Opinion
No. 2-15-0246
03-28-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County.
No. 14-CM-2304
Honorable Joel D. Berg, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, as defendant's act of closing the door impeded the officer's authorized entry into his house.
¶ 2 Defendant, Patrick J. Anderson, appeals from his conviction of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2014)), arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On November 28, 2014, defendant was charged with one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, where the following relevant testimony was adduced.
¶ 5 David Bachman, a sheriff's deputy for the McHenry County sheriff's office, testified that, at about 9:12 p.m. on the evening in question, he received information from dispatch that a woman called 911 asking for police assistance. Dispatch reported that a woman was heard crying and a man was heard yelling in the background. Bachman responded to a residence on Fernwood Lane. He approached the house and saw a pit bull outside barking and growling. He saw defendant looking out the front window. Defendant brought the dog inside. Bachman told defendant why he was there and asked if there was a woman inside the house. Defendant told Bachman that no one else was there. Bachman testified that defendant appeared to be very intoxicated; he slurred his speech and his mannerisms were delayed.
¶ 6 Bachman testified that he continued to speak with defendant for about 30 seconds to one minute as two other officers arrived. Defendant denied that anyone else was there or that there had been any kind of situation. One of the officers advised defendant that, due to the nature of the call and the information the officers had been given, the officers would have to enter the house to verify that no one needed assistance. According to Bachman, defendant "began to close the door and he said, in a vulgar manner, go get a warrant." When asked what happened next, Bachman testified:
"As he started closing the door, I pushed the door open. He fell backwards a little bit but was able to catch himself. I recall that after he had collected—or maintained his balance he said something vulgar directed toward me and started to approach me as I was
coming through the door and then after that I tackled him. We started to roll down a small flight of stairs to the basement and at that point I was attempting to restrain him."
After restraining defendant, the officers located defendant's girlfriend, Nicole D., upstairs. She stated that she had called, hoping that the officers would calm defendant down.
¶ 7 For the defense, Nicole testified that on the evening in question she was at defendant's residence trying to go to sleep. She testified that there was an argument and that she called the police. She never spoke to anyone on the phone; she put the phone under her pillow and eventually hung up. When the police arrived, Nicole was in the neighbor's yard, to the right of defendant's yard. She heard screaming and reentered defendant's house through the back door. She was met by a police officer in the house.
¶ 8 The trial court found defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail. His motion for a new trial was denied. Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer.
¶ 11 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, " 'the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony,
weighing the evidence, and determining what inferences to draw, and a reviewing court ordinarily will not substitute its judgment on these matters for that of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000).
¶ 12 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2014)) provides:
"A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer *** of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor."
Defendant does not dispute that he knew that Bachman was a peace officer or that Bachman was authorized to enter the residence. Instead, he argues that he did not actually obstruct Bachman. According to defendant, there is no evidence that his "conduct in merely starting to close the door actually impeded Bachman's entry into [his] house." We disagree.
¶ 13 In People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, the supreme court was asked to determine whether certain conduct—the provision of false information to a police officer—constituted "obstruction" of a peace officer for purposes of section 31-1(a) of the Code. Id. ¶ 17. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, the court looked to the "ordinary and popularly understood definition" of the term "obstruct." Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The court reasoned as follows:
"At the time the statute was adopted, the dictionary defined 'obstruct' to mean '1: to block up: stop up or close up: place an obstacle in or fill with obstacles or impediments to passing *** 2: to be or come in the way of: hinder from passing, action, or operation: IMPEDE ***.' [Citation.] In turn, 'hinder' means 'to make slow or difficult the course or progress of' [citation], and 'impede' means 'to interfere with or get in the way of the progress of' [citation]. Applying the dictionary definition, it is evident that 'obstruct'
encompasses physical conduct that literally creates an obstacle, as well as conduct the effect of which impedes or hinders progress." Id. ¶ 19.
The court determined that "[t]he legislative focus of section 31-1(a) is on the tendency of the conduct to interpose an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer in the performance of his authorized duties. That inquiry is for the trier of fact, based upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 14 Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant's actions impeded or hindered Bachman's entry into the house for purposes of investigating the 911 call. Bachman testified that he was dispatched to the home to investigate a 911 call from a woman needing assistance. At the doorway to the home, defendant denied that anyone else was in the house. When the officers told defendant that they needed to enter the home to investigate, defendant told Bachman to "get a warrant" and started closing the door. This conduct certainly interfered with Bachman's entry into the house, as it necessarily required Bachman to stop his entry and to "push[] the door open" in order to enter the house. Ultimately, Bachman had to tackle defendant to restrain him before he could continue his investigation.
¶ 15 Based on the foregoing, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of resisting or obstructing a peace officer.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2014); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978).
¶ 18 Affirmed.