Opinion
D075502
06-23-2020
In re A.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.D., Defendant and Appellant.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. J241240) APPEAL from a disposition order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed. Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
A.D. admitted he committed one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) while knowingly armed with a firearm (id., § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (the DJJ) for a maximum term of confinement of 12 years.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
A.D. claims the juvenile court failed to give sufficient consideration to mitigating circumstances when it set the maximum term of confinement at 12 years and, therefore, abused its discretion. We reject this argument and conclude the juvenile court acted within the bounds of its discretion. Therefore, we affirm the disposition order.
II
BACKGROUND
The following factual summary is drawn from the probation officer's social study of A.D., which both parties reference in their appellate briefs.
In April 2018, 17-year-old A.D. and 16-year-old M.K. were the sellers in a drug deal that went wrong and ended with the death of the buyer, E.R. (the victim). During the botched drug deal, A.D. sat in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle and M.K. sat in the passenger seat. The victim approached the passenger side of the vehicle, removed money from his pocket, and asked M.K. if he could see the marijuana he intended to buy. M.K. replied that he needed the money from the victim first. In response, the victim stepped back, reached for his waistband, and stated, "You're gonna get the burner," at which point one of the occupants of the vehicle shot the victim twice, killing him. A knife was later found tucked in the deceased victim's waistband.
In interviews with police, A.D. and M.K. gave conflicting accounts of who shot the victim, with each minor identifying the other minor as the shooter. A presumptive test revealed no gunshot residue inside the vehicle, which suggested M.K. may have shot the firearm with his arm extended outside the passenger-side window. Further, the autopsy revealed the victim was shot at a downward angle. It would have been difficult for A.D. to shoot the victim at such an angle from the driver's seat.
In January 2019, the People filed an amended juvenile wardship petition alleging A.D. came within the provisions of section 602 because he committed one count of deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and one count of voluntary manslaughter. For each charge, the petition alleged a firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
Pursuant to a stipulated agreement, A.D. admitted the voluntary manslaughter charge and the accompanying firearm allegation and the parties agreed to a commitment with the DJJ. In exchange, the People dismissed the murder charge and its accompanying firearm allegation. The juvenile court accepted the stipulated agreement, adjudged A.D. a ward of the court, and scheduled a disposition hearing.
In anticipation of the disposition hearing, A.D. filed a disposition memorandum in which he requested a commitment of four years or less. He argued such a commitment was appropriate for the following reasons: he was academically gifted and athletically accomplished; he had a nurturing home environment; he was capable of rehabilitation; he was particularly susceptible to peer pressure, in part, because he moved and changed schools frequently as a child; A.D. and M.K. gave conflicting accounts regarding the identity of the shooter; and the shooting occurred in self-defense, given that the victim's statements and conduct suggested he intended to rob or harm A.D. and M.K.
Together with the disposition memorandum, A.D. filed character letters, athletic awards, transcripts and records reflecting his academic achievements, letters of support from a teacher and site administrator at the juvenile detention facility in which he was detained, certificates of completion for rehabilitative programs in which he had participated since his detention, and autobiographies of A.D.'s parents, both of whom were service members. A.D. also filed a report from a psychologist who evaluated A.D. and opined that he was amenable to care, treatment, and training through the juvenile system. Further, he filed a report from a former chief probation officer who reviewed the case files and recommended A.D. remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, rather than being transferred to adult criminal court.
The People filed a disposition statement recommending a maximum term of confinement of 12 years. They based their recommendation on the following factors: A.D.'s nurturing home environment did not prevent him from selling drugs in an ongoing criminal enterprise; A.D.'s academic successes demonstrated he did not labor under the incompetencies associated with youth; the killing occurred just one month shy of A.D.'s 18th birthday and during an illegal drug sale; A.D. bought the firearm used to shoot the victim; the victim never pulled out a weapon during the drug deal, which cast doubt on A.D.'s claim of self-defense; even if A.D. felt threatened by the victim, he could have driven away in his vehicle; A.D. destroyed evidence of the crime by throwing away shell casings he found in his vehicle; and A.D. and M.K. continued selling marijuana for weeks after they killed the victim. Together with the disposition statement, the People filed photographs from social media accounts and cell phones belonging to A.D. and M.K., which showed them holding large quantities of money and marijuana.
During the disposition hearing, the juvenile court stated it "reviewed every single word" in the documents submitted by the parties, including the social study, A.D.'s disposition memorandum and accompanying documents, and the People's disposition statement and accompanying documents. The court stated that minors with A.D.'s intellectual, athletic, and personality traits did not typically appear before the court, but A.D. used those traits to sell drugs and engage in inherently dangerous activities. The court opined that while he believed M.K. likely shot the victim, A.D. chose to buy and bring the firearm to the drug deal. The court also opined it did not believe A.D. was scared for his life or as naïve as he portrayed, given that he continued selling drugs after the killing.
