Opinion
A145615
11-06-2019
In re A.C., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ15024946-01)
This case—which challenges the validity and constitutionality of a probation condition authorizing electronic searches—returns to us following a grant of review and transfer by the California Supreme Court. We complied with our high court's order directing us to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). We now dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Alameda County filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) in May 2015, alleging A.C. possessed a folding knife with a locking blade exceeding two and one-half inches, a violation of Penal Code section 21510, subdivision (b). On May 28, A.C. admitted the charge in the petition. The juvenile court declared A.C. a ward in June 2015 and placed him in the home of his mother under supervision of the juvenile probation department. The court imposed several probation terms and conditions, including the requirement that A.C. submit to searches of "any and all electronics including passwords."
A.C. promptly appealed. He challenged the electronic search condition under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), superseded on another ground in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290-295, and constitutional principles of overbreadth. We modified the challenged electronic search condition, but otherwise affirmed. (People v. A.C. (May 23, 2016, A145615 [nonpub. opn.], vacated Sept. 26, 2019.)
The California Supreme Court granted review (Aug. 10, 2016, S235565) and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Ricardo P. In August 2019, our high court decided Ricardo P. As relevant here, the court held an electronic search condition was invalid under the third prong of Lent where there was no evidence the defendant had used or would "use electronic devices in connection with . . . illegal activity." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116; see id. at pp. 1119-1120.) Ricardo P. did "not 'categorically invalidate electronic search conditions' in juvenile delinquency cases. [Citation.] . . . . The court held only that the broad search condition, as written and imposed by the juvenile court, was invalid under Lent because it was not reasonably related to [the defendant's] future criminality." (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 165-166.) After issuing its decision in Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court, directing us to vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Ricardo P. We vacated our opinion and received supplemental briefing. According to that supplemental briefing, A.C. turns 21 this month and is no longer being supervised on probation.
II. DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
According to the parties, the appeal is moot because A.C.'s probationary period has terminated and he will turn 21 this month. They are correct. The termination of a juvenile court ward's probationary period moots an appeal challenging probation conditions. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611 [termination of probation mooted complaints regarding probation conditions].) Because A.C. is no longer on probation, a ruling on the validity of the challenged probation condition would have no practical effect and would not provide him with effective relief.
We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal. Because our high court has spoken on the validity of a similar electronic search probation condition, this appeal does not present "a novel question of continuing public interest" (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232) or one "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (Ogunsalu v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 107, 111), such that its review notwithstanding mootness would be justified. No other exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
Sanchez, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Margulies, J.