Opinion
No. 2012–776KCR.
2014-08-5
Present: WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from a sentence of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Shari Ruth Michels, J.), imposed February 10, 2012, upon his conviction of driving while intoxicated, upon his plea of guilty.
ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.
Defendant was charged with driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1] ), driving while intoxicated (per se) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2] ), driving while intoxicated (common law) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3] ), and aggravated driving while intoxicated (per se) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2–a][a] ). On February 10, 2012, defendant, while represented by counsel, waived prosecution by information and pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (per se) in full satisfaction of the charges. Defendant was sentenced, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, to three years' probation, which included participation in an alcohol treatment program, a six-month license suspension, and a $500 fine. The Criminal Court informed defendant that if he violated his sentence, he would receive a sentence of one year in jail. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and that he should have received a fine and a conditional discharge conditioned on his completion of an alcohol treatment program.
As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement will not be heard to complain that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive ( see People v. Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 [2010]; People v. Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 [2009]; People v. Grigg, 53 AD3d 629, 630 [2008] ). Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to deviate from that rule. In any event, the sentence did not constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion, nor should the sentence be modified in the interest of justice.
Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.