Opinion
357183
03-24-2022
In re FORFEITURE OF 2006 SATURN ION v. 2006 SATURN ION, Defendant, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, and STEPHANIE WILSON, Claimant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-014106-CF
Before: O'Brien, P.J., and Shapiro and Boonstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this forfeiture action, plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting claimant's motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 24, 2021, claimant received a call from Malcolm Smith requesting a ride. According to claimant, she drove her 2006 Saturn Ion to Detroit, Michigan, parked in front of a gas station on Lumley Street, and Smith came up from behind and got into the vehicle. Claimant testified that, afterwards, she drove a short distance and was pulled over moments later by Sergeant Chivas Rivers of the Wayne County Sheriff's Office, who had been surveilling a house on Lumley for narcotics activity.
Rivers' account of the stop differed from claimant's. According to Rivers, claimant and Smith drove up to and parked in front of the house on Lumley that Rivers was surveilling for narcotics activity, and while they were parked, an unknown black male approached the passenger side of claimant's vehicle and "reached his arm into the window in what appeared to be a hand to hand drug transaction." After claimant pulled away from the house, Rivers stopped the vehicle and interviewed claimant and Smith. According to Rivers, Smith said that he was there to purchase $10 worth of heroin, and claimant confirmed "that she was transporting Mr. Smith down there to purchase narcotics from the Lumley address . . . ." Claimant, for her part, denied making these statements. After interviewing claimant and Smith, Rivers found five empty syringes under the passenger seat, but no drugs. Nevertheless, the vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, on October 23, 2019, forfeiture proceedings were initiated by plaintiff under MCL 333.7521 et seq.
Following discovery, claimant moved for summary disposition on three grounds. Claimant asserted that she was entitled to summary disposition under (1) MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on plaintiff's failure to promptly file its complaint for forfeiture, (2) MCR 2.116(C)(8) based on plaintiff's failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and (3) MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was no material factual dispute and claimant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At the hearing on claimant's motion, the trial court questioned counsel from each party about the facts surrounding the seizure of the vehicle. The court acknowledged that Rivers appeared to witness a "hand-to-hand transaction," but noted that "people can come and go and go up to a car and hand a lot of things over," and the car was stopped only "a couple minutes later" and "no drugs" were found. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted claimant's motion for summary disposition without specifying under which subrule it was ruling.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, a motion to stay, and an ex parte motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied these motions and directed plaintiff to release claimant's vehicle immediately. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Hoffner v Lactoe, 492 Mich. 450, 459; 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court considers "all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." McLain v Lansing Fire Dep't, 309 Mich.App. 335, 340; 869 N.W.2d 645 (2015). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint" and "[a]ll well-plead allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant." Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). For review of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers "affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Sanders v Perfecting Church, 303 Mich.App. 1, 4; 840 N.W.2d 401 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich. 419, 425; 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008).
To the extent that this appeal asks this Court to review the interpretation of a statute, "[t]his Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo." Herald Co, Inc v Eastern Mich. Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 470; 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006).
III. VEHICLE FORFEITURE
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In response, claimant argues that the trial court not only granted her motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), but also under subrules (C)(7) and (C)(8), and she argues that plaintiff's failure to brief arguments related to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) constitutes an abandonment of these issues. We disagree with plaintiff's assertion that the trial court granted her motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (C)(8). Although claimant argued that she was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), the trial court appears to only have decided the case on MCR 2.116(C)(10) grounds. For claimant's contentions related to MCR 2.116(C)(7), the trial court made no mention of those arguments during the motion hearing or in its order following the hearing, therefore the record lacks any finding that plaintiff failed to promptly file its complaint for forfeiture, as claimant argued. As for claimant's arguments related to MCR 2.116(C)(8), it appears that the trial court did not grant summary disposition under that subrule because the court considered evidence outside the pleadings during the hearing on claimant's motion. See Steward v Panek, 251 Mich.App. 546, 554-555; 652 N.W.2d 232 (2002) (explaining that a motion will not be considered to have been decided under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings). Consequently, by only contesting the trial court's order on MCR 2.116(C)(10) grounds, plaintiff disputed the basis for the trial court's ruling, and plaintiff was not otherwise required to argue on appeal that summary disposition was not warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (C)(8) in order to obtain appellate relief.
Turning to the remaining dispute on appeal, plaintiff alleges that claimant's vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). That subsection provides in relevant part that "a conveyance, including an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of [a controlled substance]," is subject to forfeiture. MCL 333.7521(1)(d). In other words, under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a "vehicle which, if used to facilitate any prohibited transaction concerning illicit drugs, is subject to forfeiture." People v One 1979 Honda Auto, Vin No 284S2150186 , 139 Mich.App. 651, 655; 362 N.W.2d 860 (1984). See also In re Forfeiture of One 1985 Mercedes Benz, 174 Mich.App. 203, 205; 435 N.W.2d 426 (1988).
