The absence of proof of ownership has been often held to constitute reversible error. People v. Acevedo (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488, was a case of criminal trespass to a vehicle. The complaint charged defendant with trespass to a 1963 Chevrolet two-door automobile, setting forth the license plate number and vehicle identification number.
conclusion, we are not persuaded by the cases cited by defendant because they fall far short of the evidence presented in this case. See People v. Hope, 69 Ill. App. 3d 375, 380 (1979) (reversing conviction where the evidence established that a 1976 white Oldsmobile 98 was reported stolen and that the defendant was in a 1976 white Oldsmobile 98 without any other identifying information); People v. Stone, 75 Ill. App. 3d 571, 574 (1979) (reversing conviction for theft over $150 where the arresting officer testified that he "found a green car" and "ran a check on the license plates," revealing it was registered to the car-owner's last name, but did not offer any other identifying information, and many people could have that last name); People v. Fernandez, 204 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1990) (reversing conviction where the evidence established that a 1984 Mazda with a particular VIN was stolen and a witness saw the defendant with a red Mazda RX7 without any other identifying information); People v. Acevedo, 5 Ill. App. 3d 968, 969-70 (1972) (reversing conviction for criminal trespass to a vehicle where the car-owner testified that his 1963 Chevrolet was stolen but there was no identifying evidence that the defendant was in that particular vehicle). ¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 24 Affirmed. Officer Tlapa's first name does not appear in the record.
Case law interpreting the prior version of the statute held that "[i]dentity of the vehicle is a material element of the crime," meaning the State must prove that the vehicle which respondent entered into was the same vehicle described in the charging instrument. See People v. Acevedo, 5 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970 (1972); People v. Bunch, 36 Ill. App. 3d 235, 237 (1976). Respondent argues that the two versions of the statute are substantively identical and, as such, the case law holding that the State must prove identity of the vehicle remains good law, and that the State failed to meet its burden.
Finally, defendant asserts there was no evidence establishing that the auto in which he was allegedly a passenger was the same auto stolen from Gold. • 4 In order to convict defendant of criminal trespass to vehicle, the State must have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle in which defendant was riding was the vehicle owned by Gold. ( People v. Bunch (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 235, 343 N.E.2d 575; People v. Acevedo (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488 (identity of vehicle is material element of offense).) The evidence amply satisfies this identity requirement.
• 1 Defendant contends the State did not properly identify the vehicles and did not prove lack of authority or ownership of the vehicles. In People v. Acevedo (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488, cited by defendant, the arresting officer did not identify the vehicle other than as "a car with no light" and the court held the evidence did not prove the vehicle defendant entered was the same vehicle described in the complaint as the property of the complainant. In this case, the police officer identified the vehicles he saw at 1633 West Madison, as a 1964 Buick and a 1963 Chevrolet. The hoods of both vehicles were up. When Alberta Anderson identified the vehicle in that lot at 1633 West Madison Street shortly thereafter, the hood of her car was raised.
Allegation and proof of ownership are essential in a theft prosecution in order to establish all the material elements of the offense and to protect the defendant against the possibility of double jeopardy. People v. Walker, 7 Ill.2d 158, 130 N.E.2d 182; People v. Acevedo, 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488. The testimony from the victim of the robbery described the automobile used in the commission of the offense as a 1963 or 1964 white Chevy with license number LH 7576. The police officers involved in the apprehension of the defendant described the car as a 1962 white four door Chevy with license number LH 7576. Mr. Gaitor, named in the indictment as owner of the stolen vehicle, described his car as a 1962 Impala Automatic V-8 two-door Chevrolet.
( People v. White (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 129.) In People v. Acevedo (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488, on which defendants rely, there was no testimony by either the complaining witness or the arresting officer to establish that the vehicle in which the defendant was arrested was the one described in the complaint or that it was owned by the complaining witness. In this case, Mr. Molter's testimony connected the defendants to his car and the damage done to it.
Identity of the vehicle is a material element of the crime, and the State must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Acevedo, 5 Ill. App.3d 968, 284 N.E.2d 488. Here, we note that only two witnesses for the State gave any testimony concerning the identity of the vehicle.