Opinion
A167031
09-26-2023
In re A.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. A.E., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J45439)
RICHMAN, J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant A.E. admitted to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and various sentence enhancements. Eight months later, appellant moved to withdraw his admissions, arguing the admissions were not voluntary or intelligent, because his juvenile court counsel provided ineffective assistance and coerced him into accepting the plea offer. The juvenile court denied the motion, adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed him in the custody of the probation officer, and committed him to the Reaching Into Successful Endeavors (RISE) program for a baseline of three years. Appellant appeals, challenging solely the denial of his motion to withdraw his admissions. We
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
The Facts
This case arises from the shooting and robbery of an elderly man and his son at their home in El Sobrante allegedly committed by three minors: then 16-year-old appellant, his half-brother Christian E., and his schoolmate Tony R. The facts of the incident and subsequent investigation are these.
We take our facts from the sheriff's investigative reports (report no. 21009903), which the parties stipulated provided a factual basis for appellant's admissions.
The Incident
On October 3, 2021, at around 6:25 p.m. a Contra Costa County sheriff's deputy was dispatched to a home in El Sobrante, where two of its residents, a son and his 84-year-old father, had been shot while they were mowing their front lawn. The son sustained multiple gunshot wounds to his right hip, chest, and arm, resulting in paralysis below his waist. The father sustained a gunshot wound above his left eyebrow, resulting in a fractured skull.
Responding deputies obtained a video of the incident captured by the victims' Ring security camera. The video showed the following.
At 6:22 p.m., a silver BMW sedan came into view, and a voice was heard stating,"' Hey everybody, give me your shit nigga.'" Suspect No. 1 then came into view, saying to the elderly victim," 'Take that watch off nigga, shut the fuck up and take that watch off nigga.'" Suspect No. 1 forcefully tried to take property off the elderly victim's person and the victim began to defend himself by swinging an electric cord at Suspect No. 1. During this struggle, Suspect No. 1 was holding a black semi-automatic pistol and pointing it at the victim.
Suspect No. 2 came into view, holding and pointing a black semiautomatic pistol at the elderly victim. Suspect No. 1 got closer to the elderly victim, grabbed a chair, and threw it at the elderly victim's head. Suspect No. 1 then stood over and struck him two times in his head with the pistol. Suspect No. 3's pants and shoes were then seen, before going out of view.
The younger victim approached and struck Suspect No. 1 over the head with a bucket and Suspect No. 1 fell to the ground. Suspect No. 2 fired a single round. Suspect No. 1 stood up and fired one round at the younger victim, who fell to the ground, appearing to lose all bodily function. Suspect No. 2 fired three more rounds. The suspects then fled the area in the BMW.
Suspect No. 1 was described as a black male in his late teens to early twenties, with a thin build, weighing approximately 150 to 170 pounds. He wore a red tracksuit with white stripes on the hood or collar area, pants with white stripes and a blue streak, and white shoes.
Suspect No. 2 was described by investigators as a black male of unknown age, with a medium build, weighing approximately 170 to 200 pounds. He wore black jeans, a gray sweatshirt with orange and purple coloring in the chest area, and black and white shoes.
Suspect No. 3 was described as a black male of unknown age, weight, or height. He wore blue pants, a dark colored top, and blue shoes.
An eyewitness was sitting in his car near the victims' home when he saw a silver BMW drive by several times before stopping in the middle of the street and making a U-turn. He stated that" '[t]hree African American males with handguns jumped out, and began to beat the victims, stomped them out.'" The witness then drove off to contact 911, before returning to the scene and rendering aid to the victims.
The witness described the vehicle he saw as a silver BMW sedan. The driver was a black male with no mask on, had "a skinny face, with visible cheekbones" and a short afro, and was light skinned. He weighed about 175 pounds and was about five feet 10 inches or six feet tall.
The witness described a second suspect as a black male with "a gray hooded sweatshirt, white t-shirt, blue jeans and a black ski mask, approximately 5'10-6'00 tall." He was dark skinned and weighed approximately 175 pounds.
The witness could not describe the third suspect, other than him having a black ski mask.
The witness stated that all three suspects had black pistols.
As would be seen, detectives identified Suspect No. 1 from the Ring video as Tony, Suspect No. 2 as appellant, and Suspect No. 3 as Christian. The witness later identified the BMW as the vehicle involved in the incident and Christian as the driver of the BMW from a photographic lineup.
The Investigation
On October 7, four days after the incident, detectives located the BMW at a Chevron gas station. Appellant was the driver and sole occupant of the BMW. Surveillance from the Chevron's security camera showed appellant "wearing the exact same shoes as Suspect #2 as seen in the Ring video."
On October 9, detectives spotted the BMW at an iPhone repair store. Detectives identified appellant as the driver of the BMW from the store's surveillance video.
On October 20, the witness at the scene identified Christian from a photographic lineup as the driver of the BMW the day of the incident.
On November 1, pursuant to search warrants, detectives searched two residences associated with appellant: (1) the apartment of Rakeem Mills and his girlfriend, Sada "Daedae" Thomas, where appellant had been staying sometimes, and (2) the house where he lived with his father and grandfather in Vallejo. They also searched Christian's residence, where he lived with his mother.
Mills and Thomas are both adults.
When detectives arrived at Mills's and Thomas's apartment, appellant was identified as Thomas's nephew and found inside his bedroom. During the search of appellant's bedroom, an iPhone, a key fob to the BMW, and a loaded handgun were recovered. Detectives also seized a pair of blue sneakers, which looked similar to those being worn by Suspect No. 3 in the Ring video.
At appellant's father's home, detectives searched one of the bedrooms that had a poster with appellant's name and photographs of appellant and found a pair of jeans "resembl[ing] the jeans of shooter #2 on the Ring video from the closet. They also found an "AR [assault rifle]-style lower," "AR-style upper," and "AR-style bolt," a loaded AR magazine, two pistol magazines, and a rifle magazine.
At Christian's home, detectives seized an empty extended magazine from the living room and a pair of white Nike shoes by the front door. In one of the front bedrooms, detectives recovered a silver watch, a broken phone, an empty extended magazine, a blue and red ski mask, a backpack containing appellant's schoolwork, and another cell phone. Two semi-automatic pistols were found submerged inside a toilet tank.
Christian and appellant were arrested and transported together to the sheriff's station.
