Opinion
2011-12-20
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Erik ALKE, appellant.
Bernard V. Kleinman, PLLC, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary Fidel and Jill Gross–Marks of counsel), for respondent.
Bernard V. Kleinman, PLLC, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary Fidel and Jill Gross–Marks of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McGann, J.), rendered November 9, 2009, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Hanophy, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his oral statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the People's argument, the defendant's contention that his oral statements to law enforcement officials should have been suppressed since he was in custody and had not been advised of his Miranda rights ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) is preserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05[2] ). However, the defendant's contention is without merit. The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the defendant, who had voluntarily accompanied the police to the police precinct, was not in custody at the time he made his statements to the police ( see People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89; People v. Martin, 68 A.D.3d 1015, 1016, 890 N.Y.S.2d 646; People v. Pegues, 59 A.D.3d 570, 571, 873 N.Y.S.2d 160; People v. Ellerbe, 265 A.D.2d 569, 570, 697 N.Y.S.2d 643). Additionally, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not establish that the defendant was intoxicated to the degree of mania, or that he was unable to understand the meaning of his statements as a consequence of intoxication ( see People v. Thornton, 87 A.D.3d 663, 663, 928 N.Y.S.2d 358; People v. Benjamin, 17 A.D.3d 688, 689, 793 N.Y.S.2d 547; People v. Roth, 139 A.D.2d 605, 606, 527 N.Y.S.2d 97). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his oral statements to law enforcement officials.
Contrary to the People's argument, the defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree is also preserved for appellate review. His argument in support of his trial motion of dismissal was sufficiently specific to alert the court to his position ( see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Demolaire, 55 A.D.3d 621, 621, 865 N.Y.S.2d 625; People v. Rose, 41 A.D.3d 742, 742, 840 N.Y.S.2d 363). However, the defendant's contention is without merit. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Penal Law §§ 15.05[3], 125.15[1]; People v. Licitra, 47 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 419 N.Y.S.2d 461, 393 N.E.2d 456; People v. Speringo, 258 A.D.2d 379, 380, 686 N.Y.S.2d 8; People v. Johnson, 205 A.D.2d 707, 708, 613 N.Y.S.2d 429). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The Supreme Court's Molineux rulings ( see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286), constituted a provident exercise of discretion, since the evidence at issue was admitted to show the defendant's intent to commit the crime charged, and the probative value exceeded the potential for prejudice to the defendant ( see People v. Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474, 479–480, 527 N.Y.S.2d 363, 522 N.E.2d 439; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808). In addition, the Supreme Court's limiting instruction to the jury served to alleviate any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of the evidence ( see People v. Holden, 82 A.D.3d 1007, 1008, 918 N.Y.S.2d 773; People v. Ramirez, 23 A.D.3d 500, 501, 805 N.Y.S.2d 617).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.