"While generally forfeitures are not favored in the law, since § 7521 is embodied in article 7 of the Public Health Code, it must be liberally interpreted in order to promote the health, safety, and welfare of Michigan citizens." In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, 183 Mich.App. 182, 184; 454 N.W.2d 201 (1990).
The trial court reasoned that, despite Rivers seeing what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, "people can come and go and go up to a car and hand a lot of things over," and ultimately "no drugs" were found when the car was stopped "a couple minutes later." That is, the trial court seemed to conclude that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to establish a question of fact about whether claimant's vehicle was used to transport drugs as part of a prohibited drug transaction that would subject the vehicle to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, we believe that this conclusion is untenable. Rivers testified that while surveilling a "known drug house," he saw claimant park her car outside the home, and watched as someone from the home approached the vehicle and "reached his arm into the window in what appeared to be a hand to hand drug transaction." Claimant then drove off. According to Rivers, when he stopped the vehicle shortly thereafter, both Smith and claimant admitted that they went to the house to purchase heroin. On the basis of this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that claimant used her vehicle to drive to a "drug house" intending to purchase heroin, her passenger purchased some heroin, and then claimant drove off with the heroin in the vehicle. If proven, these facts would establish that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d).
Claimant argues on appeal that her vehicle was only used to bring Smith "to a location where he bought and used drugs," seeming to imply that she never drove the vehicle with the heroin in it. That is, she seems to argue that she never transported the heroin. While it is true that no drugs were found in the car when it was stopped shortly after it pulled away from the "drug house," no evidence established when Smith used the heroin. A reasonable factfinder could infer that Smith used the heroin in the short time between when claimant drove away from the house and when Rivers stopped claimant.
The majority concludes that it does not need to address whether 1987 Chevrolet Blazer was rightly decided because the prosecution has not argued that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f). But while the prosecution does not expressly rely on MCL 333.7521(1)(f), it implicitly does so by relying on 1987 Chevrolet Blazer.
Plaintiff contends on appeal that this conclusion is buttressed by this Court's decision in In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, 183 Mich.App. 182. It is not. In that case, the plaintiff conceded that the vehicle was never used to transport controlled substances, but argued that it was still subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f). Id. at 183-184. This Court agreed that the text of subsection (f) supported that a vehicle would be subject to forfeiture under the facts of that case, and further concluded that subsection (f) and (d) did not conflict because "§ 7521(1)(f) addresses contingencies in addition to those provided for in § 7521(1)(d), such as here, where the Blazer may have been used to facilitate the sale or receipt of a controlled substance not by actual transportation of the controlled substance to a customer but rather by transportation of the customer to the controlled substance." Plaintiff here has not argued that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f), so we offer no opinion on whether that subsection would support forfeiture in this case or whether In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Chevrolet Blazer was rightly decided.
§ 505(a)(4) authorizes forfeiture for "all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) . . . ."
Claimant argues that even under these facts, MCL 333.7521(1)(d) cannot support forfeiture because the evidence only supports that claimant's vehicle was used to transport an individual to buy drugs, not to transport drugs. We disagree. As explained, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff-as it must be at this stage in the proceedings-a reasonable factfinder could infer that claimant used her vehicle to transport the heroin after Smith purchased it. That is, we do not interpret plaintiff's action as seeking to subject claimant's vehicle to forfeiture merely for transporting a person who intended to purchase or did purchase illicit drugs.
As previously explained, in her motion for summary disposition, claimant raised additional claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) that the trial court failed to address. While we conclude that the trial court erred in granting claimant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we remand to the trial court to consider the other potentially meritorious grounds for summary disposition-particularly claimant's argument under MCR 2.116(C)(7)-that claimant raised in her dispositive motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reversed and remanded to the trial court to make a determination whether claimant's motion for summary disposition should have been granted on one of the other grounds raised in her motion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Douglas B. Shapiro, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the grant of summary disposition on the basis that the forfeiture statute does not apply when the vehicle is used to transport an individual to procure a small amount of drugs that is immediately consumed.
MCL 333.7521(1)(d) generally authorizes the forfeiture of a "conveyance, including an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation . . . of property described in subdivision (a) or (b)." The "property described in subdivision (a) or (b)" includes controlled substances and the materials used to produce them. MCL 333.7521(1)(a)-(b).