Appellant gave the following statement to one of the deputies: Mills purchased the BMW for appellant two to four weeks earlier since appellant was not old enough to purchase it himself. The car was purchased from an unknown person on OfferUp for $4,500. Appellant used money that he received from family and that he had saved up to purchase the BMW. There was a document in the car's glove compartment showing proof of the purchase. Mills purchased the car for appellant, and so the car belonged to appellant. Mills never drove the car.
Appellant denied going to Contra Costa County on October 3 and being involved in the incident. He stated that he was associated with the crime because of the BMW. He also stated that the iPhone that was just seized previously belonged to Mills and that Mills had given to it him two days earlier. Appellant said that his grandfather gave him the Android (Samsung) phone a couple of weeks prior. Appellant admitted he had the gun for protection but stated the gun was never fired.
Appellant and Christian were then transported together to the juvenile facility. Their conversation was surreptitiously recorded. Among other things, Christian said that "he knew [the detectives] did not have all the evidence since [the detectives] did not arrest Rakeem because [Rakeem] was there."
Also on November 1, detectives downloaded data from the iPhone that Mills had given appellant. The phone contained 15 photographs of appellant "wearing what appears to be the same clothing as he was wearing during the shooting. [Appellant] was wearing a white and black sweatshirt with an orange money sign on the front, black jeans with a stripe on the side and orange print scattered randomly on the pant legs, either holding a large amount of money, . . . and what appears to be two firearms at his feet."
Additionally, the "Notes" application in the Phone contained entries dated July 20, August 20, October 18, and October 25, 2021 of what appeared to be rap lyrics. The lyrics referred to Glocks, robbing, shooting, and "Rollies."
For example, one set of lyrics says: "Lil Dae brought me / glock and I robbed a nigga / stick in my glock no I don't / be stockin nigga hit a nigga / in his face juss for talkin / shit keep one up to cause / A nigga stay on blitz."
On November 2, a detective returned to Mills's apartment and interviewed him. Mills stated he had purchased the BMW for appellant in early September. Appellant gave Mills around $3,000 to buy the car, which they found listed on OfferUp. They purchased the car from the owner in Sacramento. Once the purchase was completed, appellant immediately took possession of the car. Mills stated he had never driven the vehicle and the vehicle belonged solely to appellant.
On November 4, a detective interviewed Mills again. Mills was played Christian's recorded statement about Mills "being there." Mills denied any involvement in the crime or being at the scene on October 3. Mills "stated he would do whatever it took to prove he was not part of the crime." Mills consented to a search of his cell phone, home, and car. On his phone were photographs dated October 2 of appellant wearing the same clothing as Suspect No. 2 from the Ring video. There was also a photograph of a bill of sale for the BMW.
In the backseat of Mills's vehicle, the detective found shoes that looked like the same shoes that Suspect No. 2 wore in the Ring video. Mills stated that the shoes belonged to him, but that he had allowed appellant to borrow them around the time he purchased the BMW for him.
On November 8, Tony was arrested. Days later, police downloaded data from Tony's phone. It contained several photographs, including a screenshot of an Instagram post from October 2 of appellant "wearing what appears to be the same clothing as he was wearing during the shooting." Another picture from October 4 was of appellant wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video. There were also multiple photographs and videos of Tony wearing the same red sweatshirt as Suspect No. 1.
Text messages on Tony's phone included one on September 24 from "Keem" stating that" 'Daedae' [(Sada Thomas)] would turn the 'Rollie' in" and Tony stating, "we sold it for 5500 (dollars) or 5000 because the gold was scratched." Other text messages between Daedae and Tony on October 2 showed Tony stating, "he and Rakeem feel broke so he needed another Rolex and Daedae felt the same way."
The Proceedings Below
On November 3, 2021, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 602), charging appellant with attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) (count one) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 211.5, subd. (c)) (count two). As to count one, the petition alleged that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(c)(1)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to the younger victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to count two, the petition alleged appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(c)); personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to the elderly victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); personally inflicted great bodily injury on an individual who was 70 or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)); and committed certain crime(s) against a victim 60 or older precluding eligibility for probation (§ 1203.09, subd. (f)).
On November 9 and 12, the juvenile court held a Dennis H. hearing, during which the investigating deputies testified about their investigation in this case. The court found the prosecution made a prima facie showing that the allegations in the petition occurred and that A.E. should be detained. A.E. was thus ordered detained.
A hearing under In re Dennis H. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 350 (Dennis H.) adjudicates whether an order of detention should be issued against the minor prior to trial on the merits.
On January 11, 2022, the court held a pretrial conference, where appellant appeared with his appointed counsel, deputy public defender Kim Mayer. The parties informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement, whereby appellant would admit to the attempted murder charge in count one and newly added enhancement allegations to the petition for the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5) and infliction of great bodily injury in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)). In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss the remaining robbery charge and all other enhancements. The parties stipulated that the sheriff's investigative reports provided the factual basis.
After the juvenile court went over appellant's written plea form with him and gave him the required advisements, appellant pleaded no contest to the attempted murder charge and the firearm and great bodily injury enhancements. The court accepted the pleas and found they were made knowingly, freely, and voluntarily and that there was a factual basis for the pleas. The court thus sustained the amended petition allegations and transferred the case for disposition to Solano County, appellant's county of residence.
Appellant subsequently retained new counsel, attorney Tim Pori. At a May 10 hearing to set disposition, Pori informed the court of his intent to file a motion to withdraw appellant's admissions. To facilitate the filing of that motion, the juvenile court granted counsel's request to transfer the case back to Contra Costa County.
On September 28, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his admissions to the attempted murder charge and the enhancements for personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. He argued that he did not receive effective assistance from his prior counsel, Mayer, before entering the admissions, and that Mayer coerced him into accepting the plea offer. The People opposed the motion.
On November 1, the court held a hearing on the motion. No testimony was presented, as the parties submitted on the moving and opposing papers and the supporting declarations and exhibits. After hearing argument from the parties, the court denied the motion. The case was transferred back to Solano County.
