Opinion
No. 349562
08-20-2020
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELIUS ADAMS, Defendant-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 18-008889-01-FC Before: REDFORD, P.J., and METER and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court's order dismissing the charges of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felonious assault, MCL 750.82, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b, against defendant. On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the case under the 180-day rule in MCL 780.131. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an armed robbery at a gas station in Detroit. The victim identified defendant as the assailant. Defendant was arrested and transferred to the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). On September 27, 2018, the MDOC, pursuant to MCL 780.131, sent written notice to the prosecution that defendant was in custody and awaiting disposition of outstanding charges. Defendant was bound over and arraigned, and trial was scheduled for January 30, 2019. That trial date was adjourned at defendant's request. On January 11, 2019, the trial court signed a writ of habeas corpus to secure defendant's presence at future proceedings. Between January 14, 2019 and March 5, 2019, the final pretrial conference was rescheduled multiple times with the agreement of the parties. With the agreement of both parties, the trial court scheduled trial for May 21, 2019.
On March 26, 2019, a period of 180 days had elapsed since the MDOC sent notice to the prosecution. On May 3, 2019, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that trial had not commenced during the 180-day period and the prosecution could not establish a good- faith excuse for the delay. The prosecution argued that the 180-day rule of MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 does not require the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial in the 180-day period, but merely to take good-faith action to ready the case for trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, reasoning that the prosecution was unable to establish a good-faith reason for trial not commencing within the 180-day period. The prosecution now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The prosecution argues that the trial court misinterpreted the statutory 180-day rule to require trial to commence within 180 days of notice from the MDOC unless the prosecution could establish a good-faith excuse for delay, when the correct interpretation of the rule merely requires a good-faith effort to proceed to trial—a burden the prosecution satisfied in this case. We agree.
This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 254; 794 NW2d 9 (2011). Statutes must be interpreted to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature as manifested in the plain language of the statute." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, we need go no further; courts will not engage in additional judicial construction of an unambiguous statute." Id. at 254-255 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss." People v Stone, 269 Mich App 240, 242; 712 NW2d 165 (2005). "A trial court may be said to have abused its discretion only when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Nicholson, 297 Mich App 191, 196; 822 NW2d 284 (2012).
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges against defendant under MCL 780.133 because the prosecution made a good-faith effort to bring the case to trial within 180 days of receiving notice of defendant's incarceration from the MDOC, and the prosecution did not create inexcusable delay that evinced an intent not to proceed to trial.
MCL 780.131(1) states, in relevant part:
Whenever the [MDOC] receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the [MDOC] causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney . . . written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint.
Relatedly, MCL 780.133 provides:
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131(1)], action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
In Lown, our Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing resolution of the ostensible disagreement between the "brought to trial within 180 days" language of MCL 780.131(1) and the "[i]n the event that . . . action is not commenced" language of MCL 780.133:
[T]he rule does not require that a trial be commenced or completed within 180 days of the date notice was delivered. Rather, as this Court has held for more than 50 years, it is sufficient that the prosecutor "proceed promptly" and "move [ ] the case to the point of readiness for trial" within the 180-day period. [Lown, 488 Mich at 246, quoting People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300, 304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959) (alteration in original).]
In this case, defense counsel argued that the plain language of MCL 780.131 required defendant to be "brought to trial within 180 days" after the MDOC's September 27, 2018 written notice to the prosecution unless the prosecution could establish a good-faith excuse for delay. Lown unequivocally states that such an interpretation of the 180-day rule is incorrect:
Significantly, although a prosecutor must proceed promptly and take action in good faith in order to satisfy the rule, there is no good-faith exception to the rule. Instead, as originally articulated in Hendershot, good faith is an implicit component of proper action by the prosecutor, who may not satisfy the rule simply by taking preliminary steps toward trial but then delaying inexcusably. [Lown, 488 Mich at 246-247.]In other words, the 180-day rule does not require that a case must be dismissed unless an inmate is brought to trial within 180-days of notice from the MDOC except if the prosecutor has made a good-faith effort to commence trial within 180 days. Instead, the 180-day rule requires that the case must be dismissed if, within the 180-day period, the prosecutor has not made a good-faith effort to "move the case to the point of readiness for trial," i.e., if the prosecutor has created an " 'inexcusable delay' " with " 'an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly. . . .' " Lown, 488 Mich at 246-247, quoting Hendershot, 357 Mich at 303 (alteration omitted).
