Opinion
B196478
4-18-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL A. AHRENS, Defendant and Appellant.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Defendant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
After a nolo contendere plea, appellant was found guilty by the court of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. Appellant appeals from the resulting judgment. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
The facts, according to the probation report, are as follows.
In February 2004, sheriffs deputies responded to a complaint regarding suspected child abuse submitted by the victims family counselor. They questioned the two alleged minor victims in March 2004.
Victim No. 1 had confided to the family counselor that appellant had molested her and her sister over a period of time. She described incidents that included appellants making her remove her clothes in front of him, forcing her and other female members of the household to walk through the house naked and making them sunbathe naked. She also reported that appellant gave her vaginal exams using digital penetration, and he had fondled her breasts in skin-to-skin breast exams. According to victim No. 1, appellant used the Bible to get her to comply, and the abusive conduct occurred when her mother was not at home. She recalled the incidents started when she was five years old, and they continued until she was 15 years old.
Victim No. 2 told sheriffs deputies that appellant had committed multiple sexual acts against her from age five until after she was 15 years of age. These acts included vaginal and rectal exams, initially with appellant using a flashlight and cotton ball and, later, pressing his penis against her vagina without penetration. She indicated appellant had pressed his penis to her vagina about 50 to 100 times. She described three to five incidents of oral copulation beginning at age 11. She reported that appellant had fondled her breasts as well.
In addition, victim No. 2 stated that appellant was obsessed with the idea that she was "damaged or no longer a virgin/pure." She described appellants further bizarre behavior: he sometimes wore a steel bowl on his head to stop "harmful energy rays" directed at him by governmental agencies; he made the victim tell him that she loved him and that her body belonged to him; he discussed taking on a second wife; and he expressed a desire to take the family to a nudist camp.
Victim No. 2 said she asked appellant several times from age five to age seven to stop these abusive acts. Appellant promised to do so, but the acts continued. Appellant occasionally stopped, only then to resume the acts several weeks later.
Appellants wife of over 19 years told the deputies that he had been physically abusive to her for a long time. She said he had become mentally ill, paranoid and delusional, as well as sexually abusive. She stated she had been present during several exams of the victims; the exams occurred when the victims were very young and appellant used a flashlight to examine their pelvic areas to make sure they were "pure." She thought the exams were appropriate and was unaware of any sexual misconduct by appellant.
Appellant was arrested and questioned while in custody. He stated he did nothing illegal. He accused the sheriffs department of illegally questioning the victims outside his presence and stated the deputies had forced the victims to make false allegations against him. He quoted the Bible and declared the year was 2003 instead of 2004.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2004, a felony complaint was filed against appellant, charging him with two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. The complaint alleged appellant had engaged in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with each of the two victims. Appellant appeared in propria persona at the bench warrant hearing, during which the court declared a doubt as to appellants mental competence. The court adjourned the criminal proceedings and appointed a public defender for appellant.
The court subsequently appointed a psychiatrist to render an opinion on appellants mental status. The court-appointed psychiatrist gave an opinion that appellant was incompetent to stand trial and should be provided treatment.
Appellant was found mentally incompetent after a mental competence hearing held in September 2004. The court ordered appellant committed to Patton State Hospital, and it directed that appellant was not to be hospitalized beyond a tentative date of January 25, 2006. By stipulation, the maximum commitment date was later set at July 23, 2007.
In January 2005, appellants appointed counsel declared a doubt as to appellants mental competency, and criminal proceedings remained adjourned.
In October 2005, a Penal Code section 1368 hearing for involuntary medication was held for appellant. (See Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166.) Appellants treating psychiatrist at Patton State Hospital testified that appellant had impaired reality contact in testing and paranoid delusions. He stated that appellant thought there was a conspiracy against him, thought Patton State Hospital was putting poison in his food and did not know he had a psychiatric problem. The doctor opined that appellants delusional thoughts might not be responsive to medication, but there were other symptoms affecting appellants competency that might be treated by medication. The doctor testified that appellant had refused to take the medication medically approved for his symptoms to restore him to competency.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated that, when taken to Patton State Hospital in the past, he was forced to take medication that had caused heart palpitations, heart stoppage and problems with his brain. He testified he has had to defend himself against false allegations made by people in the legal and medical systems. Those individuals, according to appellant, were attempting to cover up for their "multimillion" dollar thefts of his intellectual property, including songs he wrote for the Beatles, Beach Boys, Jackson Five and Rolling Stones in the 1960s and 1970s.
The court considered the doctors testimony as well as that of appellant. The court concluded appellant was not able to make a rational or reasoned treatment decision, finding appellants rejection of medication was largely influenced by his paranoia. The court therefore granted the petition for involuntary medication.
A court trial on appellants mental competency was held in April 2006. The court found appellant to be mentally competent. Appellant was ordered remanded to the custody of the sheriff, and criminal proceedings against appellant were resumed. On respondents motion, appellant was ordered housed in the mental health ward of the county jail pending the criminal proceedings.
Appellant was arraigned on May 2, 2006. At this hearing, appellant was personally advised of, and waived, his rights to a jury or court trial, to a preliminary hearing, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to subpoena witnesses in his defense and against self-incrimination. Appellant was also advised of the possible consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, including the maximum penalty and administrative sanctions. In addition, he was told of the possible legal effects and maximum penalties incident to subsequent convictions for the same or similar offenses. Defense counsel joined in his clients waivers.
