Opinion
2018–01722 Ind. No. 40033/17
02-13-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ali AHSAN, Appellant.
Segal & Greenberg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Philip C. Segal of counsel), for appellant. Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Alexander Fumelli of counsel), for respondent.
Segal & Greenberg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Philip C. Segal of counsel), for appellant.
Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Alexander Fumelli of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Catherine M. DiDominico, J.), rendered December 20, 2017, convicting him of attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination (see U.S. Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6 ), that right is not unfettered (see People v. Francisco, 44 A.D.3d 870, 870, 843 N.Y.S.2d 439 ; People v. Magrigor, 281 A.D.2d 561, 562, 721 N.Y.S.2d 827 ). The trial court has broad discretion in limiting cross-examination when questions are repetitive, irrelevant, only marginally relevant, or concern collateral issues (see People v. Cruz, 131 A.D.3d 706, 707, 15 N.Y.S.3d 692 ; People v. Francisco, 44 A.D.3d at 870, 843 N.Y.S.2d 439 ; People v. Cato, 5 A.D.3d 394, 394, 772 N.Y.S.2d 548 ). Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to limit the defendant's inquiry during his cross-examination of the prosecution witness, who was the complainant's brother, about the particular model of the cell phone used to take photographs of the complainant's injuries (see People v. Cruz, 131 A.D.3d at 707, 15 N.Y.S.3d 692 ; People v. Rivera, 98 A.D.3d 529, 529, 948 N.Y.S.2d 912 ).
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish intent to cause physical injury (see Penal Law §§ 120.00[1] ; 110.00; CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19–20, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 ; People v. Carrington, 155 A.D.3d 888, 889, 63 N.Y.S.3d 710 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), the defendant's intent to cause physical injury can be inferred from evidence that the defendant grabbed the complainant's arms with both his hands, squeezed her arms, and "threw [her] back" (see People v. Carrington, 155 A.D.3d at 889, 63 N.Y.S.3d 710 ; Matter of Eric C., 281 A.D.2d 543, 544, 722 N.Y.S.2d 61 ; Matter of Marcel F., 233 A.D.2d 442, 442–443, 650 N.Y.S.2d 274 ).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643–644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
LEVENTHAL, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, DUFFY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.