In this case, it appears that the trial court erroneously applied a "good-faith exception" interpretation of MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133. At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the prosecutor provided the correct interpretation of the 180-day rule, and explained that, despite the prosecution's efforts to proceed promptly to trial, multiple pretrial hearings before a previous judge had been rescheduled due to difficulties with executing the writ of habeas corpus to secure defendant's presence in court.
The record shows that the prosecution participated in the November 6, 2018 preliminary examination and the November 13, 2018 arraignment. The trial court scheduled a January 7, 2019 deadline for motions, a final conference for January 14, 2019, and trial for January 30, 2019. The register of actions indicates that the January 30, 2019 trial date was "[a]djourned at the request of the [d]efense."
On January 11, 2019, the trial court signed a writ of habeas corpus to secure defendant's presence at a rescheduled final conference on January 29, 2019. On January 16, 2019, the prosecution filed its witness list. On January 29, 2019, and again on January 30, 2019, the court rescheduled the final conference for reasons that are not apparent from the record. On February 6, 2019, the court, with the agreement of both parties, adjourned the pretrial conference to allow for further plea negotiations. The prosecutor stated that, absent a plea agreement, "the People will be prepared to go to trial." On February 22, 2019, the court rescheduled the pretrial hearing to February 27, 2019. On February 27, 2019, the court stated, "We had sidebar discussions regarding the pretrial and we're going to continue this pretrial to [March 4, 2019]." Both parties agreed to the continuation.
For reasons not apparent from the record, the case was transferred to a different circuit court judge. On March 5, 2019, the trial court held a final conference. The court stated, "They have a trial date set for [May 21, 2019]. Is that okay for you guys?" Both parties agreed that the trial date was acceptable. Defense counsel reported, "Your Honor, [defendant] is here on a writ and we have asked the sheriff's department to keep him here pending." A deputy sheriff affirmed that the sheriff's department would keep defendant until trial. The prosecutor stated that defendant had rejected the offered sentencing agreement of 7 to 20 years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The court concluded, "Okay. We're all set."
There is no indication in the record that any difficulties in securing defendant's presence in court were attributable to intentional delay tactics or an absence of good faith on the prosecution's part. Despite the trial prosecutor's insistence that the prosecution's efforts satisfied the 180-day rule, the trial court reasoned:
Well, you've got one case that says in good faith. Now I've always interpreted good faith to be where the prosecutor is trying to get the case to trial. Let's say that you called up [the MDOC] and they told you this Defendant was in the hospital and we can't bring him right now. That would be a good faith effort on the part of the prosecutor to get him here, because you couldn't. But you don't have anything like that.
It appears that the trial court erroneously concluded that 1) the 180-day rule required defendant to be brought to trial within 180 days of the prosecution receiving notice from the MDOC, and 2) the prosecution had not established a good-faith excuse for not commencing trial. The trial court should have concluded that 1) the prosecution commenced action in good faith within 180 days of notice from the MDOC, and 2) there was no evidence that the prosecution harbored an intent to delay trial.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court applied the correct formulation of the rule—that the prosecution must commence action in good faith within 180 days—but simply determined that the prosecution had not commenced action in good faith. However, defendant's argument conflates the concept of "good faith" with an "excusable delay," and simply replicates the trial court's erroneous "good-faith exception" interpretation of the 180-day rule. The proper analysis does not require that the case must be dismissed if trial has not commenced in 180 days unless the prosecution can show an excusable delay; it asks whether the prosecution has commenced action within 180 days. If the prosecution has commenced action, the case should not be dismissed unless that commencement of action evinces of an absence of good faith, i.e., " 'an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly. . . .' " Lown, 488 Mich at 246-247, quoting Hendershot, 357 Mich at 303. The trial court expressly rejected the prosecution's correct statement that the 180-day rule merely requires commencement of action and the absence of "inexcusable delay": "No, [the Legislature] didn't say nothing about no inexcusable delay. It says good faith." The prosecution reiterated that it had acted in good faith to proceed to trial: "We've readied the case for trial, we got it here, we've sent the writs, we've set the dates." These efforts were sufficient to satisfy the 180-day rule, and the record does not reflect " 'an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly. . . .' " Id. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges against defendant.
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of defendant's charges. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien