Opinion
SC: 165717 COA: 330612
10-13-2023
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alex Jay ADAMOWICZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 6, 2023 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Welch, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from this Court's order denying leave in this case. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, a crime he committed when he was 21 years old. Defendant was therefore mandatorily sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In People v Parks , 510 Mich. 225, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022), we held that it was a violation of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16 to automatically sentence 18-year-olds to life in prison without parole. Our decision was based upon the scientific fact that the adolescent brain is more similar to the juvenile brain, that the brain is not fully developed until the age of 25, and that many factors should be considered prior to deeming a young adult permanently incapable of rehabilitation. Because the same arguments have been raised in this case, I believe this Court should have granted leave.
In 2022, this Court issued three other seminal decisions in addition to Parks . In People v Stovall , 510 Mich. 301, 312-322, 987 N.W.2d 85 (2022), this Court held that life with parole was a cruel or unusual sentence when imposed on juvenile offenders who commit second-degree murder. In People v Taylor , 510 Mich. 112, 119-120, 987 N.W.2d 132 (2022), we determined that prosecutors had the burden of proof to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that juveniles should receive a life without parole sentence. And, in People v Boykin , 510 Mich. 171, 196, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022), we determined that sentencing courts were required to consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing hearings where a defendant who committed first-degree murder was sentenced to a term of years.
While Parks itself did not extend relief to adolescents over the age of 18, Parks , 510 Mich. at 255 n 9, 987 N.W.2d 161, we explicitly noted:
[S]ome of the mitigating characteristics in the scientific research submitted by amici and defense counsel apply to young adults, in some form, up to the age of 25. We also do not dispute the
dissent's point that any line-drawing will, at times, lead to arbitrary results. The United States Supreme Court grappled with this same issue in [ Roper v Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ], noting, "Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules." While line-drawing is difficult, our Constitution compels us to make these difficult decisions. Given that Parks and Poole (the defendant in the companion case) were both 18 at the time they committed their crimes, our opinion only applies to 18-year-olds. We need not address the Michigan constitutional requirements for sentencing offenders who were over 18 years old at the time of the offense. [ Parks , 510 Mich. at 244-245, 987 N.W.2d 161.]
The scientific research laid out in Parks arguably could apply to defendant's then 21-year-old brain in the same manner that it applies to the brain of an 18-year-old counterpart. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have reiterated repeatedly that youth matters in sentencing and that juveniles, and those young adults who share the qualities of youth, have diminished culpability compared to older adults because of the inherent malleability and plasticity of adolescent brains, a finding supported by a clear scientific consensus. See, e.g., Parks , 510 Mich. at 249-253, 987 N.W.2d 161 ; Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders was unconstitutional because it precluded consideration of defendants’ youth and attendant characteristics); see also Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (reasoning that the death penalty is reserved for only the worst offenders and that this group could not possibly include juveniles). This body of caselaw has also reinforced that juveniles are particularly capable of being rehabilitated. See Miller , 567 U.S. at 478, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; Parks , 510 Mich. at 265, 987 N.W.2d 161 ; see also Graham v Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (concluding that life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders was cruel and unusual because juveniles are not "sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment" and should be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation").
Parks was limited to 18-year-olds in part because the defendants in that case and in the companion case People v Poole , 510 Mich 851, 977 N.W.2d 530 (2022), were both 18 years of age, not because the characteristics of youth only applied to those aged 18 and younger. I believe there remains a significant question as to whether the automatic condemnation to die in prison is unconstitutionally cruel when applied to 21-year-old defendants, whose brains are not yet fully developed, who are more likely to have lessened culpability when they committed the crime, and who are particularly capable of rehabilitation. As noted, these factors of youth were a significant consideration when we held that mandatory life without parole sentences were unconstitutional as applied to 18-year-olds.
While it is possible that the age demarcation we have already set forth is constitutionally sound, defendant's arguments cannot be easily dismissed and are worthy of further consideration by this Court before becoming the settled law of the state. Because an opportunity to consider this vitally important question was presented here and not fully addressed by this Court, I respectfully dissent.