Opinion
A149940
08-22-2018
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JW15-6219)
Defendant A.M. appeals from the San Francisco Superior Court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The contested evidence, a knife, was found on A.M.'s person when he was detained and handcuffed after he approached an officer during a traffic stop involving a suspected stolen vehicle and indicated the car belonged to him. A.M. argues the court erred in concluding a valid detention and arrest occurred. Seeing no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
At 5:17 p.m. on October 30, 2015, San Francisco Police Department officer Matthew Hackard, while on patrol driving southbound on Mission Street, saw a black Jeep with no license plates blocking 3940 Mission Street, in apparent violation of the Vehicle Code. Officer Hackard recognized the driver, Roberto Reyes, as an individual he previously detained in connection with a car theft and knew to be a parolee. He made eye contact with Reyes, who "quickly turned his head away." Sitting in the Jeep with Reyes was a female companion in the front passenger seat.
Officer Hackard pulled his patrol car behind the Jeep and stepped out of his car to conduct a traffic stop. Reyes could produce no identification and did not possess the Jeep's keys. Officer Hackard, alone and concerned about suspicious movements Reyes made while in the car, handcuffed him, escorted him out of the vehicle, and placed him facing toward the driver's side passenger door of the Jeep. Reyes then stated the Jeep "was his friend's vehicle." The passenger remained in the car.
At that point, Officer Hackard saw A.M. walk toward the Jeep with his hands in the front pocket of the black, hooded sweatshirt he wore, which put Officer Hackard on alert because he knew, based on his experience and training, "people will conceal weapons on their person in the front of their clothing, pockets of large baggie clothing." As A.M. neared the Jeep, Reyes said A.M. owned the vehicle. A.M. then told Officer Hackard the Jeep "was his car." Next, Officer Hackard ordered A.M., now five feet away from the vehicle, to step back and walk away from the Jeep. A.M. complied, turning around and walking to the sidewalk roughly 20 to 30 feet away from the Jeep.
Upon conducting a records check over the radio, Officer Hackard learned the Jeep was reported stolen. He saw Reyes attempt to communicate with A.M. by making eye contact, nodding his head, and mouthing the word "leave." A.M. made eye contact with Reyes but did nothing "furtive, suspicious, [or] noncooperative." After learning the vehicle was reported stolen, Officer Hackard ordered A.M., who was still standing on the sidewalk, "to stay there" or "stay where he was." A.M. complied. Officer Hackard requested backup.
Eight officers in four patrol cars arrived quickly. Officer Marcus Wells, who arrived at about 5:22 p.m., "immediately stepped out of the patrol car." Officer Wells approached A.M. in response to Officer Hackard's request to his fellow officers of "can you guys get that guy," referencing A.M. Out of a concern A.M. was suspicious or threatening, Officer Wells ordered him to remove his hands from his hoodie pocket and face a wall. A.M. complied and did not resist.
Next, Officer Wells performed a cursory pat search and found no weapons. He did not have a warrant to either search or arrest A.M. Concerned for officer safety because his back was turned to Mission Street and based on the overall "totality of the circumstances," Officer Wells handcuffed A.M. A.M. continued to cooperate. Officer Wells then "escorted" A.M. to the patrol car, holding onto his arm as he walked.
Officer Wells began to seat A.M. in the backseat of the patrol car, and in the course of doing so, felt a large, sharp object while placing his hands on A.M's chest near the sweatshirt pocket. Officer Wells immediately recognized that the object was a knife and removed it from the pocket. The discovery of the knife occurred about 90 seconds after Officer Wells arrived at the scene. At that point, Officer Wells read A.M. his Miranda rights. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444-446.)
On November 2, 2015, the San Francisco District Attorney's office filed a juvenile wardship petition in San Francisco County Superior Court alleging A.M. unlawfully possessed a dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code section 21310, a felony offense. A.M. filed a motion to suppress the knife, and the prosecution filed a motion in opposition.
