Opinion
April 24, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Burton G. Hecht, J.).
Petitioner waived his right to counsel at a final parole revocation hearing after appropriate inquiry by the Administrative Law Judge and advisement and acknowledgment of the dangers and disadvantages of going forth in such a proceeding without benefit of counsel (cf., People ex rel. Perez v. Warden, 139 A.D.2d 477).
Petitioner was given appropriate 14-day notice of his final revocation hearing, in accordance with Executive Law § 259-i (3) (f) (iii). The fact that the final revocation hearing was subsequently adjourned, and that petitioner did not receive a separate 14-day notice with regard to the adjourned date, did not prejudice his ability to prepare his defense therefor (People ex rel. Medina v. Superintendent, 101 A.D.2d 871; People ex rel. Wentsley v. Hammock, 89 A.D.2d 1058). Only where the adjourned date falls outside the 90 days required for bringing on such a proceeding (Executive Law § 259-i [f] [i]) is such an adjournment rendered invalid (People ex rel. Campbell v. Meloni, 139 A.D.2d 947; Matter of Jackson v. Hammock, 82 A.D.2d 888). The better practice would have been when a relator appears pro se, that he be given prior notice of the adjourned date.
Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Sullivan, Ross, Carro and Kassal, JJ.