Opinion
April 23, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Beal, J.).
The total amount of time chargeable to the People, from defendant's arraignment until the commencement of trial, was only 141 days, and therefore his CPL 30.30 speedy trial motion was properly denied.
The period from November 5, 1992 to November 30, 1992 was properly excluded as a reasonable delay resulting from defendant's motion practice, including a reasonable postdecision preparation period, ten days of which were requested by defendant in any event (see, CPL 30.30 [a]; People v. Green, 90 A.D.2d 705, lv denied 58 N.Y.2d 784).
The motion court, relying on the parties' submissions, correctly found the period from November 30th to December 18th to be excludable as an adjournment at defendant's request, and defendant has not produced any evidence to the contrary to permit appellate review ( see, People v. Kramer, 181 A.D.2d 449, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 949).
The record demonstrates that the period from January 8, 1993 to January 19, 1993 was correctly excluded as an adjournment on consent, in which defendant participated in the choice of date ( see, People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676, 678; People v. Matthews, 227 A.D.2d 313, 314, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 989).
The period from February 4th, the date on which the People filed a certificate of readiness, until February 23rd, is excludable except for the five-day period from February 4th to February 9th, the requested adjourned date. The fact that the prosecutor subsequently requested adjournments or was not ready for trial on certain dates does not invalidate the statement of readiness ( see, People v. Robinson, 171 A.D.2d 475, 477, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 973), which is presumed to be accurate and truthful ( see, People v. Caussade, 162 A.D.2d 4, 12, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 984). Moreover, "the People are generally not required to declare their readiness repeatedly throughout the pendency of a criminal action" ( People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 214).
Defendant does not submit any evidence to contradict the motion court's finding, and the submissions of the People on the motion, that the People were ready for trial on March 16th, and that the prosecutor requested an adjournment to March 29th or 30th upon filing another certificate of readiness on March 29th.
Defendant's contention that the certificates of readiness filed on March 29th and April 29th were illusory is rejected for the reasons previously discussed. However, contrary to the People's argument, the motion court correctly charged the People with the six-day period from May 12th to May 18th. The parties agree as to the includability and excludability of the remaining periods, and thus the total amount of time chargeable to the People is 141 days.
Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied. The police officer's observation of defendant's running out of a nightclub and periodically putting his hand in his waistband while looking back at his two pursuers, whom the officers recognized as bouncers from the club, and who were yelling, "grab him, grab him," provided reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant ( see, People v. Hammonds, 215 A.D.2d 166, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 795). The officers were further justified in transporting defendant back to the club for identification by the manager, relying on the information provided by the bouncers that they believed defendant had just robbed the club ( see, People v. Kadan, 195 A.D.2d 174, 178, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 854). The handcuffing of defendant did not elevate the detention to a full-blown arrest ( People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378; People v. Alford, 186 A.D.2d 43, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 973), and was for purposes of transporting him a short distance for a showup identification ( see, People v. Crowley, 156 A.D.2d 135, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 918).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Lerner, P.J., Nardelli, Wallach, Williams and Saxe, JJ.