Opinion
E073293
05-01-2020
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Allison Acosta and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1800324) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean Lafferty, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Allison Acosta and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant A.M. (minor) admitted committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) A juvenile court declared him a ward and committed him to the custody of the probation department, on home supervision, under specified conditions. He challenges the juvenile court's dispositional order contending that one of his probation conditions is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and should be either stricken or modified. We agree that the condition should be modified. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that minor committed three counts of committing a lewd act on a minor. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) At the initial hearing on the petition, the court detained him under a home supervision agreement. Thereafter, minor admitted the allegations. The parties stipulated that the probation officer's report contained a factual basis for the plea. The probation officer's report essentially stated minor, who was 12 years old at the time, had sex with his eight-year-old sister; he also committed lewd acts with his seven-year-old and four-year-old half brothers. Minor was interviewed by a social worker/forensic investigator and told her he got the idea from pornographic Web sites he had discovered on his own. The juvenile court subsequently adjudged minor a ward of the court and placed him under the care, custody, and control of the probation department, under specified conditions. The court set a 15-day placement review, with home supervision to terminate upon placement at an appropriate facility.
ANALYSIS
The Probation Condition Should Be Modified
Minor challenges the probation condition that provided he was to "not knowingly possess sexually explicit materials." He contends this probation condition (hereinafter, the condition) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and should be stricken or modified. We disagree that it should be stricken, but will modify it for clarity.
At the outset, we note the People's claim that minor failed to raise this issue in juvenile court and therefore has forfeited the claim on appeal. However, minor's challenge to the condition as facially vague and overbroad "presents an asserted error that is a pure question of law, easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888 (Sheena K.).) Thus, his challenge was not forfeited by the failure to raise it in juvenile court. (Id. at p. 889.)
A. Relevant Law
"A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile. [Citation.] That discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse. [Citation.]" (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order " 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.' " (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) "[T]he overbreadth doctrine requires that conditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation." (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.)
"Merely because a condition could have been drafted with more precision does not make it unconstitutional." (People v. Holzmann (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246.) "[T]he relevant question is whether a person who wants to comply with the law can reasonably understand how to do so—not whether a person seeking to break the law can find some ambiguity in it." (Id. at p. 1245.)
B. The Condition Should Be Modified
Minor argues the term "sexually explicit materials" leaves a person to guess what is prohibited and is not limited to inappropriate material. He claims, for example, that the condition prohibits him "from reading any high school biology textbook explicating the process of sexual reproduction" and "from consulting nearly any dictionary." He contends the condition prohibits him from possessing "a vast array of materials necessary to a rounded education." He further points out that the condition is not limited to prohibiting him from possessing child pornography.
In the interest of clarity, we will modify the condition. Since we understand the intention of the condition was to prohibit minor from seeing pornography or child pornography, we will modify the condition to read: Not knowingly possess or access materials containing pornography or child pornography. As used herein, "pornography" means materials depicting obscene matter as described in Penal Code section 311, subdivision (a), and "child pornography" means materials depicting a child involved in sexual conduct as described in Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The probation condition is modified to read: Not knowingly possess or access materials containing pornography or child pornography. As used herein, "pornography" means materials depicting obscene matter as described in Penal Code section 311, subdivision (a), and "child pornography" means materials depicting a child involved in sexual conduct as described in Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J. We concur: MILLER
J. RAPHAEL
J.