisman]: But we were trying . . .
"[Sims]: That's - that's what I was doing, I was saying it to be safe.
"[Defendant]: You gotta understand, I'm a little frustrated . . .
"[Chrisman]: To be safe.
"[Defendant]: . . . right now because . . .
"[Chrisman]: Well I can understand that.
"[Defendant]: . . . I'm stuck in cuffs right now, out there freezing my ass off. I don't . . .
"[Chrisman]: That's why we brought you in.
"[Defendant]: Dude, I got a daughter to go home - I was just looking at that sign that says, 'I love you, Daddy.' I promised my daughter three years. I got no will or want to kill nobody.
"[Chrisman]: Okay.
"[Defendant]: Okay?
"[Sims]: Well I've gotta ask you about what happened tonight. And that's why I wanted to read you your rights because . . .
"[Defendant]: Yeah.
"[Sims]: . . . I want you to make an informed opinion. Those rights are to protect you . . .
"[Defendant]: Well, we were there talking . . .
"[Sims]: Hold up - hold on . . .
"[Defendant]: No, I - I wish to talk to you now. I wish to talk to you.
"[Sims]: Do you want me to read you your rights again?
"[Defendant]: No, you don't have to read me my rights.
"[Sims]: Okay. But you're telling me that having your rights in mind, you do wish to talk to me about . . .
"[Defendant]: Yes, sir. I do.
"[Sims]: . . . what happened tonight?
"[Defendant]: Yes, I will talk to you about what happened.
"[Sims]: Okay. Sounds good."
Defendant ultimately proceeded to tell the investigators he had killed Parks.
Defendant made a motion in limine to suppress his statements that he killed Parks, claiming the investigators violated his Miranda rights by continuing to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel. The prosecution argued after defendant invoked his right to counsel, the investigators did not ask any questions designed to elicit an incriminating response, there was no coercion, and defendant subsequently initiated conversation and indicated he wanted to speak with the investigators.
The trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Sims testified he and Chrisman interviewed defendant in the watch commander's office. The door was closed, but not locked. Chrisman was sitting in a chair next to Sims and defendant was seated across from them with his back to the door. Defendant was in handcuffs during the interview. Another officer was outside the interview room waiting to escort defendant out of the room when the interview was completed.
After defendant stated he wanted an attorney, Sims Mirandized him anyway, and defendant again stated he wanted an attorney. Sims and Chrisman paused, for about 25 seconds, while they took notes and got ready to leave. During that pause, neither Sims nor Chrisman attempted to contact the escort officer. After the 25 second pause, Sims told defendant that he was not going to ask any questions, but defendant's earlier statement would be admissible. Sims testified he was referring to defendant's earlier statement to prison officials, that when "he got off his bunk, [he] saw the victim with a ligature around his neck, and that he had taken the victim and removed the ligature . . . ." Sims testified he was telling defendant that "he had already given a version of what happened, and if evidence proved otherwise, he was kind of locked into that version." During the subsequent exchange between Sims and defendant, about the admissibility of those prior statements, defendant said, "I'll talk to you, I don't have a problem talking to you." After some additional conversation about his frustration, being cold, and having a daughter he wanted to get home to, Sims stated, "Well I've gotta ask you about what happened tonight. And that's why I wanted to read you your rights because . . . [¶] . . . I want you to make an informed opinion. Those rights are to protect you . . ." Sims explained when he was explaining to defendant that if defendant "wanted to talk, I had to ask him questions about what happened that night, and I had to make sure that he was knowingly waiving his rights." During the entire interview, he never had the impression defendant did not know what was going on. Defendant never requested food, water, or a bathroom break.
