Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SF082949A
BLEASE, J.
The trial court, on remand, held an in camera hearing pursuant to a Pitchess motion filed by defendant Larry Alexander to determine the existence of any complaints alleging acts or statements of untruthfulness, propensity for fabrication or planting of evidence by six of the officers involved in defendant’s 2001 arrest for transportation of cocaine and possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11351.5). After reviewing files provided by the custodian of records, the court concluded only one complaint against one of the officers warranted disclosure. Defendant’s subsequent motion for new trial based on the late disclosure of that complaint was denied, and the court reinstated defendant’s original judgment of conviction and sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
On appeal, defendant asks us to conduct an independent review of the sealed records regarding his Pitchess motion. (See Evid. Code, § 1043.) He also contends the trial court’s denial of his Pitchess motion in 2002 resulted in prejudice through lost discovery opportunities and a lost plea bargain, requiring dismissal of the case. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Police and narcotics detectives observed defendant in what appeared to be a drug transaction. They detained defendant and searched his vehicle, finding cocaine hidden in baggies secreted in his gas tank.
Defendant was charged with sale or transportation of cocaine (count 1) and possession of cocaine base for sale (count 2). It was also alleged that defendant suffered two prior serious felonies within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i) and 1170.12; further undesignated references are to this code) and one prior conviction (§ 969).
Defendant filed a Pitchess motion on January 4, 2002, seeking information regarding past complaints against Officers Votino, Martinez, Fritts, Miles, Wentland and Dixon, all of whom were involved in his arrest, relating to acts or statements of untruthfulness, propensity for fabrication and planting of evidence.
On February 6, 2002, the trial court denied defendant’s motion without conducting an in camera hearing.
On April 12, 2002, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison as to count 1, and one year four months (one-third the middle term) on count 2 to run consecutively thereto.
Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment.
The California Supreme Court granted review and, on September 28, 2005, transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and “reconsider the cause in light of Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, and insofar as it may become necessary to reach the issue of a district attorney’s standing to appear on Pitchess motion, for reconsideration in light of People v. Alford (2003) 29 Cal.App.4th 1033. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.3(d).)”
On November 28, 2005, this court vacated its prior order, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court with the following directions: “[H]old an in-camera hearing at which the personnel records sought by defendant’s Pitchess motion shall be produced. The trial court shall determine whether the records are material to the defendant’s alleged scenario of police misconduct. If so, the trial court shall grant the request for discovery, allow the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice and order a new trial if prejudice is demonstrated. If not, the judgment of conviction shall be reinstated .
Pursuant to the order on remand, the trial court held several hearings related to defendant’s Pitchess motion. At the April 20, 2006, hearing, the city attorney informed defendant and the court it had documents going back to 1999, but none prior to that date due to its procedure of purging and destroying files after five years. The matter was continued to investigate the possibility of reconstructing records prior to that date, if any existed.
At the June 15, 2006, hearing, defendant requested that the court dismiss the case due to prejudice against him arising from his inability to obtain records for 1997 and 1998. The court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice and held an in camera hearing to review all records produced by the city attorney. The court concluded there was only one complaint dated February 16, 2000, against Officer Miles, which warranted disclosure.
At the June 16, 2006, hearing, the parties discussed possible ways to recreate the records from 1997 and 1998.
At the continued in camera hearing on June 20, 2006, the court reviewed additional personnel records provided by the city attorney for the years 1997 and 1998, and concluded that none warranted disclosure.
On July 5, 2006, defense counsel made a motion for new trial based upon the late disclosure of the complaint against Officer Miles, arguing defendant was prejudiced because the jury could have reached a different result had it heard about the complaint, and because defendant himself might have accepted the plea bargain offered by the prosecution instead of going to trial had he known that, contrary to what he had been told by fellow inmates, there was no evidence of relevant past complaints in the officers’ personnel files. The court denied the motion, concluding there was no prejudice on either front.
On August 1, 2006, defendant filed a supplemental Pitchess motion seeking additional information from the personnel file of Officer Miles related to the February 2000 complaint. The court denied the motion.
On January 5, 2007, the court denied defendant’s subsequent motion for new trial and, pursuant to this court’s order on remand, reinstated the judgment of conviction and imposed the original sentence against defendant, modifying the abstract of judgment to reflect that count 2 be stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I Independent Review of Sealed Record
Defendant asks us to conduct an independent review of the sealed records of the trial court’s hearing on his Pitchess motion to obtain discovery of the relevant officers’ personnel records. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225.) We have done so and find no error.
A trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess discovery motion will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039.)
Following the hearings related to the Pitchess motion, the court informed defendant there was only one discoverable item--the February 2000 complaint against Officer Miles. Having reviewed the sealed records, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion. The hearing disclosed no other evidence that any of the officers acted or made statements of untruthfulness, had a propensity for fabrication, or in any way planted or falsified evidence.
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court related to defendant’s Pitchess motion.
II Prejudice
Defendant contends the trial court’s initial denial of his Pitchess motion in 2002 resulted in prejudice because he was denied discovery opportunities and was further denied sufficient information with which to determine whether to accept the plea bargain offered. We disagree.
