Opinion
Appeal No. 3-13-0730
11-19-2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM J. ALCANTARA, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois, Circuit Nos. 13-CF-33 and 12-TR-96702 Honorable Robert P. Livas, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence where the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop after a computer check of the license plate of the vehicle defendant was driving revealed that the license plate was registered to a different vehicle. ¶ 2 The State appeals from the trial court's order granting the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence of defendant, William J. Alcantara. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 Defendant was charged with driving without a valid vehicle registration (625 ILCS 5/3-401 (West 2012)) and aggravated driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2012)). Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing the search, seizure, detention, and arrest was illegal as having been without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, warrant, consent, or authority. ¶ 5 At the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, Officer Thomas Gallas testified that on November 12, 2012, at 3:30 a.m., he observed a black Monte Carlo traveling northbound on Route 53. Gallas ran a check of the vehicle's license plate number. The check indicated that the license plate number was not registered to the Monte Carlo. Gallas initiated a traffic stop and asked the driver for his driver's license. The driver was identified as defendant. A check of defendant's driving record revealed that his driving privileges had been revoked. Defendant was charged with driving while license suspended and not having a valid vehicle registration. ¶ 6 Defendant's fiancee, Leslie Peguero, testified that on September 6, 2012, she and defendant traded in a Dodge Neon van to purchase the black Monte Carlo. On the same day, they paid a fee to the dealership to have the license plates from the van transferred to the Monte Carlo. Personnel at the dealership physically transferred the license plates from the van to the Monte Carlo but failed to forward the transfer application and fee to the State of Illinois until November 6, 2012. The transfer was complete on November 13, 2012. ¶ 7 Following defendant's arrest on November 12, 2012, Peguero called the dealership to inquire about the status of the license plate transfer. Dealership personnel apologized for the delay in processing the transfer. The owner of the dealership issued a handwritten note to Peguero acknowledging the dealership's delay in transferring the registration to the Monte Carlo. The note indicated that the dealership would "accept full responsibility for this matter." ¶ 8 The trial court found that the dealership had authority to transfer the license plates from the van to the Monte Carlo and, therefore, was acting as an agent of the State. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning that defendant's car would not have been driven illegally but for the failure of the State to act in good faith to fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to transfer the registration. The State filed a notice of appeal and certificate of impairment.
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence based on its finding that the dealership's act of delaying the registration transfer was attributable to the State. The State contends that Gallas was entitled to rely in good faith on the Secretary of State's records regarding the status of the license plate registration in forming probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle. ¶ 11 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to a two-part test. People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781. We give great deference to the trial court's factual findings, reversing only when those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. We assess those facts in relation to the legal issue presented, reviewing the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted under the de novo standard. Id. Here, there is no dispute as to the circumstances leading to the stop of defendant's vehicle. Therefore, we review the trial court's ultimate ruling on whether suppression was warranted de novo. ¶ 12 The federal and state constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of a person and is subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007); People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497 (2010). The reasonableness of a traffic stop is measured by the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. 1; People v. Cummings, 2014 IL 115769; see also 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2012). The investigatory stop must be justified at its inception. Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Cummings, 2014 IL 115769. A traffic stop is justified when there is a reasonable suspicion that a driver is committing a traffic violation. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781. The officer's suspicion must be more than an inarticulate hunch but need not rise to the level of probable cause. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497. ¶ 13 Here, the trial court's reasoning for granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence was that the dealership was authorized by the State to register license plate transfers and it was, therefore, an agent of the State, making the delay in registration attributable to the State and thus, presumably the State's fault. Who is responsible for the inaccurate record presents a very different, and separable, question from whether or not the specific officer on patrol, relying on that record, could form a reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop that defendant was committing a crime. We need not address the trial court's reasoning to answer the latter question, and we elect not to do so. ¶ 14 In this case, Gallas stopped defendant's vehicle because a computer check of defendant's license plate indicated that the plate was not registered to the black Monte Carlo driven by defendant on which the plates were displayed. Section 3-401(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that it is unlawful for a person to "drive or move *** upon any highway any vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder which is not registered or for which the appropriate fee has not been paid" except on a temporary basis when an application with the proper fee has been made by displaying evidence of application for the registration. 625 ILCS 5/3-401(a) (West 2012). At the time Gallas initiated the stop, reasonable suspicion existed for him to believe that defendant was committing the traffic violation of driving an unregistered vehicle. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress.
Police may conduct a computer check of a license plate without first observing a traffic violation. People v. Blankenship, 353 Ill. App. 3d 322 (2004).
¶ 15 CONCLUSION
¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. ¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.