After defendant refused, Jennings told defendant to take a seat in the back of the patrol car. In People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996), cited by the State, the defendant was stopped by two police officers after she disembarked from a train. The officers approached defendant and asked her if she had come in on the Texas Eagle.
However, "[t]he facts used to support an investigatory detention are insufficient when they describe `a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.'" People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 946 (1996), quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 894, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980). This analysis does not change depending on the individual's location.
Whether a defendant was denied due process, and whether that denial was sufficiently prejudicial to require the dismissal of the charges, are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo. See People v. Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695 (2006); People v. Mattis, 367 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435-36 (2006); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945 (1996). However, once it is determined that a defendant suffered a prejudicial violation of his due process rights, the trial court's decision on the appropriate remedy—whether it be dismissal of the indictment or some other remedy—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Whether claimants were afforded due process in the instant matter is an issue of law, and any review is de novo. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill.2d 156, 162 (2001); see also People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 944-45 (1996). "Due process entails an orderly proceeding wherein a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights."
Nothing about the scent of a single air freshener, even when combined with “extreme" nervousness, would be so far from the ordinary that it should create an expectation for a competent officer to act quickly. See People v. Croft, 346 Ill.App.3d 669, 675, 282 Ill.Dec. 216, 805 N.E.2d 1233, 1240 (2004) , quoting People v. Smith, 331 Ill.App.3d 1049, 1055, 269 Ill.Dec. 235, 780 N.E.2d 707 (2002), quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill.App.3d 940, 945-46, 216 Ill.Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996) (“The facts are insufficient to support an investigatory detention when they describe ‘ “ ‘a very large category [377 Ill.App.3d 213] of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.’
Thus, we will review de novo whether defendant was denied due process and, if so, whether that denial was prejudicial. See People v. Mattis, 367 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435-36 (2006) ("because the essential facts concerning what happened at the grand jury proceedings are undisputed, we review de novo whether defendant suffered a prejudicial denial of due process"); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945 (1996) (when a determination as to a defendant's constitutional rights depends on a legal conclusion based on undisputed facts, the reviewing court must make its own determination). However, if a prejudicial denial of due process indeed occurred, we will reverse the trial court's ultimate decision to dismiss the indictment only if the court abused its discretion.
The facts are insufficient to support an investigatory detention when they describe "`"a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures." [Citation.]'" Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945-46 (1996). Further, an officer's decision to engage in a brief Terry stop may not be justified on the basis of unparticularized suspicion or on a hunch.
[Citation.] The question for the court is the degree of suspicion which attaches to the circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions. [Citation.] The facts used to support an investigatory detention are insufficient when they describe 'a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.' " People v. Anaya, 279 Ill.App.3d 940, 945-46, 216 Ill.Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1996). We believe that, considering the totality of the circumstances as they existed on November 24, 2000, there were insufficient specific, articulable facts to create a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime.
A law enforcement officer does not violate the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure by approaching a person and questioning him or asking him to provide identification. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); People v. Billingslea, 292 Ill. App.3d 1026, 1029 (1997); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 944 (1996). Our supreme court in People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382 (1990), noted that there are three tiers of police-citizen encounters.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is generally subject to reversal only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, but where there is no dispute about the facts or credibility of witnesses, the decision is subject to de novo review. People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App.3d 940, 216 Ill. Dec. 465, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996). This court may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any issue appearing in the record, and the State may defend the trial court's ruling "on any grounds sustained in the record regardless of the reasoning used by the trial court."