After additional argument from the parties, the trial court found the investigators had not violated defendant's Miranda rights and his statements were admissible. The trial court found defendant clearly invoked his rights twice, once before Miranda warnings were given and once after. The trial court concluded that after the discussion about whether defendant's prior statements would be admissible, defendant "actually starts to rethink his invocation." The trial court found although Sims's statement that he had to ask defendant questions could have been misleading, he believed Sims "was just making a general reference to something like, 'It's my job, but if you don't want to talk, okay. I just had to come and ask you anyway.' " The trial court concluded then, defendant's "immediate and adamant desire to speak to the investigators comes shining through." The trial court found, "So I do not believe, based upon the words that were said and the context in which they were said and the intonation that was used, that this one postinvocation statement, quote, Gotta ask, close quote, was enough so that [defendant] was coerced or tricked into abandoning his invocation." Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found that defendant "initiated further communication, exchange, and conversation with the investigators because of the words he spoke and his conduct that fairly can be said to represent a desire on his part to open up a more generalized discussion relating to the investigation.
"Moreover, he clearly indicated that he wished to waive his rights, and there was no coercive activity by the investigators.
"So, in the end, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances standard, I do conclude that [defendant] effectively and voluntarily reengaged and waived both rights, and to the extent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is implicated, I find that he waived that right too." Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements.
Evidence from a custodial interrogation may not be used against a defendant unless the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478-479 .) To be valid, a waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 845.) If a suspect invokes the right to counsel, officers may only resume the interrogation if the suspect " '(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.' " (Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 527 [93 L.Ed.2d 920, 927]; People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 596.) If, instead, "police initiate further questioning in the absence of counsel, the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and are inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even if the suspect later waives the right to counsel and the statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards." (Davis, at p. 598.)
If after receiving Miranda warnings the defendant requests counsel, the interrogation must cease and the authorities may not initiate any "communication, exchanges, or conversations" relating to the case, other than those routinely necessary for custodial purposes, until counsel has been made available. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386]; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1122; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 274, disagreed with on another point by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) Not all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation; police may properly engage in routine functions distinct from investigatory functions, such as, routine booking questions and casual conversation or " 'smalltalk' " unrelated to the offense, without running afoul of Miranda. (People v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 86-87; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985; see also People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 301; People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609, 630-631.) Rather, interrogation occurs "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308]; see also Haley, at p. 300) and consists of words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" (Innis, at p. 303 ). An " 'incriminating response' " is "any response -- whether inculpatory or exculpatory -- that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." (Innis, at p. 302 fn., 5 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 308, fn. 5]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 476-477 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 724-725].)
Even routine questioning or casual conversation "must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the police are not using the communication as a pretext for eliciting incriminating information. [Citation.] This cautious approach is particularly appropriate when a defendant has invoked his or her Miranda rights before the communication. [Citation.] When evaluating whether the Miranda requirements should apply during noninvestigative routine or casual exchanges, relevant factors to consider include the nature of the questions, the context of the questioning, the knowledge and intent of the officer asking the questions, the relationship between the questions and the crime, the administrative need for the questions, and any other indications that the questions were designed to elicit incriminating evidence." (People v. Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 88.)
Edwards set forth a "bright-line rule," clear and unequivocal, that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. (Solem v. Stumes (1984) 465 U.S. 638, 646 [79 L.Ed.2d 579, 589]; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 473.) The purpose of the bright line rule is to prevent the authorities from persuading the suspect to incriminate himself, notwithstanding his request for counsel, through " 'badgering' or 'overreaching,' -- explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional." (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98 [83 L.Ed.2d 488, 495].) Continuing with the Miranda advisement, questioning the suspect about invoking his rights after an unequivocal invocation violates this bright line rule. (Id. at pp. 98-99 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 495-496].)
Initially, even before defendant was Mirandized he stated, "I have no wish or desire to talk to you unless my attorney is present." Despite this clear invocation, Sims continued the Miranda advisement, asked defendant if he understood his rights, and if he wanted to give a statement. Advising defendant of his rights was unnecessary once he had clearly asserted his rights. While police can clarify a suspect's response if there is some preceding ambiguity, defendant's statement was clear and simple, and did not call for a clarification. (People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 99.) Accordingly, defendant's Miranda rights were violated.
