Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 199839, MCN: 2278861
Jenkins, J.
This is an appeal from a final judgment following the entry of a guilty plea by appellant Yakub Alhalim to felony assault with means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, and the subsequent revocation of his probation. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2006, an information was filed charging appellant with one felony count of assault with means of force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code, section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count one), and three misdemeanor counts of the same offense (counts two through four). The charges stemmed from the following facts.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
About 6:30 p.m. on August 13, 2006, San Francisco Police Officer John Ferrando responded to a report of an individual knocking people to the ground in the vicinity of the Embarcadero and Broadway Streets. Once there, Officer Ferrando interviewed several individuals, including Donald Mayeda, Joseph Costello, Ms. Maslard, and Alexandra Tripoli, who had either been knocked down or had witnessed others being knocked down by an individual described as a black male in his forties wearing a gray sweatshirt and green pants. Appellant was later detained, after which Ms. Tripoli and other witnesses identified him as the perpetrator of the crimes. When asked to explain his behavior, appellant responded: “They were in my [expletive] way.”
On November 6, 2006, appellant pled guilty to count one, felony assault with means of force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and the remaining charges against him were dismissed. Pursuant to the stipulated disposition, the trial court stayed imposition of a sentence and placed appellant on probation for three years subject to several conditions, including strict obedience to all laws.
On March 9, 2009, and then again on April 13, 2009, the prosecution filed petitions to revoke appellant’s probationary status on the ground that he had committed felony assault with a deadly weapon and with force likely to cause great bodily injury. These petitions were based on the following facts.
On September 19, 2008, at about noon, Wesley Flowers, property manager for the Elm Hotel in San Francisco, was in his office when appellant, a hotel resident, came to the door. Shortly before this visit, Flowers had ordered appellant to remove a device that was screwed into the door frame of his hotel room, which had a chain or cord running underneath the door. Appellant initially denied installing the device, but later told Flowers he did not want the device removed. Flowers nonetheless advised appellant that a maintenance person would visit his room shortly to remove the device.
On September 19, 2008, when appellant came to Flowers’s office, appellant again told Flowers he did not want the device removed. Appellant then pulled out a knife. Flowers yelled for help, and then climbed over his desk to try to escape. Appellant swung at Flowers and missed, but then swung again, striking Flowers in the chest with the knife. Another hotel employee who saw what had occurred called “911,” but appellant left the hotel, never to return. Appellant was later arrested in New York.
Appellant responded to the petition to revoke his probationary status with a denial of the allegations and a motion to continue the proceedings until after resolution of the charges in the 2008 matter involving the stabbing of Flowers (the 2008 criminal matter). The prosecution opposed appellant’s motion and, on April 29, 2009, the trial court denied it.
On May 7, 2009, the trial court held concurrently a probation revocation hearing in this matter and a preliminary hearing in the 2008 criminal matter. Afterwards, the trial court revoked appellant’s probationary status and held him to answer the charges in the 2008 criminal matter. On June 15, 2009, the trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of four years in state prison for the 2006 conviction. In addition, the trial court awarded appellant 350 days of custody credits and ordered him to pay a restitution fine and a parole revocation fine, each in the amount of $200. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, appellant raises two interrelated issues for our consideration. First, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue proceedings with respect to revocation of his probation until after disposition of the 2008 criminal matter. Second, appellant contends the trial court erred in holding the probation revocation hearing concurrently with the preliminary hearing in the 2008 criminal matter. According to appellant, these errors deprived him of his constitutional due process right to present a defense. Moreover, he says, the errors were “prejudice[ial] per se,” requiring automatic reversal. For reasons set forth below, we disagree.
We begin with the relevant legal principles. First and foremost, it is beyond dispute that a probationer has a due process right to defend against a petition to revoke his or her probationary status, and that such right includes an opportunity to present mitigating factors weighing against the revocation. (People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 873.) The purpose of this due process right is to “assure informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions.” (Ibid.)
