Opinion
C042744.
11-25-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALLEGHENY CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Allegheny Casualty Company (Allegheny) appeals from an order refusing to discharge an order of forfeiture and set aside the summary judgment. Allegheny contends the imposition of release conditions invalidated the bail bond contract. We disagree. Allegheny also contends the summary judgment is void as to the bail agent. The County properly concedes this issue.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 28, 2001, Frank Calabrettas Bail House Bail Bonds (Bail House Bail Bonds), acting as an agent for American Surety Company, posted a bond in the amount of $30,000 to secure the release of Miguel Carrazco. Carrazco had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152) with a prior conviction for driving under the influence within the preceding 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23550.5). Bail for this offense was $25,000. Carrazco was charged with violating his probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2.) Bail for this offense was set at $5,000.
Based on Carrazcos prior record, the People moved to have bail increased. After hearing argument on the matter, the court exonerated the $25,000 bond and increased the bail amount to $70,000. Bail House Bail Bonds, acting as an agent for Allegheny, posted the $70,000 bond.
In addition to increasing the bail, the court "post[ed] conditions if he makes bail. Obviously one is he will not drive at all. He will not possess any alcohol. He will submitted [sic] to search and seizure. He will submit to testing, and he will not be in any place where alcohol is the chief item of sale. I am giving him verbal notice that his license is revoked . . . [and] [n]o firearms." The court further indicated it expected Carrazco to attend three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings a week.
Carrazco was ordered to be present at the next review hearing which was set for September 11, 2001. He failed to appear at that hearing and bail was forfeited that day. Summary judgment was entered against Allegheny and Bail House Bail Bonds on November 1, 2002.
DISCUSSION
I
Allegheny first contends the imposition of additional conditions upon Carrazcos bail invalidated the bail contract. We agree with the premise that a court may not vary the terms of the undertaking. "It is a familiar rule of law that sureties cannot be held beyond the terms of their contract of suretyship. They have a right to declare in their bond the terms and conditions upon which they shall be bound and to stand on the precise terms of that contract." (San Luis Obispo County v. Ryal (1917) 175 Cal. 34, 36.)
"The surety guarantees that the defendant will appear at the specific time and place and if the defendant fails to appear at the specified time and place, the surety is absolutely indebted to the state for the amount of the bond. [Citation.] The scope of a suretys contractual obligation under the . . . bond is defined by applicable statutory law and language of the bond itself. [Citation.]" (People v. Allen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 575, 581.)
Under the precise terms of the contract here, Allegheny guaranteed that Carrazco would appear on September 11, 2001, and if he did not, Allegheny would pay $70,000 to the State of California. Bail was forfeited exclusively as a result of Carrazcos failure to appear as ordered, the precise condition which Allegheny had secured. Put another way, "[Allegheny] agreed that, in the event [Carrazco] did not appear [as ordered], it would pay the amount of the bond. [Carrazco] having failed to appear, we see no reason why [Allegheny] is not liable upon its contract." (People v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1930) 107 Cal.App. 160, 164.)
Further, we do not agree that the public safety conditions imposed by the court subjected Allegheny to any increased liability in the event of Carrazcos failure to abide by those conditions. The public safety conditions were imposed upon Carrazcos release. There is no suggestion in the record that violation of any of those conditions would result in the forfeiture of his bond. To the contrary, violation of those conditions would have led to the revocation of Carrazcos release. Upon Carrazcos being taken into custody by the sheriff, this revocation of release would have exonerated bail and removed Alleghenys liability. (People v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 773, 785.)
II
Allegheny next contends the summary judgment erroneously holds the bail agent jointly liable on the bond. The County correctly concedes this point. (People v. Landon White Bail Bonds (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 66, 73.) This appears to be a clerical error which we have the inherent authority to correct. (See Aspen Internat. Capital Corp. v. Marsch (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1199, 1204; Lane v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 165, 168.) Accordingly, we shall direct the trial court to correct the judgment to remove Bail House Bail Bonds as a judgment debtor.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is ordered to correct the judgment, removing Bail House Bail Bonds as a judgment debtor. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., HULL, J.