After Sims finished advising defendant of his rights, he asked if defendant wanted to give a statement. Defendant again clearly invoked his rights, stating, "Not unless there's an attorney present, I don't want to talk to you." Once again, after this clear invocation, all questioning should have stopped. Instead, Sims stated, "Okay. Well, I'm not gonna ask any questions, so just keep in mind that you've made statements to the officers out here already. Those are gonna be useable, okay?" This was not, as the People claim, "simply an off-the-cuff remark." Rather, Sims was thinking defendant "had already given a version of what happened, and if evidence proved otherwise, he was kind of locked into that version." Defendant had already given an explanation that Parks had committed suicide and Sims was seeking to elicit a different explanation, one that the prosecution would likely seek to introduce at trial; that is, an incriminating response. This was a violation of defendant's Miranda rights.
Here, defendant twice unequivocally invoked his Miranda rights. Rather than cease all interrogation, after both invocations, Sims kept asking defendant significant questions. After the first invocation, Sims asked defendant if he understood his Miranda rights and if he wished to talk to Sims. After the Miranda advisement and the second invocation, immediately before defendant's confession, Sims asked additional pointed questions designed to restart the conversation about the crime: "Those are gonna be useable, okay?" and "Why's that?" These were not merely remarks; they were questions, designed to encourage defendant to keep talking. The only possible benefit to keeping defendant talking was to elicit incriminatory information from him, as he had already provided an exculpatory explanation for the victim's death.
Each continued conversation after each invocation was a violation of defendant's Miranda rights. Defendant's waiver after these violations " 'cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation.' " (Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 484 .) Using an accused's subsequent responses to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request itself is even more intolerable. " 'No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to proceed . . . on his own terms and as if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney . . . .' " (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 99 .)
II
Prejudice
Defendant contends the error in denying his motion to suppress was prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires the state to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
After trial, defendant filed a motion for new trial. In the motion, defense counsel indicated his original defense strategy was to argue there was a reasonable doubt whether Parks had committed suicide. In pursuit of that defense, he retained a psychiatrist, Dr. Paul G. Mattiuzzi, to review Parks's health, mental health, and central files to determine whether he had a history of suicidal behaviors and ideation. Dr. Mattiuzzi noted Parks's mental illness, included schizoaffective disorder and manic depressive illness with major depressive episodes. Parks was noted to have had a clinically significant risk for suicide, violent self-directed impulses, and his treating clinicians had observed Parks as being at risk for suicide. Defense counsel corresponded with the state pathologist, Dr. Stephany Fiore, about the possibility that Parks committed suicide. Dr. Fiore indicated Parks did not appear to have been hanged, but there were no defensive wounds which suggest there was no violent struggle, the damage to face and neck was equivocal as to the death being self-inflicted or not, and Parks's psychiatric history could favor a self-inflicted strangulation. Counsel then hired a private forensic pathologist, Dr. Kathrine Raven, to review Dr. Fiore's findings. Dr. Raven concurred with Dr. Fiore's findings that suicide was not ruled out as a possible cause of death. After the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress defendant's statements, defense counsel decided not to present this defense, as he believed there was no chance the jury would accept the possibility Parks had committed suicide, and such a defense would alienate the jury and undercut the defense position.
The erroneous admission of a defendant's statements obtained in violation of his Miranda rights is subject to the harmless error standard of Chapman. (People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 447.) That test requires the People "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U. S. at p. 24 .) "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record. Thus, to say that [the error] . . . did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error]." (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449].)
In the absence of the confession, there is still some evidence that defendant killed Parks. Parks's injuries were consistent with ligature strangulation. Defendant's DNA was found under Parks's fingernails. The cell was in disarray consistent with a struggle. Defendant had injuries on his face also consistent with a struggle.
However, even with this evidence, we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the defendant's statements confessing to killing Parks did not contribute to the verdict. As a general matter, confessions constitute compelling proof of a defendant's guilt, and improper admission of a confession in violation of Miranda is more likely to be prejudicial than other evidentiary errors. (See People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 503 [inadmissible confessions are more likely to affect the outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, as confessions invariably provide persuasive evidence of a defendant's guilt and operate as an " 'evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense' "].) The prosecutor relied heavily on defendant's confession in his closing argument. In addition, as a direct result of the admission of this evidence, defense counsel made the tactical choice not to put on evidence supporting a defense that strongly suggested Parks had committed suicide. On this record, we find the error in admitting defendant's statements was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Murray, J. /s/_________
Duarte, J.