A penal statute must define an offense with sufficient clarity to permit ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and in such manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); People v. Schoondermark, No. 84SA99 (Colo. May 6, 1985); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983). Thus, the due process clauses of the federal and Colorado constitutions require articulation of definite and precise standards capable of fair application by judges, juries, police and prosecutors.

We agree with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Colorado, which recently rejected a vagueness challenge to prosecution under a statute providing for punishment of anyone who, "having the charge and custody of an animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink, or protection from the weather." People v. Allen, Colo., 657 P.2d 447, 448 (1983) (en banc) (citation omitted). The court pointed out that "[t]he necessity of providing standards flexible enough to ensure the effective application of legislative policy to changing circumstances frequently requires the use of such words as 'reasonable,' 'competent,' 'proper' and 'fair.'"

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Enea, 665 P.2d 1026; People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983); People ex rel. City of Arvada v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1982); Jennings, 641 P.2d 276; People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo.

Criminal statutes should be framed with clarity sufficient to inform a person of the standards of conduct imposed and to give fair warning of the acts which are forbidden. People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983); People ex rel. City of Arvada v. Nissen supra. However, due process of law does not require scientific exactitude in legislative draftsmanship.

Even under the circumstances where a constitutional attack on a statute may be presented to the trial court prior to trial and, consequently, without benefit of a trial record, adherence to the traditional concepts of standing is required. See, e.g., State v. Friedkin, 244 Ala. 494, 14 So.2d 363 (1943); State v. Wilkerson, supra; People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983); State v. Raybon, 242 Ga. 858, 252 S.E.2d 417 (1979); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 916, 96 S.Ct. 2619, 49 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976); People v. Jose L., 99 Misc.2d 922, 417 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y.Crim.Ct. 1979); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 364 A.2d 306 (1976). Unless these usual rules of standing are not applicable to the situation at bar, they should have precluded the trial court from deciding the constitutionality of the sexual misconduct statute in a factual vacuum.

That said, a law is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703; see also People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447, 449 (Colo.1983) (observing that due process does not require “mathematical exactitude in legislative draftsmanship”). Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it “is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”

That said, a law is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 ; see also People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447, 449 (Colo.1983) (observing that due process does not require "mathematical exactitude in legislative draftsmanship"). Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."

Even under the circumstances where a constitutional attack on a statute may be presented to the trial court prior to trial and, consequently, without benefit of a trial record, adherence to the traditional concepts of standing is required. See, e.g., State v. Friedkin, 244 Ala. 494, 14 So.2d 363 (1943); State v. Wilkerson, [ 54 Ala.App. 104, 325 So.2d 378 (1974)]; People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983); State v. Raybon, 242 Ga. 858, 252 S.E.2d 417 (1979); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 916, 96 S.Ct. 2619, 49 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976); People v. Jose L., 99 Misc.2d 922, 417 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y.Crim.Ct. 1979); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 364 A.2d 306 (1976). Unless these usual rules of standing are not applicable to the situation at bar, they should have precluded the trial court from deciding the constitutionality of the sexual misconduct statute in a factual vacuum.

The Colorado legislature intended and stated articulately that two or more incidents are sufficient to establish the pattern of sexual abuse. The legislature has opted for language "sufficiently general to address the essential problem under varied circumstances and during changing times." People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447, 449 (Colo. 1983). The 1989 amendment to section 18-3-405 provides an intelligent standard for permitting a rational distinction between a pattern of sexual abuse and one instance of sexual assault on a child.

Statutory terms need not be overly precise, however, because "the statutory language must strike a balance between two potential conflicting concerns: it must be specific enough to give fair warning of the prohibited conduct, yet must be sufficiently general to address the problem under varied circumstances and during changing times." Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d at 1368; see also People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983); People v. Schoondermark, 699 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1985).