Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura No. 2005009231, Charles McGrath, Judge
Esther R. Sorkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jason Tran, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Joshua Adams appeals a judgment following conviction of making criminal threats, possessing a controlled substance, and resisting a police officer, with a finding that he suffered a prior serious felony conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 148, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the morning of March 22, 2005, Simi Valley police officers were assisting federal law enforcement officers execute a search warrant on Adams's residence located at 2023 Covington Street. The officers planned to await Adams's departure from his residence prior to executing the warrant. Police Officer Richard Morton and his canine partner, "Rex," waited near the residence in a marked patrol car.
As Adams drove from his residence, Morton followed. He found Adams stopped along the roadside, "leaning and doing something in the center console, passenger seat area." When Morton approached, Adams drove away at high speed. Morton pursued him as Adams returned to his home. Adams drove through a stop sign and threw an object from the automobile window near 2080 Covington Street.
When Adams arrived home, he left his automobile and attempted to enter a door into the garage. When the door would not open, he ran into the backyard with Morton in pursuit. Several times Morton shouted: "Stop. Police. Stop or I'[ll] send the dog." Morton grabbed Adams's left arm as Adams attempted to open a glass patio door. When Adams continued to resist, Morton summoned Rex. Rex bit Adams's right arm and assisted Morton in restraining Adams.
Adams was "very belligerent, just yelling [profanities] at the top of his lungs." He shouted: "Fuck you guys for disrespecting me in front of my family. I am fucking La Eme [Mexican Mafia]. I'm going to fucking find out where you live, and I'm going to come after you." Adams was agitated and continued to curse and shout for approximately ten minutes.
Morton was upset at Adams's threats and returned to his patrol car to regain his composure. He requested another canine patrol unit to respond and execute the search warrant of Adams's residence. Morton took Adams's threats seriously because he had been advised that Adams was a violent criminal street gang member who had been convicted of firing a firearm into an inhabited dwelling. Morton believed that Adams likely had access to firearms and would be angry because Rex had bitten him.
Ten to twenty minutes after his return to the patrol car, Morton and another police officer walked the route of the vehicle pursuit. In the street gutter at 2080 Covington, Morton found a bindle containing four balloons of heroin. He also found a needle and syringe in the street gutter at 2084 Covington. At the area where Adams had parked, the officers found a cut-open balloon and a base of an aluminum can bearing burn marks. Morton opined that addicts use aluminum cans to heat heroin into liquid form for purposes of injection.
Later that day, Morton saw Adams at the police station. Adams was "staring [him] down" and "mad-dogging" him as Morton passed by. Adams leaned toward Morton to read the nametag on his police uniform. Morton became fearful for his safety and the safety of his family, given Adams's earlier threats. He informed his wife of the threats, varied his daily commute, obtained a protective order against Adams after his release from custody, installed an alarm system in his home directly linked to the police station, and requested police patrols of his residence.
The trial court convicted Adams of making criminal threats, possessing a controlled substance, and resisting a police officer. (§§ 422, 148, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) It also found that Adams suffered a prior serious felony conviction, alleged for purposes of sentence enhancement and recidivist sentencing. (§§ 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of nine years.
Adams appeals and contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction of making criminal threats and possessing a controlled substance.
DISCUSSION
I.
Adams argues that there is insufficient evidence that he possessed the heroin and drug paraphernalia because the police officers found the contraband on a public street at least ten to twenty minutes after he had driven through the neighborhood. (People v. Van Syoc (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 370, 372-373 [insufficient evidence of possession of marijuana cigarettes found in cigarette package on dashboard of unlocked vehicle].) He points out that the heroin and drug paraphernalia were found in the gutter beside three separate residences. (People v. Theobald (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 351, 354 [insufficient evidence that defendant possessed drugs found in public storage cabinet where he had made only casual inquiry of landlord regarding storing possessions there].) Adams asserts that the ten to twenty minute "time gap" here precludes the reasonable inference that he possessed the contraband. (People v. Wallace (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 600, 601 [police officers immediately retrieved object defendant tossed from automobile window during pursuit]; Carroll v. State (Ariz. 1962) 368 P.2d 649, 650-651 [insufficient evidence defendant possessed contraband found on airport bench where he sat some time before].) He adds that his flight from the officers is not an "evidentiary wild card[]" that supports the element of knowing possession, particularly because he was a parolee under investigation for other crimes. (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 585.)
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we review the entire record to determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom support the judgment. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.) We do not reweigh the evidence nor do we redetermine the credibility of witnesses. (Ibid.) This standard of review also applies to prosecutions resting upon circumstantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Sufficient evidence supports Adams' conviction of possession of heroin. (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1184 [required elements of possession of controlled substance are "'dominion and control of the substance in a quantity usable for consumption or sale, with knowledge of its presence and of its restricted dangerous drug character . . . .'"].) Here the officers found drug paraphernalia in the area where Adams had parked his automobile and was "leaning and doing something in the center console, passenger seat area." The officers also found a bindle containing four balloons of heroin at the address where Morton saw Adams throw an object from his automobile window. The officers found the contraband ten to twenty minutes following the pursuit. In addition, Adams fled following his initial conduct while parked, and jettisoned the contraband from the window during a high-speed police pursuit.
The precedent upon which Adams relies is distinguishable because Morton saw Adams throw an object from the automobile window, and Adams threw the object during the pursuit. Thus, in People v. Van Syoc, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d 370, police officers found marijuana inside a cigarette package resting on the dashboard of an unlocked vehicle. Defendant and his two companions were not inside the vehicle at the time. In People v. Theobald, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 351, 354-355, police officers discovered contraband inside an apartment building storage locker, accessible by others. The only link between the contraband and the defendant was his inquiry to the landlord about using the storage locker. By contrast, Morton's observations directly link Adams to the contraband, and Adams's flight and behavior during the high speed pursuit support the reasonable inference that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance.
II.
Adams asserts that his threats against Morton were "ambiguous" and "no more than a vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution." (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1138.) He argues that the statements were an emotional outburst and adds that there is no history of hostility toward Morton. (Ibid. [evidence did not suggest "prior history of disagreements"]; People v. Teal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281 ["[S]ection 422 is not violated by mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent"].) Adams points out that Morton delayed taking protective measures, suggesting that Morton was not in sustained fear of harm.
Sufficient evidence exists that Adams made more than "a vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution." (In re Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1138.) The crime of making criminal threats demands that the purported threat be examined on its face and under the circumstances in which it was made. (Id., at p. 1137.) Here Adams, a criminal street gang member who had been convicted of firing a firearm into an inhabited dwelling, threatened "to fucking find out where [Morton] live[d], and . . . come after [him]." Following his arrest, Adams stared at Morton in the police station and attempted to read his name from his police uniform. Morton was concerned at the time of the threats, and sat in his patrol car to regain his composure. Later, Morton informed his wife of the threats, sought a protective order, installed a security alarm in his home, and requested additional police patrols. The trier of fact properly considered and weighed the circumstances in which the threat was made, Morton's delay in implementing protective measures, and the credibility of his testimony. We do not reweigh that evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COFFEE, J., PERREN, J.