“[A]n accused must demonstrate that prejudice resulted from a trial court’s error in denying discovery. [Citations.]” (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 684.) “[T]he proper standard of analysis regarding whether a defendant was prejudiced from the denial of a discovery motion is to determine if there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different had the information been disclosed to the defense. . . . When the trial court excludes relevant, admissible evidence over the defendant’s objection, the proper standard of review is whether there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a different result had the evidence been admitted. [Citations.]” (People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 422.)
Defendant argues that the court’s initial decision to deny an in camera hearing in 2002 was improper because, despite the fact that an in camera hearing was later conducted following remand, it was discovered that documentation from 1997 and 1998 had been destroyed and the unavailability of documentation from that time period resulted in prejudice to defendant due to his inability to “review all applicable Pitchess material and follow all applicable leads.” We are not persuaded.
The trial court reviewed documentation from the relevant personnel files as far back as 1999. The city attorney was subsequently able to locate summary documentation for the years 1997 and 1998. That earlier documentation provided sufficient information to determine the nature of any complaint against the officers, the identity of the complaining party and the disposition of the complaint. We are confident, from our review of the transcripts of those in camera proceedings, that the court was provided with sufficient documentation from the officers’ personnel files from 1997 through 2002, and that defendant was provided with all relevant information responsive to his Pitchess motion.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the jury, had it had before it information related to the February 2000 complaint against Officer Miles, would have reached a conclusion more favorable to defendant. Miles, although involved in the process leading to defendant’s arrest, merely stopped defendant’s vehicle and detained defendant while other officers searched the vehicle and found drugs hidden in the gas tank. According to his testimony at trial, consisting of just three pages in all, his participation in the arrest was limited to the vehicle stop. He was neither asked to provide information, nor did he offer any, regarding the circumstances under which the drugs were found in defendant’s vehicle or any other aspect of the case. Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Miles with respect to that testimony, and did so.
We do not find it reasonably probable that the outcome of the case would have differed had the jury been presented with information regarding the February 2000 complaint against Officer Miles. (People v. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) We therefore conclude there was no prejudice to defendant.
Defendant also argues he suffered prejudice in the form of a “lost plea bargain.” That is, he was certain, based on information from other inmates, that the personnel files of the officers involved in his arrest contained complaints against those officers which would support his defense; however, had he known no such evidence existed, he “never would have gone to trial” and instead would have “taken the eight year deal . . . .” Again, we are not persuaded.
Following the in camera hearings on remand, in light of the absence of evidence of officer misconduct, defendant made a motion for new trial. He urged there, as he does here, that he was prejudiced by not having the Pitchess information because, had he “realized he was mistaken in his belief that there was a lot of documentation of officer misconduct,” he would have accepted the eight-year plea offer. While the trial court did not doubt defendant’s sincerity in that regard, it recalled that defendant “had adequate time to decide the issues in this case, the most important one being whether to plead or go to trial,” noting he did so with “the assistance of a trial attorney highly experienced and well versed in the facts of [defendant’s] case.” The court further noted its doubts that defendant would have accepted the plea offer, and stated, “I have severe doubts given the strength of your conviction before trial that you would have done that anyway. [¶] I believe you were set on going to trial. I know we delayed this case a little bit to give you additional time to think about it, which is not something we usually do, wait a day or more, but we did because it was a serious case. And I believe at the time you decided to go to trial is what you wanted to do with the stakes involved and regardless whether you had a Pitchess motion or not.” Adding that defendant took full advantage of the opportunity to present his “straightforward and graphic” version of events to the jury, the court rejected defendant’s claim of prejudice and denied the motion for new trial.
The record, such as it is, supports the trial court’s findings. The plea bargain was offered to defendant more than once. While we were not provided with a transcript of the proceedings related to the plea offer, we can infer from the statements of both the prosecution and the court that defendant was encouraged to carefully consider the offer and given sufficient time to do so. Defendant maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings and remained firm in his belief that Officer Fritts was “a crooked officer” who had planted evidence on more than one occasion.
Defendant likens his situation to cases in which incompetent trial counsel or trial court error has “improperly impeded [a defendant’s] ability to obtain a plea bargain,” citing to People v. Brown (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 537, 546; People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695 [defendant entered guilty plea based on misinformation from prosecutor and trial court regarding amount of custody credit available under plea offer]; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924 [defendant not competently counseled as to consequences of rejecting the offered plea]. Unlike those cases, however, the error urged by defendant here is due not to incompetent counsel or misinformation from the court or the prosecution, but to the court’s denial of his Pitchess motion. Nonetheless, we apply the same test as that applied in In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 938, that a defendant claiming prejudice must establish “a reasonable probability that, with effective representation, he or she would have accepted the proffered plea bargain.” (Fn. omitted.) Defendant fails to meet that burden. As we have already discussed at length, defendant was adamant that his arrest was the result of unethical and illegal conduct by at least one of the officers involved, and did not waiver from that position during the trial, maintaining his innocence throughout.
His self-serving statements now that he would have accepted the plea had he only known there was no evidence to support his allegations of officer misconduct is neither compelling nor sufficient to sustain his burden of proof as to prejudice. (In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938 [independent corroboration by objective evidence is required to prove prejudice].)
We conclude defendant was not prejudiced in his ability to participate in the plea bargaining process.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., HULL, J.