Opinion
Argued December 6, 1999
February 3, 2000
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Finnegan, J.), rendered May 15, 1996, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, resisting arrest, criminal mischief in the third degree, and criminal contempt in the second degree (four counts), upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 12 1/2 to 25 years for attempted murder, 3 1/2 to 7 years for assault, 3 1/2 to 7 years for reckless endangerment, and 2 to 4 years for criminal mischief, and determinate terms of imprisonment of 90 days for leaving the scene of an accident and one year for resisting arrest, all to run concurrently with each other, and definite sentences of one year imprisonment for each conviction for criminal contempt in the second degree to run consecutively to each other and to the sentence imposed for attempted murder.
Steven R. Kartagener, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Thomas S. Berkman of counsel), for respondent.
FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that the terms of imprisonment for the defendant's convictions of criminal contempt in the second degree shall run concurrently with each other and with the sentence imposed on the conviction of attempted murder in the second degree; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5]).
However, as correctly conceded by the prosecution, the four definite one year sentences imposed upon the defendant for the four convictions of criminal contempt should merge by operation of law and run concurrently with the indeterminate sentence imposed on the conviction of attempted murder. Penal Law § 70.35 provides that "service of an indeterminate * * * sentence * * * shall satisfy any definite sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person for an offense committed prior to the time the indeterminate * * * sentence was imposed", and "contemplates that the definite and indefinite sentences will be served concurrently" (see, People v. Leabo, 84 N.Y.2d 952 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., S. MILLER, LUCIANO, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.