Opinion
G054030
03-29-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DYLAN MICHAEL ABER, Defendant and Appellant.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. P02503) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Craig E. Robison, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In September of 2014, appellant Dylan Aber, who had been convicted of first degree burglary, was paroled. The conditions of his parole included that he violate no laws, possess no deadly weapon, and possess no knife with a blade longer than two inches.
On August 5, 2016, at 11:40 p.m., Costa Mesa police responded to a call from a homeowner who reported a man standing on his porch, banging on the door, with a machete in one hand and two steak knives in the other. Upon arrival, police found Aber, still holding the knives, sitting on the curb and muttering to himself. After examining him, they took him into custody for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Upon booking, they learned of Aber's status as a parolee and parole violation proceedings were initiated against him for violating the three parole conditions noted above.
At a violation hearing in which he was represented by counsel and fully advised of his rights, appellant admitted the violations. He was ordered to serve 180 days in county custody.
Aber appealed, and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case, but she was understandably perplexed by the task of setting forth an appellate argument. In the end, she gave up and filed a Wende brief (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436). In that brief, she did not argue against her client but told us she was unable to find an issue she could argue in his behalf.
Aber was given 30 days to file written argument in his own behalf. That time passed and no brief was filed. We have read counsel's brief and have scoured the record, including the very short transcript of the parole violation hearing, and we are unable to find any arguable appellate issue.
No case is "routine." Every case involves a different human being, and we look at every case and base our judgments on the unique facts presented. But we can certainly understand why appellate counsel could not find an arguable appellate issue. This is as straightforward and correct a process of parole revocation as we can imagine. There is simply nothing in Aber's case that varies in any way from a textbook handling of such matters. The underlying conviction was never questioned, the arrest was proper, the violation clear, the process correct, the judgment reasonable.
We find ourselves in agreement with appellate counsel that there are no appellate issues with a reasonable prospect of success with respect to Aber. The judgment is affirmed.
BEDSWORTH, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. ARONSON, J.