Opinion
A144398
11-19-2019
In re ALEJANDRO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEJANDRO R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ11017351)
Our prior opinion in this case addressed appellant Alejandro R.'s challenge to a probation condition requiring him to submit to the warrantless search of his electronic devices and his use of social media. (In re Alejandro R. (Dec. 30, 2015, A144398) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded the condition was valid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), but unconstitutionally overbroad. We modified the condition and affirmed.
The case now returns to us following a grant of review and transfer by the California Supreme Court. Our high court directed us to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). Having done so, we now dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant, the subject of a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), admitted a misdemeanor charge of being an accessory after the fact to the transportation and distribution of marijuana, a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). The police report from appellant's arrest stated he approached undercover officers outside a concert venue and "said something similar to, 'yo $10 bucks for a blunt.' " When an officer expressed interest, appellant directed him to another person seated nearby, from whom the officer purchased two marijuana cigarettes.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found appellant to be a ward of the court, but allowed him to remain at home. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring appellant to submit to the warrantless search of his electronic devices and his use of social media. Appellant challenged the condition as substantively invalid under Lent and unconstitutionally overbroad. In our prior opinion, we concluded the condition, while valid under Lent, was overbroad as imposed by the juvenile court. We modified the electronics search condition and otherwise affirmed the trial court's order.
The California Supreme Court granted review (Mar. 9, 2016, S232240) and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Ricardo P., S230923. In August 2019, our high court decided Ricardo P. and, as relevant here, invalidated an electronic search condition under the third prong of Lent where there was no evidence the defendant had used or would "use electronic devices in connection with . . . illegal activity." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1119-1120.) Ricardo P. did "not 'categorically invalidate electronic search conditions' in juvenile delinquency cases. [Citation.] . . . . The court held only that the broad search condition, as written and imposed by the juvenile court, was invalid under Lent because it was not reasonably related to [the defendant's] future criminality." (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 165-166.)
After issuing its decision in Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court, directing us to vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Ricardo P. We asked the parties to file supplemental briefs and vacated our opinion. The Attorney General filed a supplemental brief stating it was informed by personnel in the juvenile division of the Alameda County District Attorney's Office that appellant's probation in this case has terminated and his record has been sealed. The Attorney General indicated appellant's counsel has stipulated the issue is moot and any mootness exception is inapt.
II. DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
The parties assert the appeal is moot because appellant's probation has terminated. We agree. The termination of a defendant's probationary period renders an appeal challenging probation conditions moot. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611 [termination of probation mooted complaints regarding probation conditions].) Because appellant is no longer on probation, a ruling on the validity of the challenged probation condition would have no practical effect and would not provide him with effective relief.
The parties also stipulate, given the fact-bound and contextual nature concerning the validity of the probation condition at issue, that application of a mootness exception is not warranted. Again, we agree with the parties, and decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal. Because our high court has spoken on the validity of a similar probation condition, this appeal does not present such "a novel question of continuing public interest" (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232), "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (Ogunsalu v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 107, 111), that we should review the issues notwithstanding mootness. No other exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Banke, J.