People v. Santana, 255 P.3d 1126 (Colo. 2011) ; People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 1984). A court abuses its discretion only when inadmissible evidence is likely to have substantially prejudiced the jurors despite the use of any alternative remedies.

There can be no question that the trial court must grant a challenge for cause directed to a prospective juror who is unwilling or unable to accept the basic principles of law applicable to a criminal trial and to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence admitted at trial and the instructions of law given to the jury by the court. E.g., People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1984); People v. Wright, 672 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1983).

People v. Wright, 672 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1983) (abuse of discretion); Independence Coffee Spice Co. v. Kalkman, 61 Colo. 98, 156 P. 135 (1916) (abuse of discretion); Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922 (1958) (clear abuse of discretion); McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, 549 P.2d 1320 (manifest abuse of discretion); People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1984) (gross abuse of discretion). Notwithstanding this restrictive standard of appellate review, this court has held that an abuse of the trial court's discretion abridges a litigant's right to a fair and impartial jury and thus constitutes reversible error.

The "purpose of seating an alternate juror is to have available another juror when, through unforeseen circumstances, a juror is unable to continue to serve." People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Colo. 1984); see § 13-71-142, C.R.S. 2008 ("In all civil and criminal trials, the court may call and impanel alternate jurors to replace jurors who are disqualified or who the court may determine are unable to perform their duties prior to deliberation."); C.R.C.P. 47(b) ("Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.").

See, e.g., Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467, 475 (Colo. 1985) ("The statutory definition of second degree kidnapping merely requires movement of the victim from one place to another. . . .") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Colo. 1984) ("The defendant in the present case was charged with second degree kidnapping, and thus, `only movement of the victim from one place to another was required.'") (quoting People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 528 n. 18, 612 P.2d 1110, 1116 n. 18 (1980)); see also Yescas v. People, 197 Colo. 379, 381, 593 P.2d 358, 360 (1979). In no prior decision have we said that asportation must include substantially increasing a risk of harm to the victim, and we decline to do so in this case.

In this case, the People urge us to hold that a heightened or serious abuse of discretion standard be applied on appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause. See People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Colo. 1984); People v. Arevalo, 725 P.2d 41, 47 (Colo.App. 1986). See People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Colo.

in the first instance, vested in the trial judge: It is the trial court which hears the questions put to the juror and the answers given, observes the juror's demeanor while being questioned, and discerns the truthfulness, the sincerity, and the dedication to the high responsibility involved in being a fair and impartial juror. People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Colo. 1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb on appeal the trial court's decision to deny a challenge for cause.

When, through unforeseen circumstances, a juror becomes unable to continue to serve before the case is submitted to the jury, the trial court may direct that an alternate replace the regular juror. People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Colo. 1984). The United States Supreme Court has characterized as the "essential feature" of a jury the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.

A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a fundamental right to a trial by jurors who are fair and impartial; to ensure that right is protected, the trial court must exclude prejudiced or biased persons from the jury. E.g., People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1984); People v. Gurule, 628 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1981); Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 612 P.2d 79 (1980).

This standard recognizes that the trial judge is the only judicial officer able to assess fully the attitudes and state of mind of a potential juror by personal observation of the significance of what linguistically may appear to be inconsistent or self-contradictory responses to difficult questions. See People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356; People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1984); People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, 549 P.2d 1320 (1976); Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337, 565 P.2d 1340 (1977). An expression of concern by a potential juror regarding some facet of the case or about jury service should not result in the automatic exclusion of such person for cause.