The court opined that A.D. likely would complete his rehabilitative programming "by the book" and be released "at the earliest possible date." However, the court stated that A.D.'s cold and calculated decision to engage in an inherently dangerous activity and his continued sale of drugs after the killing were "aggravat[ing factors] that [could not] be ignored." The court set the maximum term of commitment at 12 years, consisting of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter charge and one year for the firearm enhancement.
III
DISCUSSION
A
Legal Principles
"The purpose of juvenile court law is to protect both the public and the minor 'and to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible.' [Citation.] A minor must receive 'care, treatment, and guidance' consistent with the best interest of both the minor and the public and, for minors who commit crimes, the disposition must hold them 'accountable for their behavior,' be appropriate for the circumstances, and conform with rehabilitative objectives and the interest of public safety and protection. [Citation.] In engaging in its deliberations, the court must consider public safety, victim redress, and the best interests of the minor." (In re J.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1217 (J.C.).)
Generally, a minor who has been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and has committed a statutorily defined offense may be committed to the DJJ. (§§ 731, subd. (a)(4), 734.) A court has discretion when setting a ward's maximum commitment term, but may "not commit a ward to the [DJJ] for a period that exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense." (§ 731, subd. (c); see In re. R.O. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1497-1498.) "[T]he juvenile court must consider the crime's relevant 'facts and circumstances' in determining whether the minor's maximum commitment period should be equal to or less than the maximum confinement term for an adult." (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 495; § 731, subd. (c) ["The court shall set a maximum term based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation."].)
" 'The California Youth Authority (CYA) was renamed California's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, effective July 1, 2005. The Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) is part of the Division of Juvenile Justice.' [Citation.] The trial court (and many cases) use DJJ (Division of Juvenile Justice) and DJF seemingly interchangeably." (J.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1204, fn. 2.)
A.D. argues without citation to authority that a court calculating a minor's maximum commitment term must evaluate a series of factors discussed in Miller v. Arkansas (2012) 567 U.S. 460. In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile criminal offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. According to Miller, such schemes preclude sentencing courts from taking into account the "distinctive attributes of youth" when "imposing a State's harshest penalties," by precluding individualized consideration of: (1) the minor's "chronological age and its hallmark features," (2) the minor's "family and home environment," (3) the circumstances of the offense, (4) whether the minor "might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth," and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 472, 477-478.) As a practical matter, these considerations will overlap with the facts and circumstances a court must consider when determining a minor's maximum commitment term. However, Miller cannot reasonably be understood as promulgating a prescriptive checklist that must be strictly followed during all discretionary commitment determinations where, as here, the maximum commitment term is neither LWOP nor a de facto term of life. --------
"In practice, the maximum term of imprisonment rarely determines the actual period of confinement of a ward committed to DJJ. Rather, '[o]nce committed to [DJJ], the minor's actual term is governed by [DJJ] guidelines, within the statutory maximum. "Minors most often do not serve their maximum terms, but the statutory maximum may affect both parole eligibility and the extent to which actual confinement may be prolonged for disciplinary reasons." ' " (In re A.G. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 791, 800.)
We will not disturb a juvenile court's commitment decision in the absence of a showing that the court manifestly abused its discretion. (In re N.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 81, 85.) We will indulge all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court's decision and will not disturb its findings when they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.)
B
Application
A.D. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ for a maximum term of 12 years. He asserts the court gave little or no weight to mitigating factors, including his allegedly unique susceptibility to peer pressures, his fear of being harmed during the drug deal, and his rehabilitation prospects. We disagree.
The record indicates the juvenile court weighed the factors identified by A.D., but found A.D. was not as naïve as he portrayed himself to be or as scared as he claimed to be during the drug deal. This determination was supported by substantial evidence, including evidence that A.D. procured the firearm that was used to kill the victim and brought it, directly or indirectly, to the drug deal. Further, the court identified A.D.'s potential for rehabilitation as a mitigating factor and opined he likely would complete his rehabilitative programming before the end of the maximum commitment term. However, it found there were countervailing factors that weighed in favor of a 12-year maximum term of commitment, in particular A.D.'s continued sale of drugs after the killing of the victim.
At its core, A.D. argues it would have been more appropriate if the juvenile court had believed his version of events and given more weight to his evidence. However, "[i]t is not the responsibility of this court to determine what we believe would be the most appropriate [commitment term] for a minor. This is the duty of the trial court, whose determination we reverse only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason." (In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.) Because the record indicates the juvenile court understood the scope of its discretion, considered facts and circumstances pertinent to the charge at issue, and reached a determination supported by substantial evidence, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.
As an alternative argument, A.D. argues in passing that the court set the maximum commitment term at 12 years because it desired to punish him for squandering his talents and opportunities for success. The record does not support A.D.'s characterization of the proceedings below. The court did not indicate it desired or felt compelled to punish A.D. for his advantages in life. Rather, it opined that these advantages suggested A.D. made a calculated decision to procure a firearm and sell drugs—not a decision based on dire need. The juvenile court did not exceed its discretion in considering these facts and circumstances, which pertained to the matter that brought A.D. under the jurisdiction of the court. (§ 731, subd. (c).)
IV
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. GUERRERO, J.