Pursuant to a plea bargain and negotiated disposition calling for a six-year prison sentence, appellant pleaded no contest to count one, violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). The court found each waiver was knowingly, understandingly and explicitly made and accepted appellants plea. After determining there was a factual basis for appellants plea, the court found him guilty as charged as to count one.
Appellants sentencing hearing took place on May 23, 2006. Before sentencing, the court confirmed that appellant understood the present offense would count as a strike and a violent felony that would limit his precustody credit to 15 percent. Defense counsel joined in appellants nolo contendere plea and stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based upon a review of the since-generated probation report and the police reports.
Based on a stipulated arrest date of July 20, 2004, the court found appellant was in actual custody for 672 days and was entitled to 100 good time/work time days, for a total precustody credit of 772 days. Appellant waived arraignment for judgment and stated there was no legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced.
The court found appellant was not eligible for probation and imposed the low term of six years in state prison on count one. The court ordered appellant to pay a victim restitution fine to the state fund of $1,200 and a parole revocation fine of $1,200, which was suspended. The court further ordered payment of a $20 court security fee and a sex offender fine of $200. The court set a maximum parole period of five years and advised appellant he could be sent back to state prison for up to a year for each violation if he reoffended. Appellant was ordered to provide DNA and other biological samples and fingerprints and to submit to AIDS testing. The court also ordered no visitation between appellant and the two minor victims. Pursuant to the plea agreement, count two was dismissed in furtherance of justice.
Appellant appealed from the final judgment on January 22, 2007, stating the appeal was based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea and asserting a challenge to the validity of the plea. Appellant also requested and was granted a certificate of probable cause from the trial court on January 22, 2007. We appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal.
DISCUSSION
After examination of the record, appellants appointed counsel submitted a brief on behalf of appellant in which no issues were raised. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, counsel requested us to independently review the entire record on appeal in order to determine whether the record contains or manifests any arguable or potentially meritorious issues. On December 17, 2007, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any grounds of appeal, contentions or argument that he wished us to consider. Appellant belatedly raised several issues in a supplemental letter brief. We granted leave to file the supplemental brief on March 24, 2008.
Appellant advanced a number of contentions in his supplemental letter brief and in a prior letter to the court incorporated in that brief, as follows.
Appellant complains his trial counsel did not interview relevant witnesses, including one of the alleged victims. This claim is not cognizable on appeal despite the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, since appellant pleaded no contest and the failure to interview material witnesses relates to the question of appellants guilt or innocence rather than a "reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings." (Pen. Code, § 1237.5, subd. (a); People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 566.) In any case, as regards such strategic litigation decisions, counsel is "captain of the ship." (In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95.)
Appellant claims the trial court acted in collusion with a "Jewish conspiracy." Such a claim, however, is not supported by the record on appeal. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 114.) Nor does the record sustain appellants claim that the trial judge deceived him regarding the judges "true identity" or the date of the hearing.
Appellant also asserts his appellate attorney was biased against him and participated in the "Jewish conspiracy" against him. As with the claim against the trial court, this contention is not supported by the record. (See People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 114.)
Appellant asserts his appellate attorney failed to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and other issues appellant wished to raise on appeal. He further claims appellate counsel incorrectly informed appellant that he could not be cocounsel on appeal. A criminal defendant has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to self-representation on appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1255; In re Walker (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 225, 228; see also People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 550, 579.) Moreover, once appointed, appellate counsel has the exclusive right to appear and control court proceedings so long as appellants fundamental rights are not denied. (In re Walker, supra, at p. 228; see also People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 570.) Appellant has failed to specify what additional issues, if any, he wishes to raise that appellate counsel has purportedly ignored. We are satisfied from our own review of the record and the brief submitted that counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities.
Appellants complaints that his appellate attorney failed to respond to all of his questions, including a question whether counsel has participated in the alleged conspiracy to prosecute appellant and whether counsel had ever represented appellant in the past, are either unsupported by the record or immaterial. (Cf. People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 488-489 [appellate counsels dual role in representing criminal defendant in both appeal and habeas corpus proceedings presented no conflict of interest].) And, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more appropriately raised in a habeas corpus proceeding rather than an appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267.)
Finally, appellant requests that this court transfer his case to the "California State Court of Appeals, Mountain Home Indian Tribal Lands Branch," indicating that court has "statewide" venue. Even if such court existed, appellant has asserted no grounds or authority for his request, and we note that appellant conceded in the trial court that the charged events took place in the County of Los Angeles. Venue properly was laid in the Los Angeles Superior Court, which is within this judicial district. (Pen. Code, § 777; People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1093-1094.) This court has appropriate jurisdiction when, as here, the Los Angeles Superior Court has original jurisdiction over the proceeding. (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1235.)
We have examined the entire record, together with appellants supplemental letter brief and incorporated letter, and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441; see also People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 123-124.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment accordingly is affirmed.
We concur:
COOPER, P. J.
RUBIN, J. --------------- Notes: Counsels brief inaccurately states the appeal was timely.