Here, the corroborating observations of the police, the evidence obtained during the controlled buy, and the affidavit of a neighbor, who previously reported suspicious activity at the apartment, are sufficient to establish the CI's reliability, as well as the basis of his knowledge (see People v. Lee, 303 A.D.2d 839, 840; People v. Tarver, 292 A.D.2d 110, 116, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 702). Further, we agree with County Court that the warrant was otherwise valid and not overbroad. "Where, as here, there is probable cause to believe that a particular location contains saleable quantities of a controlled substance, which could be quickly destroyed, an all-hours, no-knock search warrant is justified" (People v. Bell, 299 A.D.2d 582, 584, lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 555 [citations omitted]; see People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 850-851, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087). Next, defendant challenges County Court's denial of his request for a missing witness charge.
Prior to the prearranged controlled buy of September 12, 2000, the police followed defendant from his apartment directly to the place at which the transaction took place. We find that defendant's activity of entering and leaving his residence immediately before and after making drug sales is sufficient to support the reasonable belief that contraband, as well as the proceeds of the drug transactions, would be found in the apartment (see People v. Middleton, 283 A.D.2d 663, 665, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 922; People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 850, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087). In light of the nature of the contraband sought to be seized and the reasonable belief, due to defendant's prior arrests and one conviction on firearm charges, that defendant might possess firearms, we find that the no-knock, all-hours provisions of the warrant were justified.
While defendant submitted an affidavit from Jones attacking the informant's veracity regarding both the presence of cocaine in defendant's apartment on February 11, 2000 and the informant's contention that Jones had told him following the arrest of Owens that the cocaine was still in defendant's apartment, such statements by Jones impugn the informant, but not the credibility of Miller, the police officer affiant. Defendant's argument that there was no basis for an all-hours, no-knock search warrant is meritless. Where, as here, there is probable cause to believe that a particular location contains saleable quantities of a controlled substance, which could be quickly destroyed, an all-hours, no-knock search warrant is justified (see People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 850-851, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087; People v. Roxby, 224 A.D.2d 864, 865, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 884). Finally, the assertion that City Court should have taken testimony before issuing a search warrant (see CPL 690.40) was not argued before County Court below and, therefore, was not properly preserved for review (see CPL 470.
We reject the contention of defendant that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized by the police pursuant to a search warrant. Contrary to defendant's contentions, the information provided by the confidential informant established probable cause to believe that cocaine was being sold at defendant's residence ( see, People v. Abron, 278 A.D.2d 919, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 797); the description of the premises on the warrant was sufficient to enable the executing officers to ascertain the premises intended ( see, People v. Davenport, 231 A.D.2d 809, 810, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 921); the information supporting the issuance of the warrant was not stale ( see, People v. Telesco, 207 A.D.2d 920, 921); and the warrant application set forth sufficient facts to justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant ( see, People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 850-851, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087). The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction and the verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence ( see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).
Memorandum: County Court properly denied the motion of defendant to suppress tangible evidence seized from his apartment pursuant to a search warrant that authorized any executing police officer to enter the apartment without giving notice of his authority and purpose ( see, CPL 690.35 [b]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the no-knock provision of the warrant was justified by more than the category of criminal activity under investigation ( cf., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388). Rather, the facts alleged in the warrant application provide reasonable cause to believe that the property sought, i.e., computer files, images and equipment, "may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of" (CPL 690.35 [b] [i]; see, People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 850-851, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087; People v. Israel, 161 A.D.2d 730, 731). The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
We also reject the contention in defendant's pro se brief that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the reliability of the confidential informant had not been established. Evidence of the confidential informant's controlled buy of drugs at defendant's apartment only days prior to the issuance of the warrant satisfied the reliability prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test (see, People v. Middleton, 283 A.D.2d 663, 665; People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, 851, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087; People v. Davenport, 231 A.D.2d 809, 810,lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 921). We are also unpersuaded by defendant's claims concerning the weight or sufficiency of the trial evidence.
Defendant's remaining contentions warrant but brief discussion. First, evidence of a police informant's controlled buy of crack cocaine from Stocks, which took place at approximately 5:00 P.M. on February 19, 1999 while she was staying at defendant's house, provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant (see, People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087). Although the controlled buy did not take place at defendant's residence, officers observed Stocks leave defendant's house immediately before meeting the informant and return there immediately after the sale (see, id.). Second, considering defendant's prior criminal record, the sentence imposed by County Court was by no means harsh and excessive. Defendant's remaining arguments have been considered and found to be unavailing. ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Furthermore, a seasoned police officer with over six years drug related experience requested that the warrant be executed by entry without prior notice of authority or purpose, because "in view of the fact that the nature of the property sought to be seized is crack cocaine, paraphernalia and/or other evidence that can be easily and readily disposed of or destroyed." See People v Kusse, 288 AD2d 860 (4th Dept 2001) People v Ackerman, 237 AD2d 849 (3d Dept 1997), lv denied 89 NY2d 1087 (1997), People v Skeete, 257 AD2d 426 [1st Dept 1999] where "no-knock" warrants were granted upon similar representations of easily disposable drugs. Accordingly, the court recited the disposability of the drugs in the order and executed the search warrant order with the "no-knock" provision.
Furthermore, a seasoned police officer with over six years drug related experience requested that the warrant be executed by entry without prior notice of authority or purpose, because “in view of the fact that the nature of the property sought to be seized is crack cocaine, paraphernalia and/or other evidence that can be easily and readily disposed of or destroyed.” See People v. Kusse, 288 A.D.2d 860 (4th Dept 2001)People v. Ackerman, 237 A.D.2d 849 (3d Dept 1997), lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1087 (1997), People v. Skeete, 257 A.D.2d 426 [1st Dept 1999] where “no-knock” warrants were granted upon similar representations of easily disposable drugs.Accordingly, the court recited the disposability of the drugs in the order and executed the search warrant order with the “no-knock” provision.
See NY Criminal Procedure Law § 690.35(4)(b); People v. Kusse, 288 AD2d 860 (4th Dep't 2001), lv. denied 97 NY2d 730 (2002); People v. Ackerman, 237 AD2d 849, 850-51 (3rd Dep't), lv. denied 89 NY2d 1087 (1997). Both justifications for a "no knock" provision exist in this case.