People v. Anaya

17 Citing cases

  1. People v. Ortiz

    317 Ill. App. 3d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 49 times
    In People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill.App.3d 212, 216, 225 (2000), for example, the appellate court determined that the fact that the defendant was driving to Aurora, Illinois, did not support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking, even though the officer knew that destination to be a" 'hotbed'" for drugs.

    After defendant refused, Jennings told defendant to take a seat in the back of the patrol car. In People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996), cited by the State, the defendant was stopped by two police officers after she disembarked from a train. The officers approached defendant and asked her if she had come in on the Texas Eagle.

  2. People v. White

    221 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2006)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that the defendant's attempt to conceal an object "suggested some consciousness of guilt" and supported a reasonable, articulable suspicion for officers to stop the defendant and investigate

    However, "[t]he facts used to support an investigatory detention are insufficient when they describe `a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.'" People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 946 (1996), quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 894, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980). This analysis does not change depending on the individual's location.

  3. People v. Stapinski

    2015 IL 118278 (Ill. 2015)   Cited 49 times
    In Stapinksi, 2015 IL 118278, this court agreed with the Smith court's assessment of how plea agreements are different from other types of agreements entered into between the prosecution and the defendant.

    Whether a defendant was denied due process, and whether that denial was sufficiently prejudicial to require the dismissal of the charges, are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo. See People v. Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695 (2006); People v. Mattis, 367 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435-36 (2006); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945 (1996). However, once it is determined that a defendant suffered a prejudicial violation of his due process rights, the trial court's decision on the appropriate remedy—whether it be dismissal of the indictment or some other remedy—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

  4. People ex Rel. Devine v. $30,700.00

    199 Ill. 2d 142 (Ill. 2002)   Cited 40 times
    Analyzing as separate issues whether notice was statutorily sufficient and whether it was constitutionally sufficient

    Whether claimants were afforded due process in the instant matter is an issue of law, and any review is de novo. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill.2d 156, 162 (2001); see also People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 944-45 (1996). "Due process entails an orderly proceeding wherein a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights."

  5. People v. Roa

    377 Ill. App. 3d 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Nothing about the scent of a single air freshener, even when combined with “extreme" nervousness, would be so far from the ordinary that it should create an expectation for a competent officer to act quickly. See People v. Croft, 346 Ill.App.3d 669, 675, 282 Ill.Dec. 216, 805 N.E.2d 1233, 1240 (2004) , quoting People v. Smith, 331 Ill.App.3d 1049, 1055, 269 Ill.Dec. 235, 780 N.E.2d 707 (2002), quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill.App.3d 940, 945-46, 216 Ill.Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996) (“The facts are insufficient to support an investigatory detention when they describe ‘ “ ‘a very large category [377 Ill.App.3d 213] of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.’

  6. People v. Oliver

    368 Ill. App. 3d 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 47 times
    Finding that false testimony was prejudicial because it "establish[ed] probable cause where none existed"

    Thus, we will review de novo whether defendant was denied due process and, if so, whether that denial was prejudicial. See People v. Mattis, 367 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435-36 (2006) ("because the essential facts concerning what happened at the grand jury proceedings are undisputed, we review de novo whether defendant suffered a prejudicial denial of due process"); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945 (1996) (when a determination as to a defendant's constitutional rights depends on a legal conclusion based on undisputed facts, the reviewing court must make its own determination). However, if a prejudicial denial of due process indeed occurred, we will reverse the trial court's ultimate decision to dismiss the indictment only if the court abused its discretion.

  7. People v. Croft

    346 Ill. App. 3d 669 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 20 times
    Declining to extend the community caretaking label to an officer's encounter with an individual pushing a bicycle when there had been incidents of theft and vandalism in the area and cautioning against the dangers of "blurring the distinction between community caretaking and an investigative detention"

    The facts are insufficient to support an investigatory detention when they describe "`"a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures." [Citation.]'" Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945-46 (1996). Further, an officer's decision to engage in a brief Terry stop may not be justified on the basis of unparticularized suspicion or on a hunch.

  8. People v. Smith

    331 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that there were insufficient specific, articulable facts to justify the stop of the defendant where the officers observed the defendant standing in front of a known drug house in the early morning hours with his hands in his pockets and where the defendant refused to remove his hands for his pockets and backed away from the officers

    [Citation.] The question for the court is the degree of suspicion which attaches to the circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions. [Citation.] The facts used to support an investigatory detention are insufficient when they describe 'a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.' " People v. Anaya, 279 Ill.App.3d 940, 945-46, 216 Ill.Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1996).         We believe that, considering the totality of the circumstances as they existed on November 24, 2000, there were insufficient specific, articulable facts to create a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime.

  9. People v. Lockett

    311 Ill. App. 3d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that gang activity in the area one week prior to the defendant's detention, coupled with, among other things, the officer's belief that the defendant was hiding a weapon in his hand, gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was about to commit a crime

    A law enforcement officer does not violate the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure by approaching a person and questioning him or asking him to provide identification. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); People v. Billingslea, 292 Ill. App.3d 1026, 1029 (1997); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 944 (1996). Our supreme court in People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382 (1990), noted that there are three tiers of police-citizen encounters.

  10. People v. Tripp

    306 Ill. App. 3d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 11 times

    A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is generally subject to reversal only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, but where there is no dispute about the facts or credibility of witnesses, the decision is subject to de novo review. People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 216 Ill. Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996). This court may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any issue appearing in the record, and the State may defend the trial court's ruling "on any grounds sustained in the record regardless of the reasoning used by the trial court."