Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCD204622 Albert T. Harutunian III and Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judges.
McINTYRE, J.
Michael Edward Ames appeals a judgment arising out of his guilty plea to three counts of residential burglary, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was used as the basis for two of those counts. We find his argument unavailing and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between January 16 and February 7, 2007, Ames committed a series of residential and commercial burglaries while on parole. (All further specified dates are in 2007 except as otherwise noted.) On one occasion, the victim caught Ames in the act; although Ames escaped without taking anything, the victim was able to identify the license plate on his getaway car. After the police traced the car to Ames, the victim identified him as the perpetrator of the crime (which was later charged as count two) in a photo lineup.
Police arrested Ames on February 8, when he reported to his parole officer, and conducted a search of his car. In it, they found four pieces of stolen mail and a stolen check for $2,000 (all of which later provided the basis for counts 4 through 6), as well as a zippered folder containing 50 sets of keys to various business offices.
The officers also conducted a search of Ames's residence, which was located on his father's property in Jamul, with the consent of his father and his parole officer. The officers discovered hundreds of suspicious items, including numerous bags of clothes, construction equipment, a laptop computer, a set of golf clubs, a motorcycle, surfboard racks, a mattress and box springs still wrapped in plastic and a washer/dryer unit stored in and around Ames's home. The officers impounded the stolen mail, as well as boxing gloves, a 43 inch television set, blankets, a camcorder, a laptop computer and a CD case with 300 CDs that had previously been reported as having been stolen, as well as numerous other items.
Based on the number of additional suspicious items still at Ames's home, Police Detective Kim Robinson contacted other officers to see if any of those items had been reported as stolen. Her inquiry resulted in the identification of two more victims of Ames's activities and on February 14, Detective Robinson, another detective and Ames's parole agent returned to his home to recover the surfboard racks, the mattress and box springs and the stackable washer/dryer unit belonging to those victims as later charged in counts one and three. On February 15, the two detectives returned to the home, with the consent of Ames's parole agent, to recover the golf clubs, which had been reported missing by a third additional victim.
The district attorney ultimately charged Ames with three counts of residential burglary (counts 1-3), three counts of burglary (counts 4-6), and two counts of receiving stolen property (counts 7-8) arising out of the crimes. Ames thereafter moved to suppress the evidence seized by the detectives during the February 14 and 15 searches, contending that the officers were required to have obtained a warrant before conducting such searches but failed to do so. The prosecutor responded that the subsequent searches were reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes based on Ames's status as a parolee.
The court found that a parole search condition permitted multiple searches of a parolee, provided that the search was not arbitrary or tantamount to harassment, and that the February 14 and 15 searches were proper in accordance with that standard. Accordingly, the court denied the suppression motion, after which Ames entered a plea of guilt to the three residential burglary counts and admitted the prison prior allegations. The court sentenced him to the upper term of six years on count one and two concurrent four-year sentences on counts two and three. Ames appeals.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment does not preclude a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. (Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 857.) "Where the search is for a proper purpose, . . . even in the absence of particularized suspicion, a search conducted under the auspices of a properly imposed parole search condition does not intrude on any expectation of privacy 'society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate."'" (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754, quoting in part Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 517, 526.)
This does not mean, however, that a parolee has no protection from unreasonable searches. (People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Rather, if a parole search is made too often or at an unreasonable hour, is unreasonably prolonged or demonstrates arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer, it will be deemed to violate constitutional principles and the evidence acquired thereby will be rendered inadmissible. (Id. at pp. 753-754.) "Where the motivation [underlying a parole search] is unrelated to rehabilitative and reformative purposes or legitimate law enforcement purposes," the search will be deemed arbitrary for Fourth Amendment purposes. (In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004.)
The standard governing our review of the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress is well established. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) We must defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, that are supported by substantial evidence, but we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.)
Here, Ames does not contest the validity of the initial searches of his car and his home, but contends that the searches on February 14 and 15 could not be justified on the basis of his acceptance of the parole search condition. However, one of the fundamental purposes of a parole search condition is to deter crime and protect the public, a purpose for which the Fourth Amendment allows suspicionless searches. (People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 753; see Samson v. California, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 853 [recognizing that a state has a substantial interest in supervising parolees and reducing recidivism].) If law enforcement officers are constitutionally permitted to conduct suspicionless searches so long as those searches are not arbitrary or oppressive, it certainly follows that they may also conduct searches that, as here, are based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, subject to a similar restriction. (See Samson v. California, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 848-849, citing United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 121-122.)
In this case, the challenged searches were not unreasonable or arbitrary, but were based on "a law enforcement purpose, i.e., to look for stolen property[.]" (In re Anthony S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004.) The fact that Ames was in custody at the time the searches were conducted does not negate the reasonableness or constitutional validity of the search. (See People v. Hunter (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153, discussing People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591-596 & People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 536.)
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Ames's contention that the searches of his residence on February 14 and 15 were constitutionally infirm and affirm the judgment of conviction on the charges arising from the evidence seized during those searches.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., AARON, J.