Opinion
E072512
02-25-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GABRIEL ANTHONY ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory L. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVI800765) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata, Judge. Affirmed. Gregory L. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant and appellant Gabriel Anthony Adams pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of the offense. In return, the remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a total agreed-upon term of 25 years in state prison.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and asking for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437). The trial court summarily denied the petition, finding defendant was not entitled to relief as a matter of law because defendant had not been convicted of murder. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his section 1170.95 petition because his guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter did not disqualify him from relief since he was charged with murder, but pleaded guilty to avoid the murder charge. He further asserts that the trial court should have appointed counsel for him and ordered further briefing on the matter. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the probation officer's report.
On April 6, 2008, at approximately 12:30 a.m., sheriff's dispatch received multiple 911 calls for shots heard and a gunshot victim in the area of Hohokam Road in the city of Apple Valley. Deputies arrived and found the victim on the sidewalk in front of a home, bleeding from a gunshot wound to his upper chest. Fire personnel arrived on scene and transported the victim to a hospital, where he died from the gunshot wound.
Following an investigation, detectives learned the victim and several of his friends attended a party at a home on Hohokam Road, along with a second group of people that included defendant and codefendants, Matthew Santos and Jose Acosta. During the party, the victim and Acosta got into an argument inside the residence. The two eventually moved to the backyard and engaged in a fist fight. The argument and fist fight were witnessed by multiple individuals. The victim was the reported winner of the fight, with Acosta receiving a split lip. Defendant and his cohorts were later ejected and told to leave the party. As they left, the group made comments they would return, and that "the others did not know what was coming to them."
Defendant and Santos got into Acosta's vehicle and returned to their own residence, where they picked up a fourth person, codefendant Steve Martinez. When they arrived at their home, defendant asked Santos if he still had a gun. Santos indicated he did, and defendant told him to get the gun. Santos looked to Acosta and asked him if he should get the gun, and Acosta told him yes. Santos thereafter retrieved a 20-gauge shotgun and ammunition and placed the items in the trunk of Acosta's vehicle. Martinez agreed to go with the other three to get revenge on the victim for beating up Acosta.
While en route back to the party, defendant confirmed with Santos that he brought the shotgun with them. All four occupants in the vehicle had knowledge the shotgun was in the car. When they arrived at the residence, they saw a sheriff's vehicle in the street and waited for it to leave. Once it was gone, Acosta drove the vehicle down the street to the front of the party, and they all got out.
The victim and his friends were hanging out in the street in front of the residence. Defendant and Martinez approached the victim and his friends, and the two groups exchanged words. Defendant yelled for Santos to "'bring it out,' meaning to get the gun, and [Acosta] opened the trunk." Santos put socks over his hands, grabbed the .20-gauge shotgun, loaded it, and then walked towards the two groups with the shotgun at his side.
As Santos neared the group, he raised the shotgun. Defendant told Martinez to move, and Martinez stepped to the side. Santos pointed the shotgun at the victim and said, "'What now?'" Meanwhile, defendant and the rest of his codefendants encouraged Santos to shoot the victim. Santos pulled the trigger and shot the victim in the chest.
Santos ran from the shooting with the shotgun and met defendant in a vacant field. Thereafter, they ran back to their residence where they met Martinez and Acosta and concealed the shotgun and ammunition. All four talked about the incident and what they would say if questioned by police. Santos was identified as the shooter and admitted to shooting the victim during an interview.
On May 5, 2008, the San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office filed an information charging defendant and his three codefendants with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2). As to count 1, the information also alleged that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury and death to the victim (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)); that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)); that a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)); and that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
Codefendants Acosta, Santos, and Martinez are not parties to this appeal. --------
On July 23, 2010, the People amended the information by interlineation to add count 3, voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), with attendant allegations that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to count 3 and admitted the attendant enhancement allegations. In return, the People agreed to a stipulated term of 25 years and dismissal of the remaining allegations.
On November 24, 2010, after the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and admissions, the court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon term of 25 years in state prison, consisting of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, a consecutive term of 10 years for the gang enhancement, plus four years for the firearm allegation. The court also dismissed the remaining charges and enhancement allegations and awarded defendant 1,107 days of credit for time served.
On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, which became effective on January 1, 2019. Senate Bill 1437 addresses certain aspects of California law regarding the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine by amending sections 188 and 189, as well as by adding section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief if the changes in law would affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-4.)
On January 10, 2019, defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 1170.95, seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and asking for resentencing in light of Senate Bill 1437.
On March 12, 2019, the People filed an opposition to defendant's petition, arguing Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional.
On March 13, 2019, the trial court filed its memorandum of decision, finding defendant was not entitled to relief "as a matter of law" because defendant had not been convicted of murder. On March 14, 2019, the trial court summarily denied defendant's section 1170.95 petition.
On April 15, 2019, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying his section 1170.95 petition.