On January 12, 2023, the court held the dispositional hearing at which it adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed him in the custody of the probation officer, and committed him to the RISE program for a baseline of three years.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the juvenile court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his admissions, because the admissions were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to (1) ineffective representation by his counsel, (2) coercion from counsel into taking the plea, and (3) his lack of understanding of the nature of his admissions. We address the first point, followed by the second and third together, and ultimately conclude the juvenile court properly denied the motion to withdraw the admissions.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Additional Background
In his motion to withdraw his admissions, appellant claimed that he "admitted to the charges . . . because his will was overborn [sic] by his counsel of record who told him that he could not win the case despite overwhelming evidence that [appellant] was not suspect #2 as alleged by the prosecution." He argued his prior appointed counsel, Kim Mayer, rendered ineffective assistance by, among other things, not retaining a cell phone expert. Had she done so, appellant asserted, she would have learned that none of the phones attributed to appellant placed him at the crime scene. Appellant also argued Mayer would have additionally discovered that Mills, not appellant, wrote the rap lyrics documented in the iPhone referring to guns, robbing, and Rolexes.
In support of his motion, appellant submitted the declaration and report of Thomas Blackburn, whom appellant's replacement counsel, Tim Pori, had retained to review data and records associated with appellant's iPhone, his Samsung phone, and Tony's cell phone.
According to Blackburn, there was no evidence from appellant's iPhone and Samsung showing that either phone was at or near the crime scene at around 6:30 p.m. on October 3, 2021, the time of the incident. As to the time after the incident, Blackburn determined that Tony's phone "was located at a McDonalds in Fairfield from 6:58 PM until 7:14 PM," while appellant's phone "was at or near (within 5 miles) of [his father's] residence" in Vallejo "from 7:13 PM - 9:50 PM." Therefore, Blackburn opined "the two phones could not have been together at this time."
Additionally, Blackburn reported that there was "no evidence that [appellant] wrote the lyrics found in the notes section of the iPhone ...." He explained, "If [appellant] was given the iPhone . . . 2 days before his arrest, then it would have been Rakeem Mills who most likely wrote the lyrics in the Notes section of the iPhone . . . as this was his iPhone."
Appellant also submitted his own declaration, in which he stated that he would not have admitted to the attempted murder charge and attached enhancements if he "had known" the information that was ultimately discovered by Blackburn. Appellant also averred he would not have entered admissions had he known his "lawyer was willing to introduce" the following: that Tony and Rakeem's girlfriend, Sada "Daedae" Thomas, texted each other about being "broke" and "need[ing] another Rollie"; that Rakeem had been previously arrested in June 2021 for possession of a handgun and ski mask; that the shoes worn by Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video of the incident were found in Rakeem's car at some point after the incident; that his parents gave Mayer a photograph of Rakeem "wearing the same pants and shoes as were worn by suspect #2"; and that the "pants seized from [his] home . . . were not the same pants that were worn by suspect #2."
The People opposed the motion, attaching several exhibits, which included photographs of appellant, screenshots from surveillance videos of the incident, of appellant in the days following the incident, and of items of physical evidence that were seized by investigators. As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the People countered that "[d]espite indications [appellant] is second guessing his plea after retaining a new attorney, there is nothing before the court to satisfy the Strickland [v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland)] . . . prejudice requirement. [Appellant] would not have received a better plea deal and his only alternative would have been to go forward to trial. With the evidence mounted against him, trial almost certainly would have left him with two sustained strikes on his record, additional custody time over his head, and two separate sustained offenses that a disposition judge would consider. Any defenses, presumably the defenses outlined in this motion to withdraw his plea, were thin at best and easily rebuttable. Mayer was able to negotiate a single strike plea deal for this especially brutal attack on a particularly vulnerable victim."
At the hearing on the motion, the juvenile court first heard argument from Pori, appellant's counsel who stated that "[t]he circumstantial evidence [against appellant] is the BMW, which has been associated with [appellant], the clothing worn, the description of the people in the video, and there's other evidence that the prosecution's case is based upon." Appellant's counsel agreed that "it's a circumstantial case, you're right, and there is evidence here. [Appellant's] not just sitting here. They didn't get his name out of a hat. I submit that to the Court, and I understand what kind of hill we're trying to climb here."
Appellant's counsel, however, argued that "the evidence against Rakeem . . . is much more compelling than it is against [appellant]." Counsel then pointed to the rap lyrics found on appellant's iPhone, arguing that it was Mills who had most likely written the lyrics. Counsel also noted that there was a text exchange between Tony and Mills's girlfriend about Mills and Tony" 'need[ing] a new Rolex,'" which counsel argued show a "conspiracy" between Tony and Mills and/or his girlfriend. Counsel then argued, "[h]ad appellant known that the phone evidence would have been brought in, he wouldn't have plead [sic]. Had he known that the evidence implicating Rakeem Mills, the abundant evidence would have been admitted, he wouldn't have plead [sic]."
The prosecutor responded: "The cell phone expert that [the] defense hired, there's nothing really new that he established, nothing exculpatory." Although defense counsel and expert Blackburn claimed, "there's nothing showing that on the cell phones that [appellant] was in El Sobrante at the time of the offense," the prosecutor argued, "[t]here's nothing showing that he wasn't there. [¶] . . . [¶] The defense expert even said that . . . the last call that came in that day, went straight to voice mail and that's consistent with the phone being off. What do people do when they don't want to get caught committing a crime? They turn their cell phones off so they don't have this tracking evidence."
The prosecutor also addressed the rap lyrics, stating, "I get defense's contention that the rap lyrics are exculpatory because someone else wrote them. I'm not contesting at this point that they were on Rakeem's phone and Rakeem wrote them and Rakeem is involved in stealing, robbing people of watches and then using his girlfriend to sell them." The prosecutor also stated his belief that Mills "was there." The prosecutor went on: "But was [Mills] the shooter in the black pants and gray sweatshirt? No. That was [appellant]. And I think the evidence is very clear that that was [appellant]. The Court has the pictures, the comparisons. [Appellant] was wearing the clothing, exact same clothing, pants, sweatshirt, lighter chain, the red and blue lighter chain the day before." The prosecutor also pointed to evidence that the day after the incident, appellant "was wearing the tennis shoes that were used in the shooting." Even though Mills said the shoes belonged to him, the prosecutor maintained, it was appellant who was seen wearing them on numerous occasions around the time of the offenses. Further, the prosecutor argued that the pants seized from appellant's room are the same pants worn by Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video.
When appellant's counsel then revisited his arguments regarding the rap lyrics, the court interjected, stating: "Let's say that that's true and that that analysis would have been done by Mayer and Rakeem wrote the lyrics, Rakeem had had that phone. The theory of the [prosecution's] case, it sounds like from the get-go, isn't that if Rakeem was involved, [appellant] ipso facto is not. It sounds like the People's theory is that they all were involved in some way, shape or form. [¶] Just because those may have been Rakeem's rap lyrics-I'm following the logical conclusion of your argument here, doesn't mean that [appellant] isn't involved as a matter of fact."
Following further argument, the court addressed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Focusing on the issue of prejudice, the court stated: "I find that the record doesn't support [appellant's] claim [that he would not have entered an admission but for counsel's omissions] and that substantial evidence indicates otherwise." The court stated it "went back and looked at the evidence" and found "overwhelming evidence of his guilt ...."
On the contested factual issue of whether the pants worn by Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video were the same pants found in appellant's bedroom, the court found the pants "were clearly the same pants," contrary to appellant's assertions.
The court then stated, "Nothing in the . . . record developed since this plea, specifically Mr. Blackborn's [sic] analysis, supports any contention, at least credible contention, that the result would have been more favorable to [appellant] than what had actually occurred." The court did not find some of Blackburn's opinions credible. It also found appellant's declaration statements "self-serving and speculative." The court then concluded that Mayer's decision not to hire a cell phone expert did not "rise[ ] to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . because even if that evidence [related to the cell phone data] were to be fleshed out, [the court did not] think it is material against the panoply of the other evidence in this case, which suggests that [appellant] was indeed the shooter that day, and he is the one depicted on the Ring video firing that weapon at the victim." Accordingly, the court denied the motion.
The Law
"The due process right to effective assistance of counsel extends to minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings." (In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528, citing Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 857 [citing In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (Gault), abrogated on other grounds in Allen v. Illinois (1986) 474 U.S. 364, 372-373; Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 554].) And that right exists at every step of the proceedings, including during the plea bargaining process. (People v. Archer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 693, 707, citing Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 167; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933 (Alvernaz).) "Where a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel in entering a plea of guilty, he is entitled to reversal and an opportunity to withdraw his plea if he so desires." (People v. McCary (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, citing People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 825.)
We will be referring to guilty pleas throughout this opinion, but the same principles apply to pleas of no contest or admissions by minors in juvenile court. (See In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1181 ["A plea of 'no contest' or an 'admission' [citation] is the juvenile court equivalent of a plea of 'nolo contendere' or 'guilty' in criminal courts"]; see also K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 303 [" 'Plea bargaining is a common feature in juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as it is in criminal proceedings in adult court. Similar principles apply in both settings.' [Citations.]"].)
Appellant "has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389.) As we explained in People v. Mackey (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 119, "[a] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (Strickland [, supra,] 466 U.S. [at pp.] 687, 691-692 . . .; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) On the first prong he must show that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . [¶] . . . under prevailing professional norms.' (Strickland, supra, at p. 688.) And under the second, he must show that in the absence of the error it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to him would have [been] obtained. A reasonable probability is 'a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' (Id. at p. 694.)"
These principles apply to a defendant who pleads guilty, but with one distinct twist: "[W]here ineffective assistance of counsel results in the defendant's decision to plead guilty," "a defendant must establish not only incompetent performance by counsel, but also a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's incompetence, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial." (Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 934, citing Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (Hill).)
"[T]he 'prejudice' inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error 'prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial." (Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 59.)
"[A] defendant's self-serving statement . . . that with competent advice he or she would have [or would have not] accepted a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant's burden of proof as to prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence. A contrary holding would lead to an unchecked flow of easily fabricated claims." (Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938, italics omitted.)
"Whether counsel's performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced defendant, are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review." (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1073.) But "[w]hile our review of the record is independent and 'we may reach a different conclusion on an independent examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting' [citation], any factual determinations made below 'are entitled to great weight . . . when supported by the record, particularly with respect to questions of or depending upon the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed.'" (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249, abrogated on other grounds in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 370-371.)
Analysis
Appellant's claim that Mayer's representation was ineffective rests primarily on her failure to retain a cell phone expert. Had Mayer retained such an expert, appellant asserts, she would have discovered "potentially meritorious defenses" and impeachment evidence.
We need not and do not determine whether appellant established the first prong, deficient performance, because we conclude, as did the juvenile court, that even if Mayer's performance was deficient, appellant has failed to sustain his burden on the issue of prejudice. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 ["[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed"]; Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 945.)
Although appellant claims that he made statements in a declaration that he would not have accepted the plea bargain offered had Mayer consulted with a cell phone expert, such self-serving statements are "not sufficient. Rather, there must be some objective showing." (Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 934.) Here, we agree with the juvenile court that appellant has not made such an objective showing.
Appellant first argues he was prejudiced by Mayer's omission, because if she had hired an expert to analyze data for his iPhone and Samsung phone, she could have developed "potentially meritorious defenses." In his discussion of the deficient performance prong, he specifies that Mayer would have discovered, as expert Blackburn did, the following: "(1) no cell phone data placed [appellant] at the crime, (2) [appellant] was not with Tony at the time of the robbery, and (3) Mills, and not [appellant], wrote the rap lyrics celebrating robbery, Glocks and Rolexes ...." We address each point in turn.
With respect to the location data, appellant relies on Blackburn's report to argue that Mayer would have learned there was no location data on appellant's iPhone and Samsung placing him at the crime scene around 6:30 p.m. on October 3, 2021, the time of the incident. To the extent appellant suggests that this evidence had exculpatory value, we disagree. Evidence of the absence of location data on appellant's cell phones establishes only that there is no evidence from those sources about his location at the time of the incident. It does not establish that appellant was not, in fact, at the scene. Indeed, in his report, Blackburn provided a likely explanation for the lack of location data: defendant simply turning his phone off during the relevant events.
Likewise unpersuasive is appellant's assertion that Mayer would have learned from a cell phone expert that "[appellant] was not with Tony at the time of the robbery." (Italics added.) This assertion is based on an incorrect reading of Blackburn's report. Blackburn's opinion on this point focused on the location of the phones after the incident. Specifically, Blackburn determined that Tony's iPhone "was located at a McDonalds in Fairfield from 6:58 PM until 7:14 PM," appellant's phone "was at or near . . . [his father's] residence" in Vallejo "from 7:13 PM - 9:50 PM," and therefore "the two phones could not have been together at this time." This information has minimal probative value as to whether appellant committed the crimes, because it pertains to Tony's and appellant's whereabouts approximately 30 minutes to several hours after the incident. Further, the fact that Tony and appellant may not have been together during that period simply does not establish that they were not together earlier at the time of the incident.
