This Court has explicitly and consistently held that a patient's medical records are confidential communications within the meaning of the physician-patient privilege. See Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659, 662 (S.D.1986) ("[T]reatment records are also protected by the [physician-patient] privilege."); Maynard v. Heeren, 1997 S.D. 60, ¶¶ 7–15, 563 N.W.2d 830, 833–36 (applying physician-patient privilege and exceptions to psychological records of plaintiff-litigant), abrogated on other grounds, Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, ¶¶ 34–35, 883 N.W.2d 725, 737–38 ; State v. Stuck, 434 N.W.2d 43, 53–54 (S.D.1988) (applying physician-patient privilege and exceptions to victim's medical records); People ex rel. D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 647–49 (S.D.1976) (applying physician-patient privilege and exceptions to hospital records of infant). Despite the majority's attempt to relabel the documents sought in this case as merely "information," the circuit court ordered the production of medical records belonging to several hundred patients —i.e., confidential communications—unrelated to this litigation.

Our holding is consistent with a recent South Dakota opinion. In People v. Interest of D. K., 245 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1976), the South Dakota Supreme Court found a prematurely-born child deprived on the grounds that the child's mother neglected her child's special needs: "Admittedly, this is a close case; there is no physical abuse of the child in the usual sense which makes for any easy decision.

The constitutionality of SDCL 26-8-6 has withstood attack on at least three occasions. Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975), People in Interest of D.K., S.D., 245 N.W.2d 644 (1976), Matter of N.J.W., N.G.B., and K.F.B., S.D., 273 N.W.2d 134 (1978). In N.J.W., supra, we reiterated the holdings of D.T., supra, and D.K., supra.

Public policy encourages "uninhibited communication between a physician and his patient ... to insure the free flow of health care, absent any fears on the patient's part that anything he says might later be used against him." People ex rel. D.K. , 245 N.W.2d 644, 648 (S.D. 1976). The disadvantage of limiting available evidence through privileges is balanced against the public policy favoring the privilege.

] In reviewing abuse and neglect findings by the trial court, it is our duty to "uphold the trial court's decision unless the findings of fact are `clearly erroneous'." Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 649 (S.D. 1976) (citing Matter of D.T., 237 N.W.2d 166 (S.D. 1975); In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970)). Therefore, the trial court's decision will be set aside only if after a review of all the evidence, we are left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

The requisite care and control called for by a minimum standard of parenting must necessarily fluctuate with the kind of children being parented. There is no absolute standard"]; People in Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644 [SD]; see also, Matter of Scott G., 124 A.D.2d 928 [definition of neglect sufficiently elastic to embrace situations in which a parent allows the child to become impaired]).

It is a privilege that seeks to insure the free flow of health care, absent any fears on the patient's part that anything he says might later be used against him. People ex rel. D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 648 (S.D. 1976) (internal citation omitted). [¶ 9.] The psychotherapist privilege in South Dakota is encompassed within the physician-patient privilege contained in SDCL 19-13-7: "[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his . . . mental or emotional condition[.]"

SDCL 26-8-22.2 calls for appointment of counsel for the child in the discretion of the court. It is within the inherent power of the court to protect the interests of a child in a dependency and neglect proceeding. People in Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1976). Accordingly, the decision to appoint counsel for the child is properly within the court's discretion.

They contend that no alternatives were considered because Social Services concluded that their poverty was a permanent condition and argue that under Matter of B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91 (S.D. 1979), their parental rights should not be disturbed without a clear showing of gross parental misconduct or unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the children's welfare. The parents also cite In the Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1976), to point out that this court must focus on the harm to the child in considering the alternatives. We have reviewed and outlined above the trial court's dispositional findings of fact which outline the parents' failure to exercise visitation rights, failure to cooperate with Social Services, failure to improve parenting skills, failure to obtain continued employment in order to provide family income, failure to provide adequate housing, failure to address two of the children's speech and learning problems, all of which are substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

We hold that the trial court's finding that P.B. was a dependent and neglected child is more than adequately supported by the evidence, and is thus not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Matter of S.H., 337 N.W.2d 179 (S.D. 1983); People in Interest of P.M., 299 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1980); People in Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1976). Given the situation in which Department found P.B. on June 4, 1984, any other finding by the trial court would have been unthinkable.