People v. Acevedo

38 Citing cases

  1. People v. Pruente

    2019 Ill. App. 170767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    In addition, defendant contends that his conviction of official misconduct must also be reversed because it was premised on a finding that he committed perjury. ΒΆ 42 To prove that a defendant committed the offense of perjury, the State must show that "(1) the defendant gave statements under oath or affirmation in any type of matter where the law requires an oath or affirmation; (2) the statements were false; (3) the statements were material to the issue or point in question at the proceeding in which the false statements were made; and (4) the defendant did not believe the statements to be true." People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 423 (1995). See also 720 ILCS 5/32-2(a) (West 2014).

  2. Taylor v. Police Board of the City of Chicago

    2011 Ill. App. 101156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 13 times

    ΒΆ 35 β€œMateriality is derived from the relationship between the proposition of the allegedly false statement and the issues in the case. [Citation.] The test of materiality for an allegedly perjured statement is whether the statement tends to prove or disprove an issue in the case.” People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill.App.3d 420, 423, 211 Ill.Dec. 926, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995). This determination β€œinvolves the relationship between an allegedly false statement and the nature of the proceedings at which it is made.”

  3. People v. Atchison

    2023 Ill. App. 4th 210510 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

    ΒΆ 10 At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis the State had not proved his false statement was material. Specifically, defendant argued his statement was not material because (1) he did not prevail on his motion to reduce bail and (2) the check did not affect his financial situation because it was assigned to his father. Defendant cited multiple cases to support his position, including Taylor v. Police Board, 2011 IL App (1st) 101156, 960 N.E.2d 750, People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill.App.3d 420, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995), and People v. Olinger, 245 Ill.App.3d 903, 615 N.E.2d 794 (1993). After hearing arguments, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, specifically noting the test for materiality is "whether the statement tends to disprove or prove an issue in the case" and "one of the issues [at the hearing on defendant's motion to reduce bail] was how much could the Defendant post to secure his release, that being a factor for the Court to consider." As to defendant's contention that his check was subject to an agreement with his father, the court found it had no evidence of the terms or rights under the purported May 15 agreement referenced in defendant's exhibit No. 1.

  4. People v. Page

    2016 Ill. App. 134009 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ΒΆ 25 The record shows that in making its sentencing decision, the trial court considered the same mitigating factors defendant brings to our attention. Although the court spoke in broad terms about the factors it considered, we observe that the trial court is not required to specifically identify all factors in mitigation that it considered (People v. Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d 916, 927 (2009); People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (1995)), nor is it required to recite and assign value to each factor presented at the sentencing hearing (People v. Baker, 241 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (1993)). Rather, it is presumed that the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors and rehabilitative potential before it, and the burden is on defendant to affirmatively show the contrary.

  5. People v. Bailey

    2015 Ill. App. 140776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ΒΆ 12 The record here shows that the court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the parties, and specifically noted that it considered that defendant was trying to better himself. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered the mitigating evidence before it (People v. Burnette, 325 Ill. App. 3d 792, 808 (2001)), including defendant's age, and also the financial impact of a lengthy incarceration (People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (1995)).ΒΆ 13 It is well-settled that a trial court is not required to specify on the record the reasons for its sentence (People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th) 110720, ΒΆ24; Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 426), nor give greater weight to defendant's rehabilitative potential than to the seriousness of the offense (People v. Phillips, 265 Ill. App. 3d 438, 450 (1994)).

  6. People v. Tabb

    2014 Ill. App. 130920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    It is well-established that a sentencing court is not required to specify on the record that it has considered the financial impact of a defendant's sentence. People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (2d Dist. 1995). Defendant failed to point out any affirmative evidence in the record that the trial court failed to consider the financial impact of his incarceration before sentencing him, and since a copy of the financial impact statement is provided to every sentencing court each year, and the statement is a matter of public record, absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered it before sentencing defendant.

  7. Collins v. Retirement Board

    334 Ill. App. 3d 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995). The statute must be read and considered as a whole such that each section of the statute is examined in relation to other sections and all words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.

  8. D.C. v. S.A

    283 Ill. App. 3d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 3 times

    * * * In considering legislative intent, courts 'must presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice, and select an interpretation of the statute which leads to logical results and avoids that which would be absurd.'" People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App.3d 420, 425-26, 656 N.E.2d 118, 122-23 (1995), quoting People v. Liberman, 228 Ill. App.3d 639, 647, 592 N.E.2d 575, 581 (1992). "Moreover, a court may properly consider not only the language used in the statute but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evil sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.

  9. People v. Moncrief

    276 Ill. App. 3d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 22 times
    In People v. Moncrief, 276 Ill. App. 3d 533, 536 (1995), this court held that the defendant, a parolee from the Department of Corrections who was on electronic home monitoring as a condition of parole, was committed to the Department of Corrections and thus was subject to consecutive sentencing.

    We conclude that a person on electronic home detention, as a condition of parole, is also committed to the Department of Corrections for the purpose of the mandatory sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(f) of the Code. Defendant's second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to consider the financial impact of his incarceration on the Department of Corrections. This issue is controlled by our recent decision in People v. Acevedo (1995), 275 Ill. App.3d 420. In Acevedo, we held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we will presume that the trial court performed its obligations and considered the financial impact statement before sentencing defendant. ( Acevedo, 275 Ill. App.3d at 426.)

  10. People v. Sims

    2021 Ill. App. 172580 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume the trial court considered this factor as well before sentencing defendant. See People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (1995). ΒΆ 23 In his reply brief, defendant argues that, given the state of Illinois correctional institutions following the COVID-19 pandemic, as an older inmate, he is at "extreme risk for infection and serious complications, including death." However, as this argument was raised for the first time in defendant's reply brief, it has been forfeited and we are unable to consider it.