Stauffer v. People, No. 88CA0795 (Colo.App. Nov. 27, 1992), cert. denied, No. 93SC102 (Colo. July 12, 1993). As the hearing board concluded, the respondent's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), see People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo. 1991) ( Abelman II) (possession of cocaine by attorney violates DR 1-102(A)(3)); DR 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law); as well as C.R.C.P. 241.6(3) (misconduct involving any act or omission violating the highest standards of honesty, justice or morality is grounds for discipline); and C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) (any act or omission violating the criminal laws of a state or of the United States constitutes ground for lawyer discipline). The respondent also failed to report his criminal conviction as required by C.R.C.P. 241.16(b).
912 P.2d 556, 557-58 (Colo. 1996). In People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 863 (Colo. 1991) ( Abelman II), the court noted that the attorney did not cease his use of cocaine after his arrest on state drug charges and only sought treatment for his addiction after his second arrest on federal drug charges. In imposing a two-year suspension, the court found a number of mitigating factors but also found that the lawyer had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, had committed multiple offenses, and had substantial experience in the practice of law.
The respondent's misconduct therefore involved not only a serious crime, see C.R.C.P. 241.16(e), but also indifference to his professional obligations as an officer of the court. As we said in People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 863 (Colo. 1991): We are mindful that the primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the public, People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Colo.
The second is whether the transgressions are so remote in time that intervening developments and current circumstances dilute the public interest in proper and prompt discipline. Miss. Bar v. Thompson , 5 So. 3d 330, 339-40 (Miss. 2008) (quoting People v. Abelman , 804 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 1991) ). ¶10.
See also People v. Sheffer, No. GC98A112 (Colo.P.D.J. 1999) 29 Colo. Law. 145 (Sept, 1999) (holding that disbarment was presumptive sanction for violation of forgery statute, a class 5 felony, but factors in mitigation resulted in suspension for two years). In People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 863 (Colo. 1991), the Colorado Supreme Court stated: We are mindful that the primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the public, People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Colo.
"The commission of serious offenses involving the possession and use of illegal drugs warrants a substantial sanction." People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo. 1991). Under the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) (ABA Standards), in the absence of aggravating or mitigating factors, suspension is an appropriate sanction when "a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice." ABA Standards 5.12.
People v. Larsen, 808 P.2d 1265 (Colo. 1991); People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 862 n. 2 (Colo. 1991) (while disbarment is appropriate when an attorney sells, distributes, or imports illegal drugs, suspension is appropriate under all the circumstances). In Larsen, the respondent, an elected district attorney, received a three-year suspension for purchasing less than one-half ounce of marihuana to deliver to his wife.
The second is whether the transgressions are so remote in time that intervening developments and current circumstances dilute the public interest in proper and prompt discipline. Thompson , 5 So. 3d at 339–40 (quoting People v. Abelman , 804 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 1991) ). ¶ 16.
The second is whether the transgressions are so remote in time that intervening developments and current circumstances dilute the public interest in proper and prompt discipline.Thompson, 5 So.3d at 339–340 (quoting People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo.1991) (citing In re Silverman, 113 N.J. 193, 549 A.2d 1225, 1245–46 (1988))). ¶ 27.
The second is whether the transgressions are so remote in time that intervening developments and current circumstances dilute the public interest in proper and prompt discipline.People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Thompson's conduct reflects a continuing pattern of neglect as to her professional responsibilities.