" '[D]irk' or 'dagger' means a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death." (Pen. Code, § 16470.)
B. Motion to Suppress Evidence
The trial court heard and denied the motion to suppress. At the hearing, the court determined the officers made a "valid first detention" which "warped into an arrest and a valid arrest." The court found probable cause that the incident involved a stolen car connected to A.M.
The trial court focused on the following factors. Officer Hackard knew Reyes and believed he was a parolee; Officer Hackard suspected the vehicle was stolen, and the Department of Motor Vehicles records indicated it was stolen; Reyes was parked in a vehicle blocking a driveway; and Reyes turned away from the officer in a "strange way or a furtive way," made a "furtive gesture reaching under the seat," and mouthed to A.M. to leave.
The court also emphasized that A.M. "claim[ed] a connection to the stolen vehicle investigation," kept his hands in the front pocket of a black hooded sweatshirt, and Officer Wells was concerned because weapons are often concealed in baggy clothing. The court characterized Officer Hackard's knowledge that the vehicle was reported stolen and A.M.'s claim to ownership of it as "important."
Following denial of his motion to suppress, A.M. admitted to an amended misdemeanor charge of possession of a dirk or dagger per Penal Code section 21310. This timely appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The prosecution bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search or seizure. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136; People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.) The court defers to the trial court's factual findings, whether express or implied, if supported by substantial evidence, but exercises "independent judgment" in determining the legality of a search "on the facts so found." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) This standard of review applies to both adult criminal and juvenile court proceedings. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
An appellate court "must accept factual inferences in favor of the trial court's ruling. [Citation.] If there is conflicting testimony, [the court] must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluations of credibility, and the version of events most favorable to the People, to the extent the record supports them." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) The court cannot reverse merely because circumstances may support a contrary finding. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 823.)
B. Detention, Arrest, and Search
1. The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Detain A.M.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and "shall not be violated." (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9.) An individual "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 789.)
The threshold question here is whether there was a "seizure," and if so, when. It seems clear a detention occurred when A.M. complied with Officer Hackard's order to "stay where he was" or to "stay there" on the sidewalk. Generally, a detention occurs when circumstances indicate to a reasonable person he or she is not free to leave due to an officer's "physical force or a show of authority." (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 553-554; Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 789-790.) A detention arises when an officer "commands" an individual to cease moving, such as when an officer states "Hold it. Police[]" or "Hold on. Police," and the individual complies. (People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 554, 557; People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 643.) Here, we have no trouble concluding Officer Hackard's command was a show of authority qualifying as a detention.
A temporary detention or "brief, investigatory stop" is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when justified by reasonable suspicion. (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30.) Reasonable suspicion "only requires facts connecting the suspect to 'criminal activity' more generally." (Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 780 (Cornell).) Our Supreme Court recently held that " '[a] detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.' [Citation.]" (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 837-838.)
A few principles are instructive. First, courts assess reasonable suspicion objectively based on "whether the circumstances as subjectively perceived by the officer provide a reasonable basis for the [detention]." (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) This test is specific to the detainee. (People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233.) Officers cannot base reasonable suspicion solely on a "mere hunch" of a connection to criminal activity or on factors unrelated to the defendant, such as proximity to criminal activity. (People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 887 [no reasonable suspicion based on an officer's hunch defendant was connected to drug activity because she walked near a suspected drug house]; see also Cornell, supra, at p. 781 [no reasonable suspicion when a man made no furtive movements, spoke to no one, and did not appear to conceal anything in his hands or clothing].)
Under these principles, the trial court properly concluded specific and articulable facts existed given the totality of the circumstances. First, Officer Hackard established more than a mere hunch of A.M.'s involvement in criminal activity. (See People v. Pitts, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) A.M. stepped off the curb and walked directly within five feet of the vehicle, made eye contact with Reyes, and explicitly claimed a connection to a suspected stolen vehicle. Importantly, Officer Hackard knew the Jeep was reported stolen at the time he detained A.M. Also, Reyes, a known parolee and current subject in a felony investigation, claimed A.M. was involved. In addition, officers suspected A.M.'s clothing could conceal a weapon or other contraband. Taken together, A.M.'s actions, along with his proximity to the stolen Jeep and Reyes's involvement, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a lawful detention.