With respect to the lyrics referring to robbing, guns, and "Rollies," appellant contends that had Mayer retained a cell phone expert, she would have confirmed that it was Mills, not appellant, who wrote the lyrics. However, no one disputed that Mills likely wrote the lyrics. Thus, an expert was not necessary to establish that fact. More importantly, any probative value that the lyrics had on the "critical issue" of "whether [appellant], not Mills, was the shooter identified as Suspect No. 2" in the Ring video was minimal.
As a preliminary matter, appellant's assertion that Mayer's discovery of Mills's authorship of the lyrics would have led her to develop a potentially meritorious defense requires us to make some assumptions. The first is that the lyrics should be taken literally, not figuratively. Courts have cautioned against a literal reading of rap lyrics "as statements of fact or actual intent." (People v. Coneal (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 951, 968; see In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 636-637 ["In general, '[reasonable persons understand musical lyrics and poetic conventions as the figurative expressions which they are,' which means they 'are not intended to be and should not be read literally on their face, nor judged by a standard of prose oratory' "].) "Absent some meaningful method to determine which lyrics represent real versus made up events, or some persuasive basis to construe specific lyrics literally, the probative value of lyrics as evidence of their literal truth is minimal." (People v. Coneal, at p. 968.)
Last year, to address the problem of introducing racial stereotypes and bias intro criminal proceedings by allowing rap lyrics into evidence, our Legislature added section 352.2 to the Evidence Code. (Assembly Bill No. 2799 (Reg. Sess. 2021-2022) Stats., ch. 973, §§ 1-2.) That section, effective January 1, 2023, requires trial courts to give special scrutiny to evidence in the form of a "creative expression"-such as song lyrics, art or film-that is offered in a criminal prosecution: "(a) . . . the court, while balancing the probative value of that evidence against the substantial danger of undue prejudice under Section 352, shall consider, in addition to the factors listed in Section 352, that: (1) the probative value of such expression for its literal truth or as a truthful narrative is minimal unless that expression is created near in time to the charged crime or crimes, bears a sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime or crimes, or includes factual detail not otherwise publicly available; and (2) undue prejudice includes, but is not limited to, the possibility that the trier of fact will, in violation of Section 1101, treat the expression as evidence of the defendant's propensity for violence or general criminal disposition as well as the possibility that the evidence will explicitly or implicitly inject racial bias into the proceedings. [¶] (b) If proffered and relevant to the issues in the case, the court shall consider the following as well as any additional relevant evidence offered by either party: [¶] (1) Credible testimony on the genre of creative expression as to the social or cultural context, rules, conventions, and artistic techniques of the expression. [¶] (2) Experimental or social science research demonstrating that the introduction of a particular type of expression explicitly or implicitly introduces racial bias into the proceedings. [¶] (3) Evidence to rebut such research or testimony." (Evid. Code, § 352.2.) Courts of Appeal are split on whether Evidence Code section 352.2 applies retroactively, and the issue is currently under review in the Supreme Court. (Compare People v. Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445, 448, review granted May 17, 2023, S279081 [Evidence Code section 352.2 applies retroactively], with People v. Ramos (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 578, 581, 596, review granted July 12, 2023, S280073 [disagreeing with Venable].)
But even assuming the lyrics were probative of their literal truth, appellant's arguments also ask us to assume that the lyrics were proof of Mills's involvement in the crimes charged in this case. However, appellant does not offer any argument to support this assumption. In fact, he sought to introduce evidence that Mills had committed similar crimes in the past, which evidence, assuming it were admissible, would make it less likely that the lyrics were evidence of Mills's participation in the crimes in this case.
And even if the lyrics were probative of Mills's involvement in this case, appellant would still fail to show that Mayer's discovery of such circumstance would have led her to change her view of the case or advice to appellant to accept the plea. As the People argue, "the authorship of the rap lyrics had little or no evidentiary weight on the issue of identification of the perpetrators." The lyrics refer to guns, "Rollies," robbing, and shooting, but include no other details about the crimes in this case. Because the evidence did not definitively limit the number of perpetrators and showed there was more than one shooter, the lyrics provided no information from which to infer who each suspect in the Ring video might have been-much less prove that Mills was Suspect No. 2. At most, evidence that Mills wrote the lyrics showed that he could have participated in the incident in some way.
But as the juvenile court found, "[j]ust because those may have been Rakeem's rap lyrics" and even if he was "involved in some way, shape or form[,] . . . doesn't mean that [appellant] isn't involved as a matter of fact." In other words, the fact that Mills was somehow one of the participants would not have undermined the significant evidence linking appellant to the attempted murder and robbery.
Appellant's replacement counsel agreed that there was circumstantial evidence of appellant's guilt. And as the juvenile court found, that evidence was strong. The Ring video showed that the suspects arrived and fled in a BMW. Suspect No. 2, who fired several shots at one of the victims, was wearing a gray and white sweatshirt, dark pants, and black and white shoes. Appellant told investigators that the BMW belonged to him and that Mills never drove it, even though he had technically purchased it for appellant prior to the incident. On multiple occasions days after the incident, detectives saw appellant driving the BMW involved in the incident. Additionally, multiple photographs dated the day before the incident showed appellant "wearing what appears to be the same clothing as" Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video. Also, a photograph dated one day after the incident showed appellant wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video. Similarly, a surveillance video from a gas station captured appellant wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2 days after the incident. Furthermore, a pair of pants that matched the pants worn by Suspect No. 2 was found in appellant's bedroom in his father's home. In short, even if evidence of Mills's authorship of the lyrics suggested his involvement in the incident, such a fact would not have tended to exculpate appellant. (Cf. People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 835 [holding harmless exclusion of evidence of third party culpability: "[D]efendant's theory of [a third party's] culpability would not tend to exculpate him in any event. Because no testimony or circumstantial evidence limited the number of perpetrators, [the third party's] participation would not undermine the significant evidence linking defendant to the murder"].)
The parties disputed whether the pants seized were the same pants that Suspect No. 2 was wearing. The juvenile court resolved this conflict against appellant, finding the pants "were clearly the same pants." On appeal, appellant does not challenge this finding. He assumes for purposes of argument that he "wore 'those pants' the day before the shooting and did not share them with Mills."