III
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 on the ground that his guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter did not disqualify him for relief, because he alleged that he was charged with a qualifying offense (murder) but pleaded guilty to avoid the murder charge. Defendant also asserts the court should have appointed counsel for him and ordered further briefing on the matter.
"Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to 'amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez).)
Senate Bill 1437 accomplished that purpose by substantively amending sections 188 and 189. Under amended section 188, subdivision (a)(3), "[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." Amended section 189 limits first degree murder liability based on a felony murder theory to a person who: (1) was the actual killer; (2) although not the actual killer, intended to kill and assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which creates a procedure by which persons convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may seek resentencing. (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) Under subdivision (a) of section 1170.95, "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts." A petitioning offender must first make out a prima facie case demonstrating eligibility for relief. A petition may be filed if the following three conditions are met: "(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) The petition must be accompanied by, among other things, a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(A).)
If the trial court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and recall the sentence. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) If the prosecution does not sustain its burden of proof, then the prior conviction, including any enhancements, must be vacated and the petitioner resentenced on the remaining charges. (Ibid.) "The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens." (Ibid.)
This sentencing recall and resentencing procedure is available to offenders whose sentences are final, as well as those whose sentences are not yet final. (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In addition, Senate Bill 1437 applies retroactively. (Id. at pp. 722, 724-727.)
"In any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature's intent, so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We begin with an examination of the statute's words, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent." (People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 753 (Munoz), citing People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603 and People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105-1106.) If the words of the statute are not ambiguous, the plain meaning of the statutory language controls, and we need go no further. (Munoz, at p. 753; Colbert, at p. 603; Ruiz, at p. 1106.) "If the statutory language supports more than one reasonable interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including the legislative history and the objects to be achieved by the legislation." (Munoz, at p. 754, citing Ruiz, at p. 1106.)
Here, the trial court properly denied defendant's section 1170.95 petition without a hearing and without appointing counsel for defendant. Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. By its plain terms, it applies only to felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. None of the sections added or amended by Senate Bill 1437 refers to voluntary manslaughter. (§§ 188, 189, 1170.95.) "If the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, [the courts'] inquiry ends, and [one] need not embark on judicial construction." (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now states that "in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought." (Italics added.)
Newly added subdivision (e) of section 189 provides that a participant in enumerated offenses "in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree." (Italics added.)
Subdivision (a) of newly added section 1170.95 states that a "person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" may petition to have his or her "murder conviction vacated" and for resentencing. (Italics added.) To establish entitlement to relief, the petitioner must show he or she was charged with murder; was convicted of first degree or second degree murder; and could not have been convicted of first or second degree murder due to changes to sections 188 or 189 wrought by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.) The remainder of section 1170.95 likewise speaks only in terms of murder, not voluntary manslaughter. Thus, Senate Bill 1437 is not ambiguous. By its plain terms, it does not extend to defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Jillie (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 960, 963.)
As our colleagues in the Second Appellate District, Division Seven recently explained in People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087: "[T]here is nothing ambiguous in the language of Senate Bill 1437, which, in addition to the omission of any reference to attempted murder [or voluntary manslaughter], expressly identifies its purpose as the need 'to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.' [Citation.] Had the Legislature meant to bar convictions for attempted murder [or voluntary manslaughter] under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, it could easily have done so. [Citations.]
"The Legislature's obvious intent to exclude attempted murder [and voluntary manslaughter] from the ambit of the Senate Bill 1437 reform is underscored by the language of new section 1170.95, the provision it added to the Penal Code to permit individuals convicted before Senate Bill 1437's effective date to seek the benefits of the new law from the sentencing court. Section 1170.95, subdivision (a), authorizes only those individuals 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' to petition for relief; and the petition must be directed to 'the petitioner's murder conviction.' Similarly, section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(1), authorizes the court to hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate 'the murder conviction.'
"The plain language meaning of Senate Bill 1437 as excluding any relief for individuals convicted of attempted murder [or voluntary manslaughter] is fully supported by its legislative history. [Citations.] When describing the proposed petition process, the Legislature consistently referred to relief being available to individuals charged in a complaint, information or indictment 'that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of first degree felony murder, second degree felony murder, or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine' and who were 'sentenced to first degree or second degree murder.' [Citation.] In addition, when discussing the fiscal impact and assessing the likely number of inmates who may petition for relief, the Senate Committee on Appropriations considered the prison population serving a sentence for first and second degree murder and calculated costs based on that number. [Citation.] The analysis of potential costs did not include inmates convicted of attempted murder [or voluntary manslaughter]." (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105; see Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 754-756, 760 ["The remedy for any potentially inequitable operation of section 1170.95 lies with the Legislature. If the Legislature concludes it is unwise or inequitable to exclude attempted murderers from Senate Bill 1437's reach, it has only to amend the law."].)
