• 1 The sole issue on this appeal is whether Danny Joseph was denied effective assistance of counsel. The right to effective assistance of counsel is absolute, even when private counsel is retained (see People v. Allen (3d Dist. 1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54), but defendant's representation cannot be called ineffective unless it reduced his trial to a sham or farce ( People v. Turner (3d Dist. 1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 847, 323 N.E.2d 371). Defendant has the burden of demonstrating actual incompetence which substantially prejudiced him. ( People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill.2d 18, 302 N.E.2d 3.) A claim of prejudice, however, cannot be based on mere conjecture ( People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill.2d 152, 330 N.E.2d 857), and the question of whether or not defendant was adequately represented must be decided on a case by case basis ( People v. Witherspoon), upon review of the whole record ( People v. Allen).

" ( People v. Stephens (1955), 6 Ill.2d 257, 259-260, 128 N.E.2d 731, 732.) A reviewing court has the authority to examine the trial record to determine the competency of even selected counsel ( People v. Allen (3d Dist. 1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54), but the defense counsel will not be considered to have acted so incompetently as to warrant a new trial unless, after examining the record, the reviewing court determines that the representation received by the defendant was so grossly inadequate as to reduce the proceedings to a farce or the caliber of representation afforded deprived the defendant of any opportunity of being found not guilty. People v. Allen (3d Dist. 1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54. • 10 The defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial.

Although the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that the better practice would have been to have defendant present, it nevertheless refused to reverse the conviction because there was no assertion that the jury selected was biased or unfair. Where trial counsel failed to file certain routine pretrial motions, the Court in People v. Allen, 132 Ill.App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54 (1971), questioned the reasonableness of trial counsel's conduct. However, the Court ultimately held: "The defendant was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one, for counsel is not required to be infallable [sic].

Here, the trial court allowed a listed witness to testify over objection that an incomplete address for the witness was given to defendant. In light of the fact that defendant has not shown that he was surprised or prejudiced thereby, we find no abuse of discretion. ( People v. Allen (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 1023, 270 N.E.2d 54. See also People v. Anderson (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 607, 614-15, 360 N.E.2d 1371.) Collier was listed as a witness. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that the defense sought to contact Collier either in Chicago or New York. Defendant was informed that witnesses were to be flown in from other States. Defendant made no showing that the unlisted witness could have been impeached had preparation been afforded; indeed, the State's assertion that Collier's testimony was consistent with the police statement and his preliminary hearing testimony has not been refuted.

( People v. Wesley (1964), 30 Ill.2d 131, 136, 195 N.E.2d 708; People v. Ruple (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 781, 786, 403 N.E.2d 129.) As is often stated, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one, for counsel is not required to be infallible. ( People v. Allen (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 1022, 270 N.E.2d 54.) Thus, our review does not extend to matters of judgment, discretion or trial tactics. (See, e.g., People v. Torres (1973), 54 Ill.2d 384, 392, 297 N.E.2d 142; People v. Martin (1970), 44 Ill.2d 489, 490-91, 256 N.E.2d 337.)

In People v. Ruscitti (1963), 27 Ill.2d 545, 190 N.E.2d 314, it was held that no fatal variance existed between an indictment charging a defendant with armed robbery and evidence that a companion of the defendant actually committed the robbery while the defendant drove the automobile for their escape. A similar result was reached in People v. Allen (3d Dist. 1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54, where the proof showed that the alleged principal armed robber was actually an unarmed accessory. The factual similarity of these cases to the present appeal compels us to adopt the same reasoning and result here. Our logic is supported by section 5-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 5-3), wherein it is stated that a party to a crime who is determined legally accountable for the conduct of another may be convicted upon proof that the offense was committed and that he was so accountable even though the other person is not prosecuted or convicted or even acquitted.

The right to assistance of counsel embraces effective representation throughout all stages of the trial. ( McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 90 S.Ct. 1441; People v. Allen, 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54.) This right to effective assistance extends to all critical stages of a criminal proceeding which may generally be described as those stages at which a defendant's rights may be lost or waived, or the outcome of the proceedings otherwise substantially affected.

(See, e.g., People v. Watkins (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 369, 373, 340 N.E.2d 92.) Accordingly, defendants have the burden of showing that surprise or other prejudice resulted from noncompliance with the requirement that the State supply names and addresses of prospective witnesses. See People v. Steel (1972), 52 Ill.2d 442, 450, 288 N.E.2d 355; People v. Allen (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 1023, 270 N.E.2d 54, appeal denied (1971), 48 Ill.2d 593. • 5 The record does not support the conclusion that the State failed to meet its burden under Rule 412 to furnish "last known addresses."

The record does not establish the need for an interpreter. People v. Allen (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54. Defendant's final argument in his post-conviction appeal is that the prosecution purposely withheld evidence helpful to the defense.

The co-defendants were not called during the trial to testify. In People v. Allen, 132 Ill. App.2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54, it was held that where a co-defendant was removed from the trial at a subsequent time after defendant's arraignment, and where such co-defendant was not called to testify during the trial, the defendant was not prejudiced by the severance and there was no reversible error. The motion to sever had been pending for nearly a month and defendant had no particular right to assume that it would be denied.