Opinion
2014–09880 Ind.No. 954/13
05-02-2018
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Ainsley ALEXANDER, appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Sean H. Murray of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Matthew Luongo of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Sean H. Murray of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Matthew Luongo of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robert Charles Kohm, J.), rendered June 5, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts) and operating a motor vehicle without a license, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Steven W. Paynter, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress a handgun. An arresting officer testified that he observed the defendant's vehicle speeding and swerving into oncoming traffic. Thus, the police officers acted lawfully in attempting to stop the defendant's vehicle when they activated their lights and sirens (see People v. Frazier , 33 A.D.3d 934, 935, 826 N.Y.S.2d 292 ). However, rather than stopping, the defendant continued to drive at a high rate of speed and continued through a red light. Thus, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant once he came to a stop after crashing into a parked vehicle (see id. at 935, 826 N.Y.S.2d 292 ). After having lawfully stopped and arrested the defendant, a police officer looked into the defendant's vehicle through the open driver's door and saw a silver handgun on the floor under the steering wheel. Thus, the police were authorized to seize the handgun because it was in plain view (see id. ; People v. Diaz , 194 A.D.2d 688, 599 N.Y.S.2d 111 ).
The defendant's challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Romero, 71 A.D.3d 795, 896 N.Y.S.2d 417 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's guilt of both counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal Law § 265.03[1][b] ; [3]; People v. Galindo, 23 N.Y.3d 719, 722–724, 993 N.Y.S.2d 525, 17 N.E.3d 1121 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People presented evidence disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense of temporary and lawful possession of a weapon (see People v. Galindo, 23 N.Y.3d 719, 993 N.Y.S.2d 525, 17 N.E.3d 1121 ; People v. Hawkins, 258 A.D.2d 472, 685 N.Y.S.2d 253 ). The People also were entitled to rely on the statutory presumption that the possession of a weapon is presumptive evidence of intent to use the same against another person (see Penal Law § 265.15[4] ; People v. Galindo, 23 N.Y.3d at 722, 993 N.Y.S.2d 525, 17 N.E.3d 1121 ).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to both counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
RIVERA, J.P., MILLER, BRATHWAITE NELSON and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.