2. The Use of Handcuffs Was Permissible to Effectuate the Detention
A.M. contends that even if he was lawfully detained, the detention became unlawful due to the use of handcuffs to restrain him. He argues the circumstances of the detention did not justify the use of handcuffs and transformed the detention into a de facto arrest, an impermissible degree of restraint, he asserts, because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Both aspects of A.M.'s argument are without merit. The use of handcuffs was permissible to protect the officers during the detention, and even if the seizure is viewed as an arrest, it was supported by probable cause.
The use of handcuffs does not necessarily invalidate an otherwise lawful detention. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 675; People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1517.) Handcuffing does not transform a detention into an arrest if the officer reasonably believes the suspect poses a physical threat or would flee. (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 759.)
The use of handcuffs was permissible to effectuate the detention in this case. Based on objective circumstances, officers reasonably suspected A.M.'s involvement in automobile theft, potentially a dangerous felony offense. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) Additionally, Officer Wells was concerned for his safety because of the heavy foot traffic on Mission Street and his vulnerability to persons passing behind him. Citing his investigator's testimony based on a site visit on a different day, A.M. claims the foot traffic was light. He also argues Officer Wells could have positioned himself to avoid pedestrians and one or more of the backup officers could have assisted him. These factual matters were necessarily resolved against him in the trial court. We cannot revisit them on appeal.
A.M. insists Officer Wells's reasoning would justify the handcuffing of any suspect on a public street. He is incorrect. Each case is decided on its own circumstances. Officer Wells was detaining a felony suspect on a busy street, surrounded by other possible suspects; he was not, for example, investigating someone on the street for suspected misdemeanor marijuana possession, absent any circumstances indicating possible danger, as in In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 439. The circumstances here justified the marginal intrusion of handcuffs. Even assuming A.M. was placed under de facto arrest, as he argues, this does not change the analysis. The record supports the court's conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest him, as explained below.
3. The Officers Had Probable Cause to Arrest A.M.
"When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by probable cause." (People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673; see Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 630.) The officers had no warrant, so they had to establish probable cause. "[P]robable cause means 'a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.' " (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7.) In order to determine if probable cause exists, the court "look[s] to whether facts known to the arresting officer 'at the moment the arrest was made' [citation] ' "would persuade someone of 'reasonable caution' that the person to be arrested has committed a crime." ' " (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) The court uses an objective test of reasonableness to "assess whether the circumstances as subjectively perceived by the officer provide a reasonable basis for the seizure. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) The "essence" of probable cause is if officers hold " 'a reasonable ground for belief of guilt" ' '[citation], where the belief is " ' "particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.' " ' " (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's probable cause finding The factors supporting probable cause are largely the same as those establishing reasonable suspicion, bearing in mind that the events here unfolded in a fairly rapid sequence. A reading of the record most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court's finding that, at the point A.M. was handcuffed, the officers had an objectively valid belief that he had committed a felony, thus supplying probable cause to arrest.
4. Assuming There Was a Search, It Was a Lawful Search Incident to Arrest
Whether a "search" took place on the facts provided here is debatable. The record shows Officer Wells discovered the knife inadvertently while guiding A.M. into the patrol vehicle. The intrusion was no greater than that entailed in brushing against him enough to feel a sharp object underneath a layer of clothing, which seems less invasive than a pat search since finding something on A.M.'s person was not Officer Wells's objective when it occurred. But even assuming there was a "search," the fruits of the search were admissible. Officer Wells lawfully searched A.M. incident to his arrest. (See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 [a "search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest" (italics omitted)].)
III. Disposition
We affirm.
/s/_________
Streeter, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Reardon, J. /s/_________
Smith, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------