Here, appellant challenges the trial court’s decisions to deny his request to continue the probation revocation hearing until after disposition of the 2008 criminal matter, and to schedule that hearing concurrently with the preliminary hearing in the 2008 criminal matter. Appellant reasons that there are distinctions between preliminary hearings in criminal matters and probation revocation hearings, which he says became blurred in this case when the two hearings were held concurrently. In particular, appellant points out that revocation of a defendant’s probationary status is not a criminal prosecution, and thus that the “full panoply of rights” available to criminal defendants does not apply. For example, appellant notes that the rules of evidence are more relaxed in probation revocation hearings than in criminal proceedings, making it easier for a prosecutor to prove its case against a probationer. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 876, fn. 8.) Further, probationers facing revocation have a right to offer mitigating factors to lessen punishment if they choose not to deny the violation. Thus, here, because the revocation hearing was held before a trial on the underlying criminal charges, appellant faced a dilemma in that, by arguing mitigating factors (i.e., self defense) at the revocation hearing, he undermined his ability to present a not-guilty defense at trial, jeopardizing his chances of acquittal.
We consider appellant’s two claims of error together, as we see no basis for distinguishing between them.
We agree with appellant that, given the lower standard of proof and more relaxed evidentiary rules that govern a probation revocation hearing, it is easier for prosecutors to achieve a probationer’s incarceration through the probation revocation process than through trial and conviction in a related criminal matter. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 873.) We also agree with appellant that, “[e]ven where a violation is proven or admitted, a probationer has a due process right to explain any mitigating circumstances and argue that the ends of justice do not warrant revocation.” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 873.) Exercise of this right is undoubtedly complicated where the probationer has yet to face trial in the criminal matter underlying the revocation, given that the probationer has a right against self-incrimination at trial that runs counter to the right to present mitigating factors in the revocation matter.
The California Supreme Court has likewise recognized this tension: “Because of the inapplicability of certain evidentiary rules and the lower standard of proof obtaining at a probation revocation hearing, the People are generally more likely to achieve a probationer’s incarceration through the probation revocation process than through the new prosecution and conviction. When a probationer is deterred from testifying at his revocation hearing by fears of self-incrimination at his subsequent trial, the People’s chances of securing his incarceration through the revocation proceeding are further enhanced. And if a probationer does successfully fight revocation by testifying at the hearing, the People’s chances of securing his conviction of a new offense will have been improved by the probationer’s having been forced, in effect, to be one of the prosecution’s principal witnesses in its case in chief at his trial.” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 876-877 [footnotes omitted].)
However, instead of alleviating this tension by doing what appellant suggests – prohibiting the scheduling of a probation revocation hearing before the criminal trial on the charges forming the basis for such revocation – the California Supreme Court has opted for a different approach. It has adopted an exclusionary rule of evidence. Pursuant to this rule, where a probation revocation hearing is held before resolution of the criminal charges forming the basis for the alleged probation violation, the prosecution is barred, upon a timely objection, from using the probationer’s testimony at the probation revocation hearing against the probationer in the subsequent criminal proceedings except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal where “the probationer’s revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived therefrom and his testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court’s admission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact the probability that the probationer has committed perjury....” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889.)
This exclusionary rule, the California Supreme Court explained, “allows the state to continue to press for revocation of probation either before or after a probationer’s trial on related charges, but insures that this scheduling discretion will not be influenced by the illegitimate desire to gain an unfair advantage at trial.” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889 [italics added].) Further, the California Supreme Court was careful to note that this accommodation made for a defendant’s rights in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required; rather, it is a matter left to the trial court’s sound discretion in the ordinary course of its administration of justice:
“Whatever their response to requests for accommodation of the conflicting constitutional rights of a defendant in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings, courts have consistently refrained from recognizing any constitutional need for such accommodation. Rather, the alleviation of tension between constitutional rights has been treated as within the province of a court’s discretion in seeking to assure the sound administration of justice. ‘There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the fact that a man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to block all civil litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter. Justice is meted out in both civil and criminal litigation.... The court, in its sound discretion, must assess and balance the nature and substantiality of the injustices claimed on either side.’ (Gordon v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1970) 427 F.2d 578, 580 [138 App.D.C. 308].).” (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 885.)
Following People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867, the California Supreme Court had reason to reaffirm its decision, holding in People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935, that, “as Coleman makes clear, by reason of its limited exclusionary rule, a probationer’s rights are not impaired by reason of the timing of his revocation hearing.”
Thus, under this California Supreme Court authority, there can be no doubt that the trial court in this case had discretion in scheduling the probation revocation hearing and the preliminary hearing in the 2008 criminal matter. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 897. See also People v. Preyer (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 568, 572.) We therefore review the trial court’s exercise of this discretion only to ensure it was reasonable. (People v. Jasper, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 935 [“Whether a revocation hearing should be held before trial rests in the reasonable discretion of the trial court”].)
In denying appellant’s request for a continuance of the probation revocation matter until a disposition could be reached in the 2008 criminal matter, and in scheduling the two hearings concurrently, the trial court stated as follows: “This is a similar course of conduct, both cases. So I am going to hear the evidence for the motion to revoke hearing at the same time as the preliminary hearing on May 7th.” Appellant describes this ruling as “perfunctory,” claiming it “suggests that [the trial court] was denying the motion as a matter of routine rather than engaging in an analysis of the prejudice to [him] from combining the probation revocation hearing and the preliminary hearing into a single proceeding.” Appellant also insists he should have been able to testify in his own defense at the probation revocation hearing without suffering negative consequences from doing so at the preliminary hearing in the 2008 criminal matter – something he claims could only have occurred if the revocation hearing was held after trial was conducted in the 2008 criminal matter. We reject both arguments.
With respect to appellant’s first argument, a more complete review of the record reveals the trial court’s ruling was not perfunctory, but, rather, was thoughtful and well-reasoned. At the time of the ruling, the trial court judge assured defense counsel that she had read appellant’s papers submitted in connection with the motion for continuance. The trial court then rejected defense counsel’s argument that holding the two hearings together would preclude appellant from testifying at the revocation hearing that he committed the 2008 assault in self defense, because, were he to do so, he would jeopardize his chances of acquittal in the 2008 criminal matter. In doing so, the trial court explained: “Yes, he can [testify in self defense at the revocation hearing]. Under Jasper-Coleman, he’s protected; [his testimony] cannot be used against him.” Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion, noting that both cases involve a “similar course of conduct.”
Thus, as the record demonstrates, after considering the parties’ papers and reviewing the relevant legal authority, the trial court ultimately relied upon principles of judicial economy in denying appellant’s motion based upon the similarity of the alleged offenses in the two matters. As other courts have recognized, judicial economy can be a valid basis for scheduling a probation revocation hearing before a criminal trial in a related case. (People v. Preyer, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 573.) While appellant may disagree with this, his disagreement is no basis for concluding that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 573-574 [“In the absence of a clear showing that its decision was arbitrary or irrational, a trial court should be presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate objectives and, accordingly, its discretionary determinations ought not be set aside on review”].)
With respect to appellant’s second argument, we conclude it is really nothing more than a challenge to the approach adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867, and reiterated in People v. Jasper, supra, 33 Cal.3d 931. Specifically, appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to schedule the probation revocation hearing before the preliminary hearing on the ground that such scheduling forced him to decide whether to testify in his own defense at the probation revocation hearing at the risk of incriminating himself in the 2008 criminal matter. While we sympathize with appellant’s dilemma, as we have already explained, the California Supreme Court has decided the best way to address it is not to bar scheduling a revocation hearing before the related criminal trial, but to bar prosecutorial use of the probationer’s testimony or its fruits in the subsequent criminal proceedings, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. Appellant does not claim the trial court violated the Jasper-Coleman exclusionary rule below. Moreover, while appellant expresses concern that hearsay medical records were admitted for purposes of the revocation hearing that may not have been admissible for purposes of the preliminary hearing, he acknowledges the trial court’s ruling in this regard was proper. (See People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 716; see also In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1529 [“[a] trial court is able to consider... evidence only for the limited purposes for which it is admitted”].) As such, because appellant has failed to demonstrate any particular prejudice he suffered from the trial court’s decision to hold the two hearings together in this case, we find no basis for reversing that decision. (See People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1168 fn. 8 [under principles of stare decisis, the decisions of the California Supreme Court are binding upon and must be followed by all California state courts].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J., Siggins, J.