In addition, the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 demonstrates the Legislature understood the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and chose to address concerns with murder liability and sentencing, not manslaughter liability and sentencing. (See Sen. Com. on Appropriations, May 14, 2018, Rep. on Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 2 ["Murder is distinguishable from manslaughter due to the additional element of malice, which may be express or implied."].) The legislative history also shows that the Legislature's concern was with the broad application of the felony murder rule, which applies only in the context of first and second degree murder. (See Sen. Rules Com., 3d Reading of Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 3 ["The felony murder rule applies to murder in the first degree as well as murder in the second degree."].) The Assembly Committee on Appropriations described the bill, as follows: "This bill limits liability for individuals based on 1st or 2nd degree felony murder if the person did not actually commit the murder and meets other criteria." (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Aug. 8, 2018, Rep. on Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 1, italics added.) In describing the reason for the legislation, the Assembly Committee on Public Safety explained, "The felony murder rule has been broadly criticized because it does not require a defendant to have that state of mind which is generally required to establish culpability for a murder." (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, June 26, 2018, Rep. on Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 6, italics added.) And in explaining the petition procedure, the Legislature repeatedly referred to relief being available to defendants "previously sentenced on a theory of felony murder." (Id. at p. 1; see p. 6 ["This bill contains provisions that would allow individuals that are currently serving sentences based on a theory of felony murder to petition the court for resentencing."].)
Furthermore, when discussing the fiscal impact, the Senate Committee on Appropriations (Committee) indicated it would be difficult to determine how many inmates were currently "incarcerated for murder whose basis of conviction is the felony-murder rule." (See Sen. Com. on Appropriations, May 14, 2018, Rep. on Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 3, italics added.) Additionally, in assessing the potential number of inmates who may petition for relief, the Committee tallied the total number of inmates serving a sentence for first degree murder and those serving terms for second degree murder, and calculated costs based on that total number. (Ibid.) The Committee neither mentioned nor accounted for the inmates currently serving sentences for voluntary manslaughter, and the analysis of the potential costs excluded any potential petitions from these defendants.
It is clear that the Legislature's primary concern in enacting Senate Bill 1437 was the harsh punishment for defendants convicted of murder based on the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, even where the defendant played a minimal role in the crime, and thus had substantially less culpability. Nothing in the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 suggests the Legislature was concerned about the severity of the punishment for defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The overriding aim of Senate Bill 1437 was to reform the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine so that sentences more accurately reflected defendants' involvement in the crimes and thus their individual culpability. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (b) [The Legislature declares "[t]here is a need for statutory changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides"], subd. (d) ["[i]t is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability"], and subd. (e) ["Reform is needed in California to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual."].)
The Legislature's concern necessarily does not apply to voluntary manslaughter convictions because neither the felony murder rule nor the natural and probable consequences doctrine are theories on which one can commit voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 969-970 (Bryant).) There are only three types of killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter: "a killing upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (§ 192, subd. (a)), a killing in unreasonable self-defense" (ibid.), and vehicular manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (c).)
Accordingly, even if we were to find Senate Bill 1437 applies to convictions for voluntary manslaughter, defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter was not based on the felony murder rule or the doctrine of natural and probable consequences. Rather, the record shows that defendant was an active and "'major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) Moreover, voluntary manslaughter "requires either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life." (Bryant, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 970.) Defendant here pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, thereby admitting every element of the offense. (See People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 125 ["[A] guilty plea constitutes an admission of every element of the offense charged and constitutes a conclusive admission of guilt."]; accord, In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 649.) The different types of offenses that constitute voluntary manslaughter "are united by the principle that when a defendant acts with an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life (i.e., the mental state ordinarily sufficient to constitute malice aforethought), other circumstances relating to the defendant's mental state may preclude the jury from finding that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. But in all of these circumstances, a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter has acted either with an intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life." (Bryant, at p. 970, italics added.) Therefore, the elements of voluntary manslaughter already account for the required mental state of a defendant, and thus accurately reflect a defendant's culpability.
Defendant argues that, because he fell within the provisions of section 1170.95, the trial court was required to, under subdivision (c) of that section, appoint counsel for him, order further briefing on the petition, and, if necessary, hold a contested hearing at which the prosecution would bear the burden of proving defendant's ineligibility for relief beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 1170.95, subdivision (c), provides: "The court shall review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause."
By its plain language, subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 only provides for appointment of counsel and additional proceedings upon the determination of a prima facie case. Here, defendant did not meet that standard for the reasons explained above. Furthermore, for these same reasons, we find any error to be harmless under any standard. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [whether there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent the error]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) Defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief under Senate Bill 1437 because he was not convicted of first or second degree murder. And defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter was not based on the felony murder rule or the doctrine of natural and probable consequences.
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court properly denied defendant's section 1170.95 petition for resentencing.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. MILLER
J.