Accordingly, appellant fails to demonstrate one of the premises of his prejudice argument: that any evidence that would have been revealed by a cell phone expert would have presented him with potentially meritorious defenses.
For similar reasons, appellant's argument that Mayer would have discovered impeachment evidence had she retained such an expert is unavailing. He asserts that an expert's review of the cell phone data would have confirmed that Mills authored the rap lyrics, which in turn could have been used to impeach the credibility of Mills, who" 'denied any involvement with the crime or being on scene.'" Even if the lyrics did inculpate Mills in this case, and therefore could have been used to impeach his denial of involvement, it is still not reasonably probable that Mayer's discovery of that circumstance would have led her to change her recommendation to appellant to accept the plea. For the reasons discussed above, while the impeachment evidence would have been relevant, it would not have tended to exculpate appellant. It would have at most shown that Mills could have participated in the crimes. It would not have tended to prove that Mills, rather than appellant, was Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video.
We next address an additional argument that appellant raises within his discussion of the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim: that Mayer "could have . . . impeached Mills's credibility with evidence that it was Mills, and not [appellant], who . . . (1) participated in a text exchange with the co-responsibles the day before the shooting, (2) kept 15 photos of [appellant] wearing the same clothes as Shooter No. 2 on the iPhone the day before the shooting, and (3) kept, on another cell phone, pictures taken the day before the shooting of [appellant] wearing 'the same clothing' as Suspect No. 2 and the bill of sale for BMW, that he volunteered to the police.... Had [Ms. Mayer] undertaken an analysis of the cell phone data, [she] could have . . . impeached Mills."
The evidence that appellant cites is evidence that the investigating deputies discovered as part of their investigation in this case. Therefore, it appears that appellant is asserting that Mayer could have impeached Mills's credibility with evidence that was already known to her, rather than any new or additional evidence she would have discovered by retaining a cell phone expert. In other words, this argument has nothing to do with the failure to hire a cell phone expert. For this reason, we reject appellant's reliance on the above evidence to argue that "had she undertaken an analysis of the cell phone data, Ms. Mayer could have . . . impeached Mills."
For all of the above reasons, we agree with the juvenile court that any evidence that would have been borne out by a cell phone expert would not have undermined "the panoply of the other evidence in this case, which suggests that [appellant] was indeed the shooter that day, and he is the one depicted on the Ring video firing that weapon at the victim." As such, we conclude, as did the juvenile court, that appellant did not sustain his burden on the prejudice component of his ineffective assistance claim. He did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that had Mayer retained a cell phone expert, her advice to appellant would have been different or he would have decided to reject the plea bargain offered to him.
Appellant's assertion that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's no-prejudice finding does not compel a different conclusion. Relying on People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 (Johnson), appellant argues that the court's finding that there was a "panoply" of evidence pointing to appellant as Suspect No. 2 from the Ring video is not supported by substantial evidence, because the court "looked solely to the isolated bits of circumstantial evidence, and not the value of such evidence in the context of the entire picture ...."
In Johnson, our Supreme Court stated that on substantial evidence review: "[T]he appellate court 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' [Citations.] The court does not, however, limit its review to the evidence favorable to the respondent ....[It] must resolve the issue in light of the whole record . . . and may not limit [its] appraisal to isolated bits of evidence selected by the respondent." (Johnson, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576-577.) Appellant's reliance on Johnson to argue that the juvenile court did not consider the "whole picture" is misplaced, because the standard it sets forth is for the appellate court.
In any event, appellant fails to establish that the juvenile court considered "isolated bits of evidence" in finding no prejudice from Mayer's asserted errors. Although the court mentioned only certain items during its discussion of the "panoply of . . . overwhelming evidence against [appellant]" at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the admissions, other times it stated that it had reviewed the moving and opposing papers and all of the evidence submitted in connection with them. The court also took judicial notice of the entire case file. Thus, contrary to appellant's assertion, the record indicates that the juvenile court did consider all of the evidence presented to it, not just "isolated bits of the evidence." Based on this, we may presume the court conducted an objective weighing of all of the evidence before concluding that the proposed new evidence from expert Blackburn would not likely have changed the outcome of the proceedings.
Rather than a failure to consider the entire record, appellant's argument is essentially that the court erred in not weighing all of the evidence in his favor and that we should reach a different conclusion. Although he acknowledges some of the evidence against him, such as that he was seen wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video, he nonetheless asserts that the "value" of that evidence "is undermined" by several "facts" he lists. We disagree. Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude the court's finding that the record contains a "panoply" of evidence of appellant's guilt is not "undermined" by the "facts" he identifies.
First, appellant states that one of the investigating deputies described Suspect No. 2 as "a black male unknown age, medium build weight approximately 170 to 200 pounds." He also asserts that an eyewitness described Suspect No. 2 as five feet 10 inches to six feet tall, around 175 pounds, and dark skinned. Appellant claims that he is five feet eight inches tall and weighs 140 pounds, while Mills is six feet tall and weighs 135 pounds. He argues that "[w]hile neither matches the weight description, Mills matches [the] description of the shooter's height." This assertion calls for a credibility assessment. Presumably, the court did not give much weight to these height and weight descriptions. The record supports the court's decision not to do so. One of the investigating deputies testified at the Dennis H. hearing that it was "very difficult" to tell the height of the individuals based on the Ring video, due to the placement and angle of the camera. He also testified that some of the eyewitness's height and weight descriptions of the suspects were not accurate. Further, it is not entirely clear from the witness's statement that he was describing Suspect No. 2 from the Ring video specifically, as opposed to just one of the two males whom he saw in addition to the driver of the BMW.
Second, appellant refers to the rap lyrics found on the iPhone. We have already discussed why such evidence does not tend to exculpate appellant. As such, this evidence does not undermine the court's finding that the evidence pointed to appellant being Suspect No. 2.
Third, appellant argues that photographs of him found on Mills's phone "that purportedly show [appellant] 'wearing the exact same outfit he wore during the offense' does not show him wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2." The record citation for this assertion is to a photograph dated October 2, 2021. However, investigators who located this particular photograph did not claim that the photograph depicted appellant wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2. Instead, investigators noted that the clothing appeared to be the same clothing worn by Suspect No. 2. Further, appellant does not dispute there were other photographs and video surveillance found by investigators depicting appellant wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video. Thus, the fact that there exists one photograph that does not show appellant wearing Suspect No. 2's shoes does not undermine the court's finding there was strong evidence of his guilt.