Applied to this case, to be subject to forfeiture, claimant's vehicle must have been used, or intended to have been used, for the transportation of drugs. As claimant argues, however, even if the testimony of Sergeant Chivas Rivers is accepted as true, the prosecution has produced no evidence that her vehicle was used to transport illegal drugs. According to the officer, he observed an alleged hand-to-hand transaction involving claimant's vehicle. Shortly after the vehicle pulled away, Rivers initiated a traffic stop on the basis of claimant not using a turn signal. It is undisputed that a search of the vehicle and its occupants produced no drugs. Indeed, Malcolm Smith's alleged comments to the officer indicates that he already consumed the $10 of heroin that he had purchased by the time of the stop.
Thus, in no sense was claimant's vehicle used for the transportation of drugs. The word "transportation" denotes traveling from one place to another. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (defining "transportation" in part as "means of conveyance or travel from one place to another"). Here, the vehicle did not move the drugs from one location to another. Rather, the vehicle was used to transport an individual to a drug sale, upon which the drugs were immediately (or nearly immediately) consumed.
The prosecution maintains that vehicles used as transportation to and from a drug sale are subject to forfeiture, even if the vehicle was not used to transport controlled substances. In support of this position, the prosecutor relies on In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, 183 Mich.App. 182; 454 N.W.2d 201 (1990), which is nonbinding precedent on this Court because it was decided before November 1, 1990, MCR 7.215(J)(1). In that case, the claimant used his vehicle to transport customers to and from the home of an illegal drug dealer, but there was no evidence that the vehicle was actually used to transport controlled substances. 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, 183 Mich.App. at 182. This Court held that the vehicle could be subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f)-rather than MCL 333.7521(1)(d)-which authorizes forfeiture of:
Any thing of value that is furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, or used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities.
The Court concluded that "the property in question here is subject to forfeiture if the people can prove a 'substantial connection' between the seized property and the alleged criminal activity." Id. at 185, quoting In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich. 242, 260-262; 439 N.W.2d 246 (1989) (construing MCL 333.7521(1)(f) as applied to real property). The Court did not view MCL 333.7521(1)(f) as being in conflict with MCL 333.7521(1)(d), reasoning that MCL 333.7521(1)(f) "addresses contingencies in addition to those provided for in § 7521(1)(d), such as here, where the [vehicle] may have been used to facilitate the sale or receipt of a controlled substance not by actual transportation of the controlled substance to a customer but rather by transportation of the customer to the controlled substance." Id. at 185.
I do not find 1987 Chevrolet Blazer persuasive and would decline to follow it. The forfeiture of vehicles that are used to transport drugs is squarely controlled by MCL 333.7521(1)(d). And it is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that "[a]ll other things being equal, a more specific statutory provision controls over a more general statutory provision[.]" Telford v State, 327 Mich.App. 195, 199; 933 N.W.2d 347 (2019). Thus, I see no basis to ignore the requirements of MCL 333.7521(1)(d) and apply a separate, more general statutory provision. This Court's brief analysis of this issue in 1987 Chevrolet Blazer is unconvincing.
The majority does not rely on Chevrolet Blazer or MCL 333.7521(1)(f), 1 but instead seems to conclude that, so long as drugs were transported in the vehicle for some infinitesimal period of time, the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). I cannot agree with this reading of the statute.
"Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act." People v Zitka, 325 Mich.App. 38, 49; 922 N.W.2d 696 (2018). See also People v Reed, 294 Mich.App. 78, 84; 819 N.W.2d 3 (2011) ("[S]tatutes should be construed so as to avoid absurd results.").
The forfeiture provisions of Michigan's controlled substances act, MCL 333.7101 et seq., are based on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. See In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich. at 255-256. See also MCL 333.7121(2) ("This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among those states which enact laws similar to it."). Relevant here, MCL 333.7521(1)(d) is nearly identical to § 505(a)(4) of Uniform Controlled Substances Act (1970).2 The comment to § 505 clarifies that the purpose of the provision is to disrupt drug trafficking:
Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this Act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility. [Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Controlled Substances Act (1970), § 505 comment.]
That the forfeiture provisions are aimed at drug traffickers is also clear from the Legislature including in "aircrafts" and "vessels" (which in this context I take to mean watercraft) in the list of conveyances. MCL 333.7521(1)(d). These are modes of transportation that, along with vehicles, are commonly associated with the transportation of large quantities of drugs. Indeed, it is safe to say that the Legislature was not concerned with individuals using aircrafts and vessels to obtain small amounts of drugs for personal use. In any event, it is clear that confiscation of claimant's vehicle has not hindered drug traffickers. Instead, as the trial court reasoned, the only effect appears to have been making it more difficult for claimant to buy groceries for her family.
Acknowledging that the forfeiture provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act are aimed at drug traffickers rather than mere users, several state courts have disallowed forfeiture of property based on possession of controlled substances for personal use. See generally 1 ALR 5th 375. We need not decide this issue here, however, because even if MCL 333.7521(1)(d) applies to conveyances used to transport drugs for personal use, there was no transportation of drugs in this case, for the reasons already discussed.