Fourth, appellant notes that investigators found the shoes worn by Suspect No. 2 in the backseat of Mills's car over one month after the incident. However, appellant does not dispute that while Mills owned the shoes, he allowed appellant to borrow them around the time he purchased the BMW for him before the incident.
Appellant also states that both he and Mills "wore those shoes." The record citation he provides is to several photographs, one of which appears to be a screenshot of an Instagram post dated October 14 (presumably of 2021) from the handle "benji_keem," with a note underneath stating "Rakeem -Defense exhibit." In his declaration, appellant stated that his parents had emailed this photograph to Mayer, claiming it showed Mills wearing the same shoes and clothing as Suspect No. 2 in the Ring video. This photograph (and many other photographs in the record on appeal) with which we have been provided is of such poor quality that the most we can discern is an individual wearing a ski mask. We therefore cannot make out any of the individual's features, clothing, or shoes, much less agree that it depicts Mills wearing the same shoes as Suspect No. 2. It was appellant's burden to provide us with a sufficient record on appeal to review the issues he raised. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132; People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.) We thus have no basis in the record to validate appellant's claim.
Fifth, appellant states that "[a]lthough the photo of [appellant] on Mills'[s] phone the day before the shooting shows him wearing a 'distinct' sweatshirt and a lighter chain, the police only found the pants at [his] home." However, appellant fails to explain, and we fail to see, how the investigators' ability to seize some, but not all articles of clothing or accessories, worn by Suspect No. 2 undermines the juvenile court's finding.
Sixth, in addition to evidence of the rap lyrics, appellant lists the following set of facts: Mills, not appellant, was "involved in a text exchange with the co-responsibles the day before the shooting"; "committed similar crimes in the months before the shooting"; "kept 15 photos of [appellant] wearing the same clothes as Shooter No. 2 on the iPhone"; and "kept, on another cell phone, pictures taken the day before the shooting of [appellant] wearing 'the same clothing' as Suspect No. 2 and the bill of sale for BMW."
Regarding the text messages, investigators found on Tony's phone texts made between Tony, Mills, and Mills's girlfriend, Sada Thomas. In one exchange, Mills stated that Thomas "would turn the 'Rollie' in," and Tony stated that it had been sold. In another exchange, Tony texted Thomas that he and Mills "feel broke" and that "he needed another Rolex." The references to needing or selling Rolexes do not necessarily show that Mills and Thomas had committed any crimes, let alone the crimes charged in this case. But even if they were involved in the crimes here, there is nothing in the texts that could identify Mills as Suspect No. 2.
In addition, appellant's statement that Mills "committed similar crimes in the months before the shooting" is misleading. It is based on an arrest report, which the court found inadmissible, and in any event, there is no indication in the record that Mills was convicted for the crimes for which he was arrested. Moreover, we fail to see how Mills's possession of certain photographs of appellant wearing the same clothing as Suspect No. 2 supports Mills's, rather than appellant's, guilt. Likewise as to the photograph of the bill of sale for the BMW-appellant himself told investigators that Mills purchased the car for him, that Mills did not drive it, and that it belonged to appellant.
Accordingly, none of the "facts" provided by appellant establishes or suggests that Mills, as opposed to appellant, was Suspect No. 2, so as to undermine the court's finding there was a "panoply of evidence" of appellant's guilt.
In sum, the record does not demonstrate a likelihood that had Mayer hired a cell phone expert, her advice to appellant would have been different or appellant would have decided to reject the plea offer. We conclude, as did the juvenile court, appellant failed to establish prejudice from Mayer's purportedly deficient performance, and that he thus received ineffective assistance.
Coercion and a Lack of Understanding of the Plea
Additional Background
On January 11, 2022, the parties informed the court they had reached a plea agreement. Appellant submitted a written plea form, in which he indicated he would plead no contest to the count one attempted murder charge and to the enhancements for personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. The written plea form contained detailed waivers of appellant's rights and acknowledgments of the consequences of each plea, including that an admission to count one would result in one strike under the Three Strikes Law. In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss the robbery charged in count two and all remaining enhancements.
Before accepting appellant's admissions, the juvenile court advised appellant of his constitutional rights, as well as the consequences of his admissions. Appellant stated he understood his rights and the consequences of his admissions. He also confirmed he had enough time to talk about his plea form and all of his rights with Mayer. The court proceeded to take appellant's pleas.
Appellant pleaded no contest to the attempted murder charge and the firearm enhancement. When the court turned to the great bodily injury enhancement, this exchange occurred:
"THE COURT: And enhancement 2 alleges that in connection with the attempted offense to which you've just plea [sic] in Count 1, that you personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person during the commission of that felony.
""How do you plead to that enhancement? [¶] . . . [¶]
""THE MINOR: What was the count again?
"THE COURT: It's that enhancement 2 for Count 1.
"THE MINOR: What is that?
"THE COURT: Let me tell you again. Enhancement 2 in Count 1, that alleges in connection with Count 1, that was the attempted murder, that you personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person and, more specifically, paralysis.
"How do you plead to that enhancement?
"THE MINOR: I don't know what to plead to that.
"THE COURT: Ms. Mayer, do you want a moment to speak to [appellant] in a breakout room? "MS. MAYER: Yes, please." Mayer and appellant then went out into a breakout room for around 13 minutes. When the parties returned, the court asked Mayer if she and appellant needed more time to discuss the enhancement or any other part of the case. Mayer replied, "no." The court also asked appellant to let the court know if he at any point needed additional time to talk to Mayer. Appellant replied, "I don't." The court then asked, "You ready to go?" and appellant responded, "Ready." The court asked appellant, "How do you plead to Enhancement 2," which "alleges . . . that you inflicted great bodily injury on somebody during the commission of attempted murder in Count 1?" Appellant pleaded no contest to that enhancement.
The court found appellant understood his constitutional rights, the nature of the charges, and the consequences of his admissions. It also found that the admissions were entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and that there was a factual basis for his admissions.
When appellant subsequently moved to withdraw his admissions, he submitted his declaration, in which he stated that Mayer had informed him that his" 'best bet' was to take the deal because [counsel] did not think she could beat the charges against [him] and that if [he] were to proceed to trial, [he] would have been found guilty of attempted murder of both victims and that [he] would suffer two strikes if the charges were found true." Mayer also read appellant the investigative reports in this case and told him that "she did not have enough evidence to go to trial." And, according to appellant, he told her that he wanted to proceed to trial, but that Mayer stated," 'I don't think we should do this'" and that" 'we are taking the deal.' "
In denying appellant's motion, the court found appellant had "entered a free, voluntary and intelligent plea with this court. His colloquy was sound and complete."
The Law
Penal Code section 1018 permits the withdrawal of a plea. That section provides in relevant part: "On application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." Section 1018 "is not expressly applicable to admissions in juvenile court, and it does not have a statutory counterpart in delinquency proceedings. However, the principles that underlie the statute have been imported into delinquency proceedings in other respects." (In re Matthew N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1420.) We agree with the parties that section 1018 applies here.
To prevail on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must establish good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)" 'Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea' under section 1018." (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894.) "Pleas may be set aside if . . . defendants represented by counsel entered into the pleas as a result of fraud or duress." (In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1142, citing § 1018; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566; People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208; People v. Dena (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1008.)
We review the juvenile court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion, and we adopt the court's factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. (People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254; accord, People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.)" 'Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.' [Citation.]" (People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 146.) "A plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind." (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456.)
Analysis
Appellant first argues the juvenile court erred in finding no good cause to withdraw the admissions, because he submitted evidence that Mayer "pressured and forced him" to accept the plea bargain offered. Although appellant's declaration contained statements to that effect, the juvenile court "was not bound to give full credence to the statements in [appellant's] affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty even though they are uncontradicted because of [appellant's] obvious interest in the outcome of the proceeding." (People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549, 553.)
As the record shows, prior to accepting appellant's admissions, the court took great care to ensure he understood what he was entering into and the consequences of entering into the negotiated agreement. The record also indicates attorney Mayer believed the evidence of appellant's guilt was strong-a conclusion shared by the juvenile court-and his case was not very defensible. In addition, appellant acknowledged that Mayer communicated to him that if he did not accept the plea, went to trial, and was convicted of all counts and enhancements, he potentially faced a much harsher sentence, with not just one, but two strikes under the Three Strikes law. The record therefore reflects that rather than oppressive conduct from counsel, any pressure that appellant felt in connection with the plea was the result of him being caught between the proverbial "rock and a hard place" in light of the charges against him and his possible sentence if convicted following a trial. Upon this record, appellant cannot show he "was under any more or less pressure than every other defendant faced with serious felony charges and the offer of a plea bargain." (People v. Huricks, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.)
People v. Urfer (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 887 (Urfer) is instructive. There, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his guilty plea to a drug charge based on his counsel's representation that defendant entered the plea "unwillingly or with 'reluctance,'" yielding to his counsel's "persuasions and prejudices." (Id. at p. 892.) In holding there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion, the appellate court explained: "Assuming appellant was reluctant or 'unwilling' to change his plea, such state of mind is not synonymous with an involuntary act. Lawyers and other professional[s] often persuade clients to act upon advice which is unwillingly or reluctantly accepted. And the fact that such advice is unwillingly or reluctantly acted upon is not a '. . . factor overreaching defendant's free and clear judgment' of what should be done to find a means to alleviate the situation with respect to which the client seeks advice." (Id. at p. 892, fn. omitted.) Here, appellant may have felt pressure to enter the admissions based on his counsel's advice, but this does not establish an involuntary choice, as Urfer explains.
We are not convinced otherwise by appellant's claim that "youth impaired his ability to understand the consequences of his plea and the constitutional rights he was giving up, and made him susceptible to pressure, if not outright coercion." Citing Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 (Roper), he argues "[i]n the analogous context of waivers of Miranda rights, courts have uniformly recognized that '[n]o matter how sophisticated,' a juvenile subject of police interrogation 'cannot be compared' to an adult subject." He also cites language in Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1 stating that "a juvenile's custodial statements and admissions 'require special caution' and heightened scrutiny."
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
The statements that appellant purports to quote from Roper are in fact not contained in that decision. Also, Roper did not even address a Miranda issue. Roper was concerned with the application of the death penalty to juveniles and held that such punishment of juveniles is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 568569.) The United States Supreme Court recognized important differences between juveniles and adults: juveniles have a diminished sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to peer pressure, and have greater prospects for reform. (Id. at pp. 569-570.) While these differences are reasons for sparing juveniles from the harshest of criminal punishments, appellant does not explain how they also apply to the context here. In short, appellant points to no reason for why Roper, which he misstates, should be applied here, and we decline to do so.
Gault also does not assist appellant. The United States Supreme Court extended many constitutional rights to juveniles, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to an attorney as set forth in Miranda. (Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 55.) The court recognized "special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege [against selfincrimination] by or on behalf of children ...." (Ibid.) As quoted by appellant, Gault states: "If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." (Ibid.) We are not persuaded that the Miranda analogy holds here, because the Miranda warning is intended to dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere at police interrogations, in addition to informing the accused of his or her rights and making clear the adversary nature of the criminal proceedings.
But even applying the standard of Gault, appellant has not shown that the juvenile court did not take special caution to ensure that his admissions were voluntary and intelligent. To the contrary, the record supports that the court took great care to ensure appellant understood what he was entering into and the consequences of entering into the negotiated agreement. Appellant apparently felt comfortable enough to ask the court and his attorney questions about his plea and voice his uncertainty when he was unsure about aspects of it. In response, the court gave appellant multiple opportunities to confer with Mayer and repeatedly asked him whether he understood the proceedings and whether he was ready to proceed, to which he answered affirmatively.
This leads us to appellant's assertion that he should have been permitted to withdraw his admissions based on the exchange he had with the court regarding the great bodily injury enhancement. He argues he "was confused and did not understand his plea." We are not persuaded. As detailed above, although appellant was initially unsure how to plead to that enhancement, he was permitted to, and did, confer with counsel and afterwards told the court that he was ready to proceed. Under these circumstances, the court could reasonably find that appellant no longer had questions about the enhancement and thus understood the nature of his admissions.
In sum, appellant fails to establish that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding no good cause to withdraw the admissions.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: Stewart, P.J., Markman